The petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit Exhibits A,  B, C, and  D (attached to the petition), as evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases  Nos. 4501 and 4502 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two  informations for libel against  Andres Guevarra.  The informations alleged that  the defendant, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the weekly paper  Ing Magumasid in  its issue of July 13, 1930, a squib in  verse, of which a translation into Spanish  was included therein, intended  to  impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit (information in criminal cause No. 4501) and of  Mariano Nepomuceno (information in criminal cause No. 4502).

The  defendant  demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations, he having published only one libelous article in the Ing Magumasid for July 13, 1930.  The court over-ruled the demurrer.

A joint  trial was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501  and 4502.  The fiscal  attempted to  present as evidence for the prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A,  B, C, and D, which are copies of the Ing Magvmasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in  the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish.  Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court.

The respondents  answered the petition for mandamus, praying for its dismissal with costs against the petitioner.

At the  hearing of this case,  both parties appeared and moved that they be allowed to present memoranda in lieu of an oral argument, which memoranda are in the record.

The petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of the libel,  the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted;  while the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not  quoted in  the information,, said evidence cannot be admitted without  amending the information. The prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the court denied the petition on the ground that it would impair the rights of the defendant, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution.

The first question  raised here is whether an information charging a libel published in an unofficial language, without including  a copy of the libelous article, but only  a translation into  Spanish,  is valid' or  not.  It is true that  in United States vs. Eguia and Lozano (38 Phil, 857), it was stated: "The general rule is that the complaint or information for libel must set out the particular defamatory words as published, and a statement of their substance  and effect is usually  considered insufficient."  But this  general  rule does not exclude certain exceptions, such as, cases where the libel is published in a non-official language.  "When the defamation has been published in a foreign  tongue, it  is proper, and in general, necessary, to set out the communication as it was originally made, with an  exact translation into English;  and  if from the translation  no  cause  of action appears, it is immaterial that  the foreign  words were actionable.  In some jurisdictions, however,  under the influence of the liberality of laws on practice, it is held unnecessary  to set out  the communication in the foreign language in which it is alleged to have been published, so long as  the  foreign publication  is  alleged,  with  an English translation attached."   (37 C. J., 27, sec. 336.)

If the libelous article had  been published in one of our official languages,  English or Spanish, it would have been necessary to follow the general rule; but since the article in question was published in the Pampango dialect, it is sufficient to insert  a Spanish translation in the information. The justice of this exception to the general rule becomes more evident if we consider a libelous article published, for instance, in Moro  or Chinese, who use characters different from our own.

The second question refers  to the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits.  The general rules regarding the admisaibility  of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander.  The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay.  (37 C. J., 151,  sec. 688.)   This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production  of  the best evidence,  is applicable  to  the  present case.  And certainly the  copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its  translation, constitute the best evidence of  the libel charged.  The newspaper itself is the best evidence  of an article published in it.   (Bond vs. Central Bank of Georgia, 2 Ga., 92.)

The respondent judge undoubtedly has discretion to ad- mit or reject the evidence offered by the fiscal; but  in the instant  case his refusal to admit such evidence amounts to an  abuse of that discretion, which may be controlled by this court by means of mandamus proceedings.   In so far  as the jurisdiction of this court is concerned, we believe the doctrine is applicable which was held in Orient Insurance Co. vs. Revilla and Teal  Motor  Co. (54  Phil., 919), namely, that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction  to entertain an application for a writ of mandamus to compel a Court of First Instance to permit the  attorney of a litigant to  examine the entire written communication, when  part  of the same has been introduced in  evidence by the other party.

Wherefore, the writ prayed  for against the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga should be issued, requiring him to admit Exhibits A, B, C, and  D, in question in criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502 of that court, and it is so ordered, without special pronouncement of costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romvaldez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.