The  petitioner  Annie  Cousins Hix,  appeals  from  the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in  the course of the intestate proceedings of E. Randolph Hix, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

"In view of the foregoing considerations, the court holds: (1) That the divorce decree granted by the Circuit Court of Randolph County of the State of West Virginia awarding the deceased Hix a divorce from his wife, Annie Cousins Hix, is valid in this jurisdiction; (2) that since the latter is legally divorced from her late husband, she is not entitled to the pension  she asks as his widow;  and  (3) that the motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel on  September 24, 1929  asking  for an allowance  for  support must be denied."

The appellant  assigns the  following  alleged  errors as committed by the court below in said order, to wit:

1. The trial court erred in assuming that  E. Randolph Hix was a bona fide resident of the State of West Virginia at the time  he instituted an action for divorce  against his wife in the Circuit Court of  Randolph County, West Virginia,  in the year 1925.
   
2. The trial court erred in not finding that E. Randolph Hix was domiciled in, and  resident of, the City  of Manila, Philippine Islands, he  having arrived here in 1910  and died here in  1929, during which period of time  he  had established  his home and had engaged in business here.
   
3. The trial  court  erred in recognizing the decree of divorce secured by E. Randolph Hix from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia.
   
4. The trial court  erred in  refusing to apply  to  this case the jurisprudence laid  down by this Honorable Court in  the cases of  Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855)  and Gorayeb vs.  Hashim (50 Phil., 22).
   
5. The trial court erred in misapplying section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in not construing the same in relation with sections 309  and 312 of the same Code."

The relevant facts necessary to decide the questions raised in this appeal are the following:

E.  Randolph Hix was born in the year 1866 in Union, South Carolina, where he lived with his parents until the age of 15.  They then removed to Rye, Westchester County, New York.  A few years later, he was sent to the University of Lehigh, and to the Massachusetts Institute" of Technology, leaving the latter before graduating, to accept employment with the Edison Company where he worked lot about three years.  After resigning from his position he opened an office and engaged in private work as consulting engineer and contractor until the  year 1895, when  he removed to Wheeling, West Virginia,  to engage in the general engineering business as a member of the firm of Hogg  & Hix, surveyors.

After fifteen years of residence in Wheeling,  he took an examination and received an  appointment as coal  expert for the Philippine Government, arriving at Manila some time during the year 1910.   While E. Randolph  Hix was living in Manila  in 1912, he met the appellant and married her in Shanghai, China, on or about June 24, 1913, returning to Manila where they established their domicile.   A son was born of this union in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 1, 1915, named Preston Randolph Hix, while she was in the United States where she had gone on the month of May of the same year to visit her family and the mother and  sister of her  husband.   The appellant returned to Manila in November,  1916, and continued to live  with the deceased as husband  and wife.

On March 16,  1919, the appellant left for Canada, where she remained  with their child until February, 1921, when she returned to  Manila in a  very  precarious condition of health and was given medical treatment in the St.  Paul's Hospital at the  expense of her husband.  After she regained her  health, she lived apart from her husband by mutual consent.

On December  7, 1922, the appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against  her husband, E. Randolph Hix, for the purpose of compelling him to provide adequate support for herself and her son, Preston Randolph Hix.  In that

"It is stipulated  and agreed  that the defendant  and plaintiff are both residents of the  City of Manila; that they were married on the 24th day of June, 1913, in Shanghai, China; that plaintiff is the lawful wife of defendant; that one son named Preston R.  Hix was born on July  1, 1915, of the said marriage, who is still living; that plaintiff and defendant are now and have been, since about the middle of December,  1921,  living  separate and apart from each other by mutual consent, though the greater part of the time since December,  1921,  up to November,  1922, they took their meals together;  that  by mutual consent they will continue to live apart from  each other; that as long as  the  child will  remain in  the Philippine Islands, the father will have the  opportunity to see him twice a week, this without prejudice of Mrs. Hix taking the child to the States.  In this case, she will keep the father informed as to the condition of the child by writing him once a  month."

The trial court  adjudicated the  case in her  favor  and ordered the defendant E. Randolph Hix to pay her the sum of P500 in advance on or before the 5th day of each month for the maintenance of herself and her son.   The case was appealed to this court, and on February 27, 1924, the judgment of the court below was affirmed.¹  During the month of December, 1922, while the proceedings in  said case were pending, the office  held by E. Randolph Hix in the  Government  was  abolished,  and he went into private practice, acting as coal expert for the Manila Electric Company and other private concerns until March, 1924, when he left for West  Virginia, leaving his wife and child in Manila, and his  business in the hands of his employee, A. W. Fluemer, the opponent and appellee, for the purpose of residing there and suing for a divorce.

In the month of May, 1925,  that is, one  year after his arrival at Elkins, West Virginia,  the deceased filed a complaint for a divorce with the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, alleging, among other things, that he was a citizen of the United States  of America, and of the State of West Virginia,  and had been for more than one year prior to the date of the institution of the suit, an actual bona fide citizen and resident of Randolph County, West Virginia; that Annie Cousins Hix  was a resident of the City of Pekin,  China; that on December 1,  1921, his wife had abandoned and deserted him, taking up a separate residence and declining to live or have  anything to do with him;  that he, Hix, freely, voluntarily,  and adequately supported his wife and child, paying her the sum of $175 per month; that he intended to reside permanently in the United States, and that  it was with such intention that he had returned to West Virginia; that he and his wife had been living apart for three years,  and that she had rejected his offer of reconciliation.   As the appellant was not a resident of the State of West Virginia, she was summoned upon the complaint for divorce by publication, and not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel within the term fixed, the Circuit Court  of Randolph County, West  Virginia,  rendered judgment against her in 1925 declaring her marriage with the plaintiff dissolved.  Having procured the divorce, E. Randolph Hix returned to Manila in 1927, where he continued to live and engaged in business up to the time of his death in the year 1929.

The first question to decide in this appeal, raised by the first two assignments of error is, whether the Circuit Court of Randolph County in West  Virginia acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for divorce filed by E. Randolph Hix and to render  a valid and binding  judgment against the petitioner and appellant, Annie Cousins Hix.

The pertinent part of section 306 of  the  Code of Civil Procedure  provides  as follows:

"SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special  proceeding before a court  or judge of the  Philippine Islands  or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be a.s follows:

1. In case of a judgment  or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition  or relation  of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing,  the  will or administration,  or the condition or  relation  of the person:  *   *  *."

Section 334, No. 15, of said Code states:

"SEC. 334.  Disputable Presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory,  if uncontradicted, but they are disputable, and may be contradicted by other evidence:

*       *         *          *          *              *             *

"15. That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise  of his jurisdiction."

These  provisions show that in order that a judgment of a court or judge  of any  state of the American Union  with respect to the personal  or  legal condition of a particular person may be conclusive and constitute res judicata,  it is essential that the court  have jurisdiction, and  such jurisdiction is presumed in the absence of evidence  to the contrary.

Section 312 of the  Code of Civil Procedure provides:

"SEC.  312. How Judicial Record  May be Impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by  evidence  of a want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the  party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings."

One of the conditions for the validity of a decree of absolute divorce  is  that  the court  granting  it has  acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter,  and to this end the plaintiff  must be  domiciled in good faith, and for the length of  time  fixed by the law,  in  the state in  which  it was granted.  E. Randolph Hix was domiciled in the City of Manila where he lived apart from his wife and child,  by mutual consent,  and here  he had  his  business.  He removed to the State of West Virginia leaving his aforesaid wife and child  and his business behind, for the purpose of obtaining an absolute divorce, which he did in 1925, returning in the year 1927 to reside in the City of Manila, and continuing his business.

Although the opponent and  appellee attempted to show that E. Randolph Hix went to West Virginia with the intention of residing there permanently,  as alleged in the complaint for divorce, such an intention was contradicted by the fact that before leaving the City of Manila, he did not liquidate his business  but placed it under the  management of said opponent,  and  once  having obtained his divorce, he returned to the City of  Manila to  take up his residence and to continue his aforesaid business, and that his purpose in going to West Virginia  was to  obtain a divorce.

In Gorayeb  vs. Hashim  (50 Phil.,  22), this court laid down the following doctrine:

"3. Id.; Id.;  Id.;  Id.; NULLITY OP  DIVORCE. Doctrine of Ramirez vs. Gmur  (42 Phil., 855),  followed, to the effect that the court of a  country  in which neither  of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the  purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction  to determine  their matrimonial status,  and  the divorce granted by such a  court is  not  entitled to recognition here.

"4. Id.;  Id.;  Id.;  Id.; Id.; PHILIPPINE RESIDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN MARRIED ABROAD. The foregoing rule is applicable to married people who  are domiciled in the Philippine Islands although they may  have contracted marriage  elsewhere."

This ruling has not been weakened in the present case by the fact that E. Randolph Hix was a citizen of the United States  and of the State of  West Virginia, since  it is not the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a  court, but his legal residence within the State where he applies for a divorce.  That E. Randolph Hix himself believed he had  relinquished his former legal residence in  West  Virginia, of which he was a  citizen, upon  establishing his  marriage  domicile in the  City of Manila, Philippine  Islands,  is shown by  the fact that he had to reestablish his residence in said State for the length of time fixed by the law in order to be able to file his complaint for a divorce.

Since E. Randolph Hix was not a  bona fide  resident of the State of West Virginia, the divorce decree he obtained from  the Circuit Court of Randolph County, is null and void,  said court  having failed to acquire  jurisdiction over the subject matter.

But even if his  residence had been taken up  in good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit,  the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses  being  the City of Manila, and  no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance  in the case, either  personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction  upon said court over her person.

In  Haddock vs. Haddock  (201 U.  S., 562), the United States Supreme  Court  laid down the following doctrine:

"The husband and wife being domiciled  in  New York, the husband left the wife, acquired, in good faith, after a lapse of years, a domicile in Connecticut, and  obtained  in that State, and in accordance with its laws, a judgment of divorce based on constructive, and not actual, service  of process, on the  wife, who meanwhile remained  domiciled in New York and never appeared in the action.  The wife subsequently sued for  divorce in New  York and obtained personal service in that State on the  husband who  pleaded the Connecticut judgment.  Held,

"Without questioning the power of the State  of Connecticut to enforce the  decree  within its  own  borders, and without intimating any doubt that the State of New York might give it such a degree of efficacy that it might be entitled  to in view of  the  public policy of the State, that the Connecticut decree, rendered as it was without being based on personal service of the process on, and therefore without personal jurisdiction  of the court over, the wife, was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue  of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal  Constitution.

"A suit for divorce brought in a  State other than that of domicile or matrimony against a wife who is still domiciled therein is not a proceeding in rem justifying the court to enter a decree as to the res; or  marriage relation, entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court."

Without deciding whether or not clause  IV of the Constitution of the United  States, with reference to the  full faith and credit to be  given to judgments of the courts of the States of the American Union is applicable to the Philippine Islands, we may say that the ruling has the same force and scope as that of international comity, which must in any case be taken into account  in considering the recognition to be given in the Philippine  Islands to judgments of foreign courts.   (Section 311,  Act No. 190.)

The divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court of Randolph County,  West Virginia,  may also be impeached  by evidence  of  fraud, according  to section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted above.

E.  Randolph Hix alleged in  his complaint for a divorce filed with the aforementioned  court, that on December 1, 1921  his wife  had abandoned  and deserted him, living separately and declining to live or have anything to do with him; that she was a resident of the  City of Pekin,  China; and that he freely and voluntarily provided adequately for her and  their son, paying her $175 per  month.  These allegations, being false,  tended to deceive and did  in fact deceive the aforesaid Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia into granting the decree of divorce  applied for, because, had he alleged in his complaint that his wife lived apart  from him  by mutual  consent, as was  a fact, said court would not  have granted the divorce, since in the case of Bacon vs. Bacon (68 W. Va., 747; 70 S. E., 762), the Supreme Court of West Virginia laid down the doctrine that separation by mutual consent does not constitute desertion or abandonment  before the  law.   (See also  Corpus Juris,  vol. 19, page 64.)

For the foregoing considerations, we  are of opinion and so hold:  (1) That the residence acquired in  a state of the American Union by a husband, who, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, abandons the  country wherein  are his matrimonial domicile and his wife, who is living apart from him by mutual consent, and then returns to said  matrimonial domicile after obtaining a divorce, continues residing therein and engaging in business, is not bona fide residence, and does not confer jurisdiction upon the court even if he alleges in the complaint  for divorce that he intends to reside permanently in said state;  (2) that the summons by publication in a complaint for divorce, filed in a state by the husband who has gone to said state, abandoning his matrimonial domicile where his  wife continues to reside, does not confer jurisdiction upon the  court over the person of said wife when she  has  not entered an appearance in the case, and the decree issued by said  court  dissolving the marriage  is not binding upon her; and  (3)  that a decree of divorce issued by a court of any state or territory of the American Union, or of a foreign country, may be impeached in another case for lack of jurisdiction in said court over the subject matter,  or over the person of the defendant, or for fraud in obtaining  it on the part of the person  procuring it.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is  reversed, and it is held  that the decree of divorce issued by the  Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, is null and void in this jurisdiction,  with  costs against the appellee.   So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J.,  Street,  Villamor, and Romualdez,  JJ., concur.

Malcolm and Ostrand, JJ., concur in the result.

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¹ Cousins Hix vs. Randolph Hix, G. R. No 21483, not reported.