For some time prior to July, 1929,  trouble  had been brewing1 between the Moro Angkaya and the Moro Japal Alli.   Angkaya resented the actions of Japal Alii and considered that he had  a just grievance against him.   Eventually  Angkaya took council with1 a number of his relatives and retainers and the plan was concocted to secure two other  Moros  by  the names of Sampang and Suhaili to murder  Japal Alli.   Sampang and  Suhaili, on  being  informed of the part that they were to play, were  not at all loath to perform it.  Those  participating in the  conferences looking to the extermination of Japal Alli were Angkaya;  his son Asaad, then  a municipal  councilor;  his daughter Nahula, wife of Mawagi, also present; the brother of Mawaji, named Saladi, and Salim, a policeman of the councilor Asaad.   It should be added that in addition to agreeing to kill Japal Alli, it was likewise the consensus of opinion of  the conspirators that his wife Nurkisa must also be done away with.

Sampang and Suhaili who had been chosen to commit the bloody deed, visited at the house of Japal Alli on two occasions, apparently for the purpose of  making a preliminary  recognizance.   On  the third  occasion, which was on July 11, 1929, Sampang and Suhaili again appeared and immediately set upon and killed Japal Alii.  Ms wife Nurkisa, entirely unconscious of her danger, was also treacherously murdered.

The murderers first to be arrested and charged with the crimes  were Sampang and Suhaili.  Afterwards, the information was amended to include seven others, namely, the Moros Angkaya, Asaad, Mawagi, Salim, Sarahaji, Saladi, and the Mora Nahula.  Subsequently,  the  case was dismissed  as to Angkaya  and Sarahaji, the first because of his death and  the second  because of lack of sufficient evidence.  At the  conclusion of the trial, the  presiding judge handed down a decision concluding as follows:

"Wherefore, applying to the accused the benefits of section 106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, quoted above, the court sentences each of  them, the Moros Asaad,  Mawaji, Salim,  Saladi, Sampang,  and Suhaili, for the death  of Japal Alli,  to life  imprisonment; the same penalty for each of them for the death of Japal Alli's wife, the Mora Nurkisa; and these penalties shall in accordance with rule 2, article 88 of the Penal  Code, not exceed 40 years.  The accused Mora Nahula is condemned to 20 years of cadena temporal.  Furthermore,  all the accused are sentenced to pay jointly  and severally an indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000 and each of them to pay one-ninth (1/9) of the costs of this trial." The guilt of certain of the accused has been overwhelmingly proven. The principal  witness for the prosecution was Sahibil.  His  story has been sufficiently corroborated to  indicate its  truthfulness.  The  attempt to cast suspicion on two innocent Moros by the names of Guak and Tangangan was futile.  The defense is unconvincing and unbelievable.

Taking up more particularly the  individual criminal responsibility of  each of the accused,  there can  exist no doubt at all with reference to Sampang and Suhaili, the authors by direct participation in the crimes.  Aside from other testimony,  there is to  be found in the record  the evidence of two  witnesses  who  were  present when  the murders were  committed, namely, Daima and Tabalong. The same statement would hold good in its broadest aspect in so far as the  accused Asaad is concerned.  It is true that the head of  the band which conspired to commit  the murders was  Angkaya, now  deceased, but his principal lieutenant was his son Asaad, the municipal councilor.   It was at the house of Asaad that meetings were held; it was Asaad who  along with his father  promised Sampang and Suhaili  the  sum of P200 for  committing the  crimes, and it was Asaad who insisted that the wife of Japal Alii needed also to be killed.

The only doubtful factor of the case has had to do with the guilt or innocence  of the remaining four accused, Mawaji, Salim, Saladi, and Nahula.  These four accused  attended the conferences and entered no opposition  to  the nefarious scheme.  After the  commission of the murders, they joined  with  the other accused in celebrating with a fiesta.  Aside  from this, these four did not cooperate in the commission of the crimes. Nor is  it certain that, as relatives or retainers  of Angkaya, the four had any  influence over Sampang and Suhaili, and that  any of the four said or did anything that determined the commission of the crimes.  May they be considered as authors by  inducement within  the meaning of article 13 of the Penal Code?  May they be considered as accomplices within the meaning of article 14 of the Penal Code?

Our deliberate judgment on these questions is that the four accused may neither be considered as authors by  inducement nor as accomplices. Merely assenting  out  of respect and  fear,  and merely attending a feast by  way of custom does not constitute an effective inducement.  What the four did amounted to joining in a conspiracy. But the Penal Code, in article 4, does not punish a conspiracy as such.  As to the accused being accomplices, it has not been  shown that, aside from attending the meetings of the conspirators and joining in a feast, they cooperated in the execution of the crimes by previous or simultaneous acts.

In corroboration of the foregoing, there may be cited the comment of Viada on article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, a comment which  has heretofore been adopted by this court, where, among other things, it is said:

"We  have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto there are similar means by which another may be induced to commit a crime which also make the one who offers the inducement  the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2.  But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed,  or in simple words  uttered at the time the act was committed.   Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly  an evil  act,  an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions  of the Code, such  act  can be  considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical  or moral  coercion or as violence itself."  (2 Viada,   Codigo Penal Comentado, p. 386, 5th Edition; U. S. vs. Indanan [1913], 24 Phil., 203.)

We conclude that the defendants and appellants  Sampang, Suhaili, and Asaad have been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of double murder.  We further conclude that the defendants and appellants Mawagi, Salim, Saladi, and Naihula  have not been proved guilty beyond  a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged,  or of any  lesser crimes included in  the charge, and that  as a  consequence they are entitled  to acquittal.

Regarding the proper penalty, the trial judge found in effect the presence of the qualifying circumstance of premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of the commission of the crimes in the dwelling of the deceased, to which  he added the further aggravating circumstance of treachery in the  killing of the wife of Japal Alli.  The trial judge then admitted candidly that, strictly speaking, there were present no  mitigating circumstances.  However, considering the respective attitudes of the families of Angkaya and Japal Alli, and the ignorance of the accused,  he was led to apply the provisions of section  106 of the Administrative  Code of Mindanao and Sulu.   We accept  the legal pronouncements of the trial judge to  the extent that they apply to the three defendants and appellants who are convicted.

The  judgment appealed from will be affirmed in so  far as it refers to the defendants and appellants Sampang,  Suhaili, and Asaad, and will be reversed in so far as it refers to the defendants and  appellants Mawaji,  Salim, Saladi, and Nahula, each of whom will  stand  acquitted of  the charge, with a one-ninth part of the costs of the first instance  against each of the defendants and appellants Sam- pang, Suhaili, and Asaad, and with a one-seventh part of the i costs of this instance against each of the three defendants and  appellants last mentioned, with six-ninths part of the costs of the first instance de oficio and four-sevenths part of the costs of this instance de oficio.   So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Johnson, Street,  Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

JOHNS,  J., dissenting: