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https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1d74?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[CARMEN VILLAFRANCA ET AL. v. PAULINA CRISTOBAL ET AL.](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1d74?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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55 Phil. 877

[ G. R. No. 33264, March 31, 1931 ]

CARMEN VILLAFRANCA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. PAULINA CRISTOBAL ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted on May 28, 1928, by Carmen Villafranca and her two daughters Soledad and Felicidad, of the surname of Gomez, for the purpose of recovering from the defendants Paulina, Luis, Josefa, and Paciencia, of the surname Gomez y Cristobal, eight parcels of land located in the sitio of Jabay, municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, together with the sum of P4,000, the value of two warehouses  alleged  to be the  property of the  plaintiffs usurped by the defendants, and the further sum of P20,000, alleged to be due to the plaintiffs as compensation earned by  Marcelino  Gomez while administering in trust certain properties belonging to the defendants.  Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendants from the demands for money but gave judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for the eight parcels  of land, declaring  them  to  be owners of the same and,  as such,  entitled  to  possession. From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed, alleging error in the decision in so far as it refused to grant to the plaintiffs compensation  for the two warehouses mentioned in the second cause of action, and the compensation for services rendered  in the amount of P20,000,  as claimed in the third cause of action;  while the defendants appealed from the decision with respect to the award to the plaintiffs of the eight parcels of land.

This case is an aftermath  of  the  litigation which  was decided in this court in the case of Cristobal vs. Gomez (50 Phil., 810), in which litigation the position of the adverse litigants  was different from the position occupied by them in the present litigation, those who were plaintiffs in that case being defendants here and those who were then defendants (after the death of Marcelino Gomez) being now plaintiffs.  An intelligent  understanding of the situation now before us presupposes, therefore, a knowledge  of the issues involved in that  litigation; and the following resume, with certain additional facts,  is necessary to a proper understanding of the  present case.  The general  situation revealed by reference to the case referred to is that, in 1907, Marcelino  Gomez and  his sister, Telesfora  Gomez, under took to assist their brother, Epifanio Gomez, in getting back some property which  he  had  lost under contract of  sate with pacto  de retro to Luis R.  Yangco.   To this end a kinsman named Bibiano  Banas agreed to advance the requisite money, while  Marcelino Gomez  and his sister  Telesfora agreed to become joint  and several sureties to Bañas for the money advanced by him.  In the contract made thereupon, evidencing  the relations and rights of the parties, it  was agreed that Marcelino Gomez  should administer the property until the capital advanced by Banas should be paid off, after which the property should be returned to Epifanio Gomez.   The  stipulation upon this point was in the  following words, to wit:
"(i) As  soon  as the capital employed, with its interest and  other  incidental  expenses, shall have been covered, said properties shall be returned to our brother Epifanio Gomez or to his legitimate children,  with the direct intervention, however, of both parties, namely, Don  Marcelino Gomez and Dona Telesfora Gomez, or one of them."
However, after the property had been administered for many years by Marcelino Gomez, and  after he had by transfer taken over the interest held in trust by his sister Telesfora, Marcelino  Gomez began to think of the property in question as his own, and after the property had been cleared of the indebtedness, he refused to surrender it to the heirs of Epifanio, who was then  dead.  This  led to the litigation which was concluded by the decision in Cristobal vs. Gomez (50 Phil., 810),  wherein the heirs of Epifanio Gomez recovered the property, which was  the  subject of that litigation.  The action referred to involved two parcels  of land, but we  are here concerned with only one of said parcels, the parcel indicated as parcel B in the complaint in that case.   Said  parcel was  there described an the following words:

"Parcel B. A land located in the sitio of Jabay, of the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite.  It contains  8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares, a little more or less.  It is bounded on the north by the  estero  called Mestizo and the lands of D. Juan Gonzalez; on the east, by the Jabay  road and lands of D. Isidoro Reyes;  on the south, by lands of D. Lorenzo Bailon,  of D. Ambrosio Cuevas, of D.a  Juana Reyes, of D. Cayetano Adriano, of D.  Laureano Peria,  of D. Ponciano Peredo, of D.  Pio Peredo,  of  D.a Matea Peredo,  and of Doroteo Reyes; and on the west, by the estero called Mabolo and by lands of Matea Gomez and of Da Inocencia Cuenca."
After the action mentioned had been concluded an execution was sued out by  the successful plaintiffs, and the sheriff delivered to them a property corresponding precisely to the above description in so far as boundaries are concerned.   This property is   correctly shown in  Exhibit 2 of the herein defendants, which corresponds very nearly with that shown in Exhibit N of the plaintiffs.  It will be noted that the parcel thus delivered by the sheriff to the defendants has natural  boundaries on three sides, namely, the Mestizo River on the north, the Jabay Road on the east, and the Mabolo River on the west.  These boundaries are fixed and admit of no error.   Moreover, the present owners of the contiguous parcels, as shown in Exhibit 2,  are all successors in interest of the owners of the contiguous parcels called for in the  description contained in the complaint referred to above.   To be specific, Juan Gonzalez, mentioned as one of the adjoining owners on the north, is now sue ceeded by his son, Zacarias Gonzalez, in Exhibit 2.  Isidoro Reyes, mentioned  in the description in  the  complaint  as an adjoining owner on the east, has been succeeded by his son, Simeon Reyes,  and one Aquilino Rafael.   One of the witnesses for  the plaintiffs gives Evarista Ignacio instead of Aquilino Rafael, but Evarista is the  wife of Aquilino, and there is therefore no inconsistency in the descriptions.

According to the description of parcel B in the complaint, there are a number of  owners whose lands are contiguous with the parcel in question on the south;  and  so it appears in Exhibit 2,  where the  present occupants, successors  in interest to those mentioned in the  description in the complaint, are indicated as adjoining owners.  The description in the complaint  calls for  Matea Gomez and Inocencia Cuenca as the owners of the contiguous parcels on the west in the part not bounded by the Mabolo River.  The present owners, as  shown  in Exhibit 2,  are the same Inocencia Cuenca and Leodegario Sarino, successor to Matea Gomez. There can be no doubt whatever, therefore, that the Exhibit 2 correctly indicates the boundaries of the land turned over to the successful plaintiffs in the former case (now defendants). In addition to this it should be borne  in mind that this tract or parcel of land is now laid out in salt beds according to Chinese  fashion, the  boundaries  of which are naturally well denned on the ground, easy also of transference to paper by any competent person drawing a sketch  of the property.

The trouble in this case has arisen  over the fact that the description  contained in the complaint in the  former action describes this property as having an area of 8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares, when, as  a matter of fact, the area shown in Exhibit 2 is 14 hectares, 80 ares, and 95 centares, and the present action was brought by the present plaintiffs for the purpose  of recovering a parcel having an area representing the excess over the 8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares.  In this connection it should be clearly impressed on the mind that  all of the eight parcels which the plaintiffs now seek to recover are located  within  the confines of the Exhibit 2.  Their own plan Exhibit N and related documents  sufficiently show this,  and Marcelino Gomez, the original defendant in the former case, testified that all of the parcels of which recovery is now  sought had been consolidated by him in the parcel B.   In other words the plaintiffs  are seeking to recover a  part of a larger parcel which they  lost by a conclusive  judgment in  the former action.   The impossibility of maintaining such an action, against the  plea of res judicata interposed by  the defendants, is of course manifest at once.  No  rule of law is better settled than the rule that a judgment in an action to recover a parcel of land is not vitiated by an erroneous statement relative to area, where it appears that the land is so  described by boundaries  as  to  put  its identification beyond doubt.   That which really defines a  piece of ground is not the area calculated with more or less certainly, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down as in closing the  land and indicating its limits.  (Loyola vs. Bartolome, 39 Phil.,  544.)  This doctrine is decisive of the controversy.

It is true that the plaintiffs in this case have  shown that some of the land contained  in the  plot delivered  to  the defendants  (the successful  plaintiffs in the other  case) as  a  result of the  former litigation was not originally  a part of land belonging to Epifanio Gomez, which was taken over  in  19D7  for  administration  in trust by Marcelino Gomez, and it  is admitted by the present defendants that there "is  contained in the parcel recovered  by them in  the former case an area  of something more than 1 1/3 hectares which was not originally a part of the land which belonged to Epifanio Gomez.  Furthermore, in order to  compensate the present plaintiffs for that land and be rid of the threat of  this litigation, the present defendants, at the time this case  was brewing, offered  to pay the  present plaintiffs the sum of P6,000.  The plaintiffs refused to accept  this offer, under  the erroneous impression, apparently,  that they could recover the entire excess  of area over the 8 hectares and  a fraction mentioned in the complaint in the other case.

It is undeniable that in the former  action the plaintiffs recovered somewhat more land than had been included in the land taken over by Marcelino Gomez from Epifanio Gomez for administration; and the parcels bearing the numbers 1, 3, 4, 5,  and 8,  in the  present complaint, are such parcels,  for Marcelino Gomez undoubtedly acquired these small parcels from other persons.   These parcels have a combined area of about 1 hectare, 37 ares, and 43 centares. With respect to  the  parcels indicated as Nos. 2, 6, and 7, in the plaintiffs' complaint, we  are of the opinion that it can fairly  be  made out that these parcels  really belonged originally  to  Epifanio Gomez, being apparently  parcels which  were  formerly hypothecated to different persons after Epifanio Gomez had sold them under  contract of sale with pacto de retro to Luis  R. Yangco,  as  explained in Cristobal vs.  Gomez  (50 Phil, 810), and which Marcelino Gomez had found it necessary to redeem, in the manner there stated.   But this point is not necessary to our decision, it being sufficient to know that all of the land claimed by the plaintiffs in the present action is within the boundaries  of the parcel which was  the subject of revindication in the other case.  In  this connection it should be pointed out that no question was made by the defendants in the other case  with respect to the several  small lots contained in parcel B, which Marcelino Gomez held in his own right by purchase from persons other than Epifanio Gomez.  If any such contention had been raised, it is probable that the defendants in that  action  could have maintained their right to these lots,  but no such issue was  raised.   The defense made in that case was planted precisely upon the alleged right of Marcelino Gomez as owner in fee simple of the whole parcel  B.   If we understand the contention of the plaintiffs in this case rightly,  their case is planted  upon the proposition that the only land really involved in the pleadings in the former case, and as to which any controversy existed, was the  particular land which had  been owned by Epifanio Gomez and which had been transferred in trust to Marcelino Gomez.  It is accordingly claimed that any land as to which Marcelino Gomez derived title  from other sources than Epifanio Gomez was not really in litigation in that case.   But this idea is untenable.  The former action was instituted  for the purpose of recovering a specific parcel of land, having precise and determinable boundaries, and the title to that piece of land was there determined, the judgment being res judicata, upon the issue of the title to that  parcel.  The circumstance that the defendants in that case had a valid title to a part of the parcel B, derived from  an entirely different source from that of the rest, was proper matter for defense in that case, but the defense was not interposed.

In  conclusion  we may point out that  the contention of the present plaintiffs to the effect that the original  holdings  of Epifanio Gomez did not comprise more than 8 hectares, 69 ares, and 24 centares, as stated in the complaint in  the other  case, is wholly  unfounded,  since Epifanio Gomez had declared for taxation under some six or seven different tax  declarations a total area,  in this  locality, amounting to  about 14 hectares, 60 ares, and 95 centares; and after  Marcelino  Gomez took the property over for administration, he declared the same property under several different declarations,  of equivalent area, the whole being later  consolidated in one single  tax declaration.  Our conclusion is that the erroneous statement of the area in the complaint  in the other case  misled nobody, and has only been seized upon  by the plaintiffs in this case as promising a possible means of escape from part of the effects of our former decision.

From what has been said it is evident that the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the first cause of action is erroneous and the same must be  reversed. We are further of the opinion that the appeal  of the plaintiffs upon the second and third causes of action is not well founded.  The title to the warehouses was  evidently determined by the decision in the former case, awarding the land upon which said warehouses are located to the plaintiffs, no exception having been made in said decision with respect to the improvements on  the property.  The claim of the plaintiffs for compensation,  amounting to P20,000 for services supposed to have been rendered by Marcelino  Gomez as administrator, is also clearly unfounded.  Under the terms of the contract under which he took over the administration of  the property,  the   expenses of administration were chargeable against the trust, and the claim was necessarily involved in the former action wherein the  real property, the subject of that action, was  recovered from the heirs of Marcelino Gomez, as trustee,  and it needs to be remembered that the defendants in  that case were absolved from a large claim for damages and an accounting, it being considered that such claim was compensated  by the obligations incident to the trust.   It results that the judgment of the trial court in refusing to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs under  their second and third causes of action was correct, and the same will be affirmed.

The judgment favorable to the plaintiffs  upon the first cause of action is reversed and the defendants are absolved from the  complaint with  respect to said cause of action; while the judgment in favor of the defendants on the second and third causes of action is affirmed.   So ordered, without pronouncement as to costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, and Ostrand,  JJ., concur.

Malcolm, J., voted to reverse, but was absent at the time of the promulgation of the opinion and his name does not appear signed thereto, AVANCEÑA, C.  J,

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