The petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus to compel the Auditor of the Philippine Islands to countersign three warrants issued by the Insular  Collector  of  Customs  for the refund of certain import duties upon merchandise paid at the port of Davao, and alleged to be excessive.

The  Insular  Auditor has  refused to countersign said warrants first, because the petitioner did not file a protest in due  time;  second, because the error in the  alleged  excessive appraisement  is not a clerical error  within  the meaning of section 1300 of the Administrative Code; and third, because even assuming it  were a clerical error, no relief  can be granted,  because  the  original  liquidation wherein the alleged error was committed, has become final and  conclusive by  the expiration of the statutory  period of one year from the date thereof for its correction.

Counsel for the petitioning corporation contend that  the case comes under either section 1300 or section 1369 of  the Administrative  Code; that  no protest was necessary  because the error was clerical within  the  scope of section 1300 of said  Code,  and that the written  notice of  error filed by the petitioner was sufficient;  that the original liquidation was  merely  "tentative;" and that  the Insular Auditor's duty to countersign the warrants aforementioned is ministerial, and  therefore he may be compelled to perform it by mandamus.

Since the parties have not discussed any question of fact, but have argued the cause and submitted it without further evidence, the  facts set out in their pleadings are deemed submitted to this court for the decision of the case.

These facts are: That during the greater part of the year 1929,  the plaintiff corporation imported into the port of Davao, on different dates, various merchandise on which the duties  were liquidated within the year, the local collector of customs  relying upon the exchange rate at "the time of exportation for the conversion of the Japanese yen into United  States  currency,  instead of  the  rate of exchange of the Federal Reserve  Bank, proclaimed  by the United States  Secretary of  the  Treasury, as  required  by the Bureau of Customs regulations.  After  the petitioner had paid the  duties thus  computed, the imported  merchandise was delivered to it, the aforementioned collector of customs having notified it at the time of the liquidation that if the petitioner desired to protect its rights, ft should file a  protest against such liquidation.

The petitioner  did not file a protest, although  some months later it addressed a petition to the Insular Collector of  Customs, which,  not being  answered,  was  repeated, asking for the  refund of the excess  paid on account of the erroneous liquidation of the imported merchandise.   (Exhibits  B and C.)

The petition was  formally acted  upon,  and the Insular Collector  of  Customs, after  making a new liquidation,  issued in November, 1930, the warrants in  favor  of the petitioner herein, numbered  1691525,  1691526, and 1691559, for  the  amounts  of  P1,100.56,  P825.86,  and  P19.32, respectively.

These warrants were sent to the Insular Auditor for his signature, but  he refused to countersign  them  for the reasons stated above.

After the  Auditor had denied a  reconsideration of his refusal to countersign, the plaintiff corporation instituted the present  mandamus proceedings.

Section 1300 of the Administrative Code is not applicable to  this case.  The  original liquidation of  the duties  in question contained none of the errors referred  to  in this section,  The application of the  current rate  of exchange to such liquidation instead of the rate of the  Federal Reserve  Bank proclaimed by the Secretary  of the Treasury of the United States, was not a clerical error or any of the other  errors provided for  in said section  1300 of the Administrative  Code.  As defined in 17 Corpus Juris,  page 637, a manifest clerical error is  one that  is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector.

Inasmuch as section 1300  of the Administrative Code is not applicable to  the original liquidation, the latter was subject to protest and  should have been protested in  due time unless the interested party was willing to waive its rights.

The letters Exhibits B and  C cannot  be  considered  a protest because they do not contain the requisites of section 1372  of  the Administrative  Code.

Nor may it be contended that those requisites could  not be complied with because the exact rates of exchange were then unknown.  It would have been sufficient to base the protest upon the omission to apply the rates required by the regulations, even  without pointing  out  what those rates were, inasmuch as they were then unknown.  Section 1372 of the Administrative Code requires "reasonable precision," and the ground just indicated could under the circumstances of the case, be considered to  have been made with the only precision then possible, and therefore with reasonable precision.

For lack  of protest, the  original liquidation was considered final and accepted in accordance with the provisions of section 1371 of the Administrative Code, and conclusive against the petitioner, being  free of all the errors provided for in section  1300 of that Code.

And being thus conclusive, the liquidation can no longer be altered by the Collector  of Customs; not even  under section 1369 of  said Code, which is inapplicable here,  because it cannot  neutralize or render nugatory the  express provisions of  another section of the  same Code, that is, section 1371 mentioned above, which applies to cases which the law considers to have been finally and conclusively terminated.  It should be noted that section 1369 refers to cases  pending, i. e., to cases not finally decided. Neither may it be said  that the original liquidation was only tentative, for the  respondent  alleges (paragraph  III of the answer) and it is not denied by the petitioner,  that the entry in question is not stamped "Tentative liquidation" as  expressly required by the law.   (Section 1285, Adm. Code.)

Finally, with regard to the equitable aspect of the case. we  agree with the Attorney-General in  his  observations made in his memorandum for the respondent, which reads as follows:

"Is it inequitable to permit the Insular Government in this case to retain the amounts paid by  the  petitioner in excess of what should have been paid by him?  At  first blush, the case for the petitioner seems to be sustained by equity and fair dealing.   But a careful and impartial estimate of the situation will disclose that equity and justice are  also, in favor  of  the  Government.   At the time the said goods were entered and the  liquidations were made, the Collector of Customs and the  petitioner could not and did not know the actual official rates of exchange on the dates of exportation.  (See p.  6, memorandum  of  petitioner.)  The Collector of Customs of Davao knew the  proclaimed rate and applied it.  The official rates of exchange on the date of exportation could have been higher or lower than the rate applied by the said Collector of Customs. If they had been higher, the Government would have collected less than the true amount due; if lower, the importer would have paid more.  If the  importer, petitioner here, did not want to lose by reason of the application of higher rates, it should have filed a protest.  But if it filed a protest and it subsequently appeared  that  such official rates of exchange on exportation were higher than  those applied by the Collector of Customs of Davao, it could have been required to pay additional customs dues.  In this case it did not Hie a protest.  So that if it had turned  out that the rates applied by the Davao Collector were lower than the rates on dates  of  exportation, the petitioner  could not be compelled to pay additional dues.  But upon knowing  that the rates of exchange applied by the Davao Collector of Customs were higher than the  official rates on the dates of exportation, it seeks to recover the difference.  In other words, the petitioner did not want to take the risk of being compelled to pay additional customs  duties  (did not protest)  but now would like to take advantage of the difference in rates in spite of its own failure to protest.  If the petitioner were  allowed  to  recover notwithstanding  its failure to protest, the effect would be  to sanction a procedure that  places the Government on an unequal footing with the importer.  The importer in this case was unwilling to,  and did not,  assume the risk of being required to  pay additional customs  dues, that is  why  it did not protest, thus virtually electing to accept the proclaimed rates applied by  the Collector of Customs of  Davao.   Therefore, it  has no  ground to complain if the rate so applied proved to be higher, just  as the Government would have no ground to complain had the rates applied proved to be  lower than the official rates  on the dates of exportation."   (Folios 49, 60 and 51, Rollo.)

Finding no merit in the complaint, the writ is denied, with costs against the petitioner.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C.  J., Johnson,  Street,  Malcolm,  Villmor, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.