The principal question to decide in this case is whether, as the plaintiff contends and the trial  court has held, the defendant waived his  right to  warranty.   The  judgment appealed from accordingly sentences the defendant to complete the full selling price by paying P8,000 to the plaintiff, with legal interest from August 15, 1927,  and the costs, and denies him the P68,000 which he claims as damages for lack of such warranty.

The defendant maintains that the so-called waiver of his right to  warranty in case  of eviction was not made with full knowledge of the risks and consequences thereof, and therefore he impugns the judgment of the  court below, making^ several assignments of error.

The facts of the case are:

On July 14, 1920, the plaintiff executed a deed of sale to the defendant conveying a parcel of  land  consisting of some 659 hectares  in area situated in the municipality of Paniqui,  Tarlac, and  five carabaos, for P13,500, of which the defendant paid P5,500 and promised to pay the balance of P8,000 on or before the month of March, 1921.

By that deed of sale, which is Exhibit 3, the defendant waived his right to warranty  in  case  of eviction, in the following terms:

"It is hereby also covenanted and agreed by both parties that the  vendee waives warranty in case of eviction from the property sold, to which he has a right by virtue of this sale, against the vendor Leocadia Angelo."

In 1924, wishing to dispose freely of the land but  prohibited  from  doing so  by  a certain clause  in the deed marked  Exhibit  3, the  defendant asked the  plaintiff to sign another deed eliminating that prohibition, and so Exhibit 4 was executed on June 18,  1924.  The second deed of sale also provided for the waiver of warranty in case of eviction in the following terms:

"It  is  also covenanted and agreed by both parties  that the vendee, Cipriano Pacheco, waives warranty in case of eviction from the property sold, to  which he has a right by virtue of this sale, against the vendor Leocadia Angelo, and undertakes to recognize any lien on said  property."

On the same date the defendant executed the promissory note marked  Exhibit A,  for P8,000 payable in three years from the  date  thereof, and secured the payment of that amount with a real estate mortgage evidenced by Exhibit B.

But the land which the plaintiff sold to the defendant through the deeds marked Exhibits 3 and 4  was at that time the subject of litigation as follows:

On July 2, 1920, or about twelve days  before the sale of the realty through Exhibit 3, the plaintiff had instituted proceedings for the registration of said land.  The defendant was aware of this action when the sale took place on the 14th of the month that year, and  he had even been told  by Attorney  Natividad  who the probable opponents would be.   From that time on the defendant was in charge of the registration proceeding,  the plaintiff taking no part therein, and he succeeded in obtaining judgment  on September 20, 1923, decreeing the registration of the land in the name of Leocadia Angelo, whose name had been retained as  that of the party applicant.

On July 18,  1924, the proper decree was issued in the name of the plaintiff.   A month had already elapsed when the deed of sale, Exhibit 4, and the promissory note, Exhibit A, as well as the mortgage, Exhibit B, had been executed.

On October  6th  that same year, i. e.,  1924, a  motion for the review of  the  decree was filed by  the Director of Lands and by two large groups of private opponents.

On May 25, 1925, when the defendant, Cipriano Pacheco already appeared as the owner of the property, with a certificate  of title, he filed his answers to the petitions for review, and after  a hearing thereon, the  court set aside on June 23, 1925, the decree issued  to Leocadia  Angelo, the plaintiff herein, and the transfer  certificate of title in the name  of the defendant Cipriano Pacheco.

From that decision an appeal was taken  both  by the latter and by Lucia F.  de Valle Cruz to whom  the property had been sold by Cipriano Pacheco, the Supreme Court on December 31,  1926,¹ affirmed  the  order setting aside the decree and the transfer certificate of title, but "declaring that the appellant Lucia F. de Valle Cruz, or her successors in interest, shall have a lien upon the land" for the sum of P15,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from July 23,  1924,  and with  the right to foreclose  the mortgage, in default of  payment, as provided in sections 254-259 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except that in  the sale under such foreclosure, the portions of the land  occupied by  the  petitioners for  review  should not be sold until the portions not so  occupied have been sold and  the proceeds of the sale found insufficient for the satisfaction of the lien.  In all other  respects, the appealed  order was affirmed.  (Exhibit 1.)

Later  on Lucia  F. de  Valle Cruz  brought  an  action against Cipriano Pacheco and  obtained  judgment  in  the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in civil case No. 2459 on January 31, 1928, for the same mortgage credit of P15,000 with the interest mentioned above.  (Exhibit D.)

The question now is: Does the warranty obligation still bind the plaintiff as the vendor of that land?  The defend- ant's formal and express  waiver  of  warranty in case of eviction,  set forth in Exhibit 3 and reiterated in Exhibit 4 under the authority of  the last paragraph of article 1475 in the Civil Code, answers this  question in the negative.

The defendant argues  that such a waiver is void under article 1476 of the Code  mentioned because there was bad faith on the vendor's part, inasmuch as in selling the land, she knew that it did not belong to her and she did not even have possession thereof.   But  the record  does  not bear out this imputation.   And in his answer to the petition  for the reopening of the decree, the defendant himself swore to the contrary, saying that when the vendor sold the land, which  she had  acquired in good faith,  she firmly believed that Pedro  Eugenio from whom  she  had bought  it, was the owner in fee simple.   (Exhibit 2, page 86.)

The counsel for the appellant invites our attention to a passage in this court's decision, Exhibit 1,  with reference to the trial  court's finding in the reopening of the decree, to the  effect that Leocadia  Angelo  obtained  the  decree through fraud and that the sale of the land to the defendant herein was not made in good  faith.  Note that  with reference to the decree the record shows that it was the defendant who obtained it, without a personal intervention on the plaintiff's part.   And with respect to  the sale of the  land not in  good faith,  such  a passage is  a mere statement made by this court of certain findings of the court below. In that case this court  never said  that Leocadia Angelo sold the land in question to the defendant in bad faith.

The appellant also cites in  his brief the following paragraph from this  court's decision in that case,  Exhibit 1:

"If that allegation is  true, and we must so assume in the absence of a denial, the applicant was guilty of a deliberate misrepresentation  which tended to prevent  the adverse claimants or occupants  from receiving formal notice of the  registration proceedings and from asserting their rights."

To begin  with, the evidence  in  this case  shows  that Leocadia Angelo  took no part in the proceedings  of the reopening of the decree; that it was  Cipriano Pacheco  himself, the defendant herein, who did so,  and who is therefore to blame for not entering the  denial for lack of which this court assumed  that allegation to be true.  In  the  second place, even assuming for a moment that the deliberate  misrepresentation to which this court referred were chargeable to Leocadia Angelo, such a falsehood in connection with the registration proceeding has nothing to  do with the eviction or its antecedents and consequences.   The bad  faith which annuls the waiver according to article  1476, invoked by appellant's counsel, must bear some relation to  the fact or facts  giving  rise  to  eviction.  Manresa, that authoritative commentator, thus expresses himself on this point:

"What does the vendor's bad faith  consist in?  In  our opinion, it  consists in his knowing beforehand at the  time of the sale of the presence of the fact giving rise to eviction and  its possible consequences."  (Commentaries  on  the Spanish  Civil Code,  by Manresa,  Vol. X, page  194,  3d edition.)

The  judgment appealed from is assailed in so far as it holds that when the deed of sale Exhibit 3, was executed, the land thereby  conveyed  had already been  registered under the Torrens system and the petitions for review were pending hearing.  This holding is,  indeed inaccurate; but such an error has not affected the case  in the court below, the decision  being  based not upon this inexactitude, but upon the defendant's complete and absolute waiver of warranty  for eviction, and upon  the  failure of evidence to show that the plaintiff acted  in bad faith in conveying the realty.

Furthermore, not only did the defendant make a formal and express waiver of warranty for eviction,  but perhaps because he was  convinced that he  had waived  that  right entirely he  failed  to notify the vendor, plaintiff  herein, or to have her summoned for the reopening of the decree, when he should have done so  because  he was  in  danger of losing the property, as he indeed did.  For failure of that notice, the plaintiff is not  bound to warranty, according to  article 1481  of the Civil Code.

The  other  assignments of error are groundless.

Finding no sufficient reason  for altering the  dispositive part of the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety.  The costs shall  be charged to  the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña,  C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm,  Villamor, Ostrand,  Villa-Real, and Imperial,  JJ.,  concur.

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¹ Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil., 838.