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[HERCULES LUMBER CO. v. MUNICIPALITY OF ZAMBOANGA](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1d2b?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 33749, Feb 18, 1931 ]

HERCULES LUMBER CO. v. MUNICIPALITY OF ZAMBOANGA +

DECISION

55 Phil. 653

[ G. R. No. 33749, February 18, 1931 ]

HERCULES LUMBER CO., INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZAMBOANGA AND CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF ZAMBOANGA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court  of First Instance of Zamboanga by the Hercules Lumber Co., Inc.,  for the purpose  of recovering from the defendant municipality of Zamboanga,  of  which the  co-defendant Carlos  Doxninguez is municipal treasurer, the sum of P112.66 for taxes paid under protest.  Upon hearing  the  cause the  trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff to recover the amount sued for with interest from the date of the filing of  the complaint, but without costs.  From this judgment  the defendants appealed.

It appears that the  plaintiff maintains in  the  municipality of Zamboanga a shed  (camarin)  from  which  it is accustomed  to sell lumber; and, in connection therewith, it operates  a machine for sawing lumber, driven by a motor-engine of twenty five  (25) horse power. Although these  activities  are  conducted by  the  plaintiff  upon a moderate scale,  we  think  that they are not  improperly designated when we  say that  the plaintiff is  engaged in maintaining a lumber yard and operating  a saw-mill.

On December 14,  1928,  the municipal  council of Zamboanga, acting under the supposed authority of subsection (d)  of section 2625  of the Administrative Code of 1917, enacted an ordinance  (No. 226) purporting to impose a license tax in the amount of one hundred  pesos per annum upon each person engaged in selling lumber from a fixed place of deposit  (coda vendedor de madera con depdsito estableddo) and also  a further annual  tax of five pesos per horse power upon  each motor-engine for sawing wood (coda mdquina de motor de aserrar madera).   This ordinance was made effective January 1, 1929, immediately prior to which date the municipal  treasurer of the municipality made a formal demand upon the plaintiff for  the payment of the  license fees upon  the activities conducted by it as  above stated.  The plaintiff questioned the right of the treasurer to collect the tax, but paid the same  under protest,  and instituted this action  to recover the money, as stated in the first paragraph of this opinion.

Subsection (d)  of section  2625  of the  Administrative Code of 1917 enumerates the  activities upon which license taxes may be imposed by the municipal council of municipalities contained in the Province of Zamboanga; but no mention is made therein of the keeping of  lumber yards or the maintenance of motor engines for sawing lumber. This is fatal to  the  pretension of the municipal authorities that  they have the power to impose the taxes here in question.   It is true that in subsection (e) of section  2625, lumber yards and saw-mills are mentioned as  businesses that may be regulated  by  the municipal  council; but regulation in the  sense  intended in said subsection does not include the levying of  license taxes for  the purposes  of revenue.  The separate enumeration of the activities which may be lawfully  taxed  and the activities which  may only be regulated reveals the distinction in the mind of the lawmaker between the  act of taxing and the act of regulating.  The power to regulate should not be construed as including the power  to impose license taxes for revenue purposes.  It is well  established doctrine  that subordinate entities like municipal councils can  exercise the power of taxation only to the extent specified  by law; and this power cannot be extended by strained implications.

The judgment ordering the refund of the tax will therefore be affirmed, and  it is  so  ordered, with costs against the appellant municipality.

Avanceña, C. J.,  Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real,  JJ.,  concur.

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