This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by  Pedro Marquez Lim Cay (alias Pedro Marquez Lim), Jose Marquez Lim, Concordia Asency, and P. Marquez Lim, Inc., against Simplicio del  Rosario, as  Judge of the  Court  of First Instance of Manila, Koo Ang Cho and Ang Chay, the latter being administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Lim Cay Til, praying for  a preliminary injunction  against the respondent judge, or his successor, and against each of the other  respondents,  enjoining  them to abstain  from taking any action in  civil case No. 37757 of the Court of First  Instance of Manila until the  disposal of  the present case, and, after  proper proceedings thisr court  declare null and void the order of the respondent judge dated January 27, 1931, which vacated  his former order dismissing said case No. 37757 for lack  of jurisdiction, and permitted the respondents herein, as plaintiffs in that cause, to file an amended complaint, on the ground that the aforesaid  order of January 27,  1931, was  rendered not only with  serious abuse of discretion and in excess of its authority and powers, but without any jurisdiction whatsoever.

The relevant facts necessary for the  solution  of the questions raised in the present case and about  which  there is no  controversy, are as follows:

On  August 5, 1930, the respondents Koo Ang Cho and Ang Chay filed a complaint against the petitioner Pedro Marquez Lim Cay wherein it is prayed  for a judgment com- pelling the latter to render an accounting of the conjugal property which he held  in trust for them, together with all the rents, income, interest and  fruits thereof from the dissolution of the conjugal partnership between Pedro Marquez Lim Keng and Koo  Ang Cho, and ordering a partition of said conjugal property,  in  accordance with  the law, be- tween the surviving spouse and the children of said Lim Cay Til, represented by their  administratrix, and by the defend- ant, after  the latter  has rendered  an  accounting (Exhibit A).

On August 8, 1930, the defendants in that case and petitioners herein telegraphed Carlos A. Imperial, as judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, asking him to  order the sheriff of the judge of the Court  of First Instance of Iloilo to accept the bond which they were willing to give for the dissolution  of the attachment  issued in said case No. 37757 (Exhibit 1).

On August 9,1930, the plaintiffs in that case and respondents herein amended their complaint, adding the name of Pedro Marquez Lim as an alias to the defendant's  name Pedro Marquez Lim Cay (Exhibit B).

On August  11,  1930, said  plaintiffs in that case and respondents herein filed another amended complaint including the firm of P.  Marquez Lim, Inc., as party defendant, with the consequent allegations (Exhibit C).

On August  19, 1930, the defendants  in that cause and petitioners herein filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts therein alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause  of  action,  inasmuch as  there  was no description of the  property sought to be partitioned, and praying that said demurrer be sustained and the complaint dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs (Exhibit D).

On the said day, that is,  August 19, 1930, said defendants filed a motion  for the dissolution  of the attachment levied upon said property (Exhibit 12).

On September 5, 1930,  the  Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order sustaining said demurrer and requiring the plaintiffs to amend their complaint within thirty days and to describe therein the property sought to be partitioned  (Exhibit E).

On September 15, 1930, said defendants filed a motion praying for the  approval  of the bond they had furnished for the dissolution of the  attachment (Exhibit 14).

On October 6, 1930, the plaintiffs in that cause and respondents herein  filed an amended complaint describing the property sought to be partitioned, and including Jose Marquez Lim  and  Concordia Asency as parties  defendant (Exhibit F).

On October  16,  1930, the defendants in that cause and petitioners herein  filed, by way of special  appearance, a motion  to dismiss  the complaint  with costs against the plaintiffs, on the ground that  the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case (Exhibit G).

On December 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Manila,  presided  over by the  respondent,  Simplicio del Rosario, granting said motion, issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try the case  (Exhibit H).

On December 19, 1930, the plaintiffs in that  case and respondents herein took exception to that order and filed a motion praying for the reconsideration or said  order of December 15, 1930, and that the plaintiffs be granted  a period of thirty days within which to amend their complaint (Exhibit I).

On December 23, 1930, the  defendants filed in  the  same case a motion asking that the damages which they  sustained by the undue and unjust issuance  of  the  attachment be determined  (Exhibit 15).

On December 26, 1930, the defendants in  that cause and petitioners herein filed a motion opposing, for the reasons therein given, the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and praying the court to deny the same (Exhibit J).

On January 27,  1931, the Court of First Instance of Manila, then presided over by the said respondent,  Simplicio del  Rosario, entered an order denying  the  cancellation of the bond furnished by the defendants and of the Us pendens notice made by the registrars of deeds of Iloilo and Occiden- tal Negros on the Torrens titles of the property belonging to the defendants,  setting aside the order of dismissal dated December 15, 1930, and granting the plaintiffs a  period of thirty days within which to amend their complaint (Exhibit K).

On February 4,  1931, the defendants in that  case and petitioners herein, filed a motion praying, for the reasons given, that the ruling of January 27, 1930, be set aside and the order of December 15, 1930, reinstated (Exhibit L).

On February 11, 1931, the plaintiffs in  that  case and respondents herein, filed a motion opposing, for the reasons therein given, the defendants' motion for reconsideration and  praying that the same be denied (Exhibit M).

On February 24,  1931, the  plaintiffs in that case and respondents herein, filed another amended complaint eliminating the petition for partition  (Exhibit N).

By a ruling dated March 25, 1931, the respondent Simplicio del Rosario, as the judge who had cognizance of the case in the Court of First Instance of Manila, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants in that case and petitioners herein, on February 4, 1931  (Exhibit O).

On April 7, 1931, the defendants in  that case and petitioners  herein took  exception  to the ruling handed  down on March 25, 1931 (Exhibit P).

In  view  of  the foregoing  facts,  the question arises: Did the respondent judge acquire jurisdiction  to take cognizance of the complaint filed by  the  herein  respondents as plaintiffs in civil case No. 37757 cited above?

The action instituted in said civil case No. 37757 of the Court of First Instance of Manila  is a mixed  action, com- posed of an action or an accounting, which is personal, and another for  the  partition  of conjugal  property,  which is real.

With respect to the personal aspect  of the  action there is no question about the respondent judge's  jurisdiction. Only jurisdiction over  the  real aspect  need occupy  our present attention.

The rule  prevailing in  the courts  of North  America, according to the weight of authority, is that the institution of an action in a province not designated by law for that purpose is not a jurisdictional defect, so long  as the court has general jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and  that  statutes fixing the venue of certain  actions only confer a personal privilege which may  be waived  (40 Cyc, 111).  This rule has been adopted by this court in Manila Railroad Co. vs.  Attorney-General  ([1911], 20 Phil., 523), in which, interpreting the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was held:

"4. ID.; ID.; ID.;  ID.; ID.; LAYING OF  VENUE IS PROCEDURAL. The laying of the venue is procedural rather than substantive.  It relates  to  the jurisdiction  of  the court over the person  rather  than the subject matter.  Provisions of law relating to the same were not intended to take anything from the power of the court but, rather, to grant something to one or both of the parties.  They establish a relation, not between the court and the subject matter, but between the plaintiff and the defendant.

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"7..ID.; ID.; ID.;  ID.; VENUE NOT CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION;  WAIVER  BY PARTIES. Venue is  not connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter; and the defend- ants' rights in respect thereto, as they are conferred  by section 377 above referred to, may be waived expressly or by implication.  Act No.  136 before referred to having con- ferred the fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon Courts of First Instance relative  to the real estate of the Islands, section 377 referred to will not be held or construed to restrict or limit that  jurisdiction, it not  containing express provisions to that  end."

According to the above-quoted doctrine, a court of general jurisdiction may rightfully take cognizance  of a case instituted in it by mistake on account of the place where the subject matter in litigation is situate, if the party to whom the law has given  the personal privilege to object to the jurisdiction of the court does not duly exercise such right, which is thereupon deemed waived.  This implied  waiver may be made in  several ways: By entering a general appearance  (40 Cyc, 113); by demurring upon a ground that is not exclusively that of lack of jurisdiction over the person or  subject  matter by reason of the place where the subject matter is situate (4 Corpus Juris, 1337); praying for the dissolution of an attachment and giving a bond therefor, without entering a  special  appearance objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the movant  (4 Corpus Juris, 1331); etc.

We have seen how, without objecting to the jurisdiction of the respondent judge to try the case on account of the place where the property sought to be partitioned by the defendants in that case and petitioners herein was situate, they asked for the dissolution of the attachment levied upon such property and  gave the proper bond.  By  these acts, said defendants and petitioners submitted to the jurisdiction of the  respondent judge and  impliedly  waived  their privilege to have the case tried in the province where the property is situated.

We have also seen that the then defendants and herein petitioners demurred on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action because the property sought  to be partitioned was not described, and praying that the said complaint be dismissed. This act is also an implied  recognition of the jurisdiction of the  respondent  judge over  their  persons and, consequently, an implied waiver of their privilege.

Finally, the then defendants and herein petitioners  filed a motion in that case praying that the respondent judge determine the  amount of damages caused them by the undue and unjust issuance of the attachment mentioned heretofore.  This  is a positive remedy  which may  be validly granted on condition that the court from whom it is solicited has jurisdiction to grant it.  The  said defendants and petitioners having  resorted to  the  respondent  judge  for such a  remedy, impliedly recognized  such  jurisdiction in him.

It is true that the then defendants and herein petitioners entered a special appearance, questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent judge to try the cause  by reason of the place  where the conjugal property to be partitioned  was situate,  but they did so after having submitted to his jurisdiction  as stated above.   If in the original complaint  the respondent judge's lack of jurisdiction to try the case  did not appear, and, consequently, they could not demur through a special appearance,  in accordance with section 91 of  the Code of Civil  Procedure,  they could have impugned such jurisdiction by means of an answer with a special appearance in accordance with section 92 of said Code, and having failed to do so, they waived such option, according to section 93 of said Code.

It thus follows that the respondent judge acquired jurisdiction to  try the complaint filed in the above-mentioned case.

Having  reached  this conclusion,  it  necessarily follows that the respondent judge erred in holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the cause, by reason of the place where the subject matter of the action was situate, and in ordering its  dismissal.  But  even if he had not had jurisdiction, the dismissal  need only have applied to the petition for the partition of the conjugal  property, for he had jurisdiction to  hear the petition for an accounting and could have proceeded to do  so.  In any  event, the respondent judge had jurisdiction to set aside his order of dismissal of December 15, 1930 and to permit the amendment of the complaint.

For  the  reasons stated  above, we are of opinion and so hold: (1)  That the filing of a demurrer on the ground that the complaint does not allege facts  sufficient to  constitute a cause of action;  the filing of a motion  praying for the dissolution of an  attachment without objecting to the jurisdiction of  the court over the place  where the property is situate, by means of a special appearance; the giving of a bond for the dissolution of said attachment; and the filing of a motion praying for the assessment of damages caused by  the undue and  unjust issuance  of said attachment, imply  a submission to the jurisdiction of the court and a waiver of the privilege to  impugn such jurisdiction (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil., 523); and (2) that the dismissal of a mixed action with reference to the real action does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the personal action, and it may continue to hear the same (15  Corpus Juris, p. 854, sec. 175).

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is  hereby denied, with costs against the petitioners.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.