STATEMENT
Desiring to obtain a license  to operate a taxicab service in the City  of Manila,  Enrique Monserrat twice applied to the Legislature for an exclusive franchise for that purpose and twice it passed a bill giving him such exclusive franchise for the period of ten years,  and wisely,  for  many reasons, the  Governor-General twice vetoed the bill.  Monserrat then made application to the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience to operate a taxicab  service  in the City of Manila  and  surrounding municipalities which, after due notice  and hearing, was granted December, 1929, and among other things provides:

"That the petitioner shall operate, without fixed route or a regular terminus,  within  the  City  of  Manila and  its suburbs, a passenger transportation service only,  with  or without personal baggage, by means of Citroen motor taxicabs with  a capacity of four passengers  each, and such service shall commence with only one taxicab, the number being  increased when the  service so requires, and within the period of one year, until there shall be 100 taxicabs, and  at  the  expiration of  said  period  of one  year, the number of taxicabs of the petitioner that have been operated within said period shall be considered as the only equipments  authorized."

Thereafter, on  December 27, 1929, the petitioners, Alfredo  Carmelo  and Ramon Oriol,  applied to the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience to operate a  taxicab service within the City of Manila and surrounding  municipalities, notice of which was  duly published.

To this application an  opposition  was filed by Enrique Monserrat, and  the case was heard and tried by the commission on January 16, 1930, which on May 30, 1930, rendered a decision denying the application of the petitioners, with one of  its  members dissenting, from which Carmelo and Oriol filed a petition for review and assigned the following errors:

"I. The Public  Service Commission erred  in  failing  to hold that the operation of a taxicab  service in the City  of Manila and  surrounding  municipalities as  proposed  by the appellants will promote the general public  welfare  in a proper and suitable manner.

"II.  The Public Service Commission erred in not holding and concluding that the preponderance of the evidence had established the necessity and reasonableness of the issuance of a certificate of public convenience in favor of the appellants for the operation of the  proposed taxicab service  in the City of Manila and surrounding municipalities.

"III.  The conclusion in the decision of the majority members of the commission that 'sobre la actual necesidad  de tales servicios en Manila, no  hay prueba concluyente  en autos' is not supported by the  weight of the evidence and it is an erroneous interpretation of the accepted meaning  of the words 'convenience' and  'necessity.'

"IV.  That the Public Service Commission erred in denying the motion for  rehearing presented by the appellants."

This is another case of first impression in this court, and for aught that appears in the record, the underlying,  fundamental legal principles involved have never been decided by any court.

In 1920 the City of Manila had an area of 36 square kilometers  and a population of 233,613, and it is a matter  of common knowledge that since  then there has been  a very material increase in  its area,  and that the population  of the city is now  about  400,000, and that portions  of the city are used exclusively for business districts, and at times there is a severe congestion of traffic.  That the streets are in general use by the carromatas and carretelas, garage and public  utility cars, and the Manila Electric Company.   It is also a matter  of common knowledge that the  city  is laid out in  a large number of streets  and alleys of  different widths and at all angles and points of the compass.   That it is growing fast, and that we are living in a  progressive age in which there is a continuous  change in  the method and mode of travel by the public, and, figuratively speaking, that which is modern today is out of date tomorrow.  The auto  and motor car is  an innovation which  in the last thirty years has worked a complete revolution in public travel.

So that now, in lieu of the  old private owned carriage and horses and of the carromata, which you formerly went out in person and picked up on the street, you  can 'phone to a garage and an auto will  come to your home or any place that you  may direct, and continue in your service as long as you may wish.  All of such garage and public utility  cars  are  operated and are under the control and supervision of the  Public Utility  Commission  with fixed charges  for  service.   The operation of a  garage  car  is not confined or limited to any particular street  within the city limits or to any given course or distance, and each car has the right to the use of any and all streets for passenger traffic.

Such were the conditions at the time Monserrat applied for and  obtained his certificate  of convenience for his taxicab service, which is another modern innovation that is more  or less in conflict with the garage for  hire auto. Both are similar conveyances operated by motor power, and in the last analysis, the  only real difference is the rate of compensation.  One is a charge  for the  actual  distance travelled, and the other for the time consumed.  Yet,  it is conceded that there are now 800 garage cars in operation in the City of Manila, and it appears that at present Monserrat is operating about 26 taxies in and  over the same streets in the City of Manila.

The business of the taxicab is new and the public here  is not yet accustomed to that kind of service,  and like other innovations, it  is one more or less of education.   Even so, in all cities in the United States of the size of Manila, taxi-cabs are in general use  and are very convenient  to the travelling public, and in so far as we are advised  there is no city of the size of Manila that does not have at least two or more  taxicab companies in actual operation.

Everything else being equal, the real, primary question involved is whether it is better  and more convenient for the travelling public in the City of Manila to have two taxi-cab companies in operation than  it is to have one, and whether in truth and in fact the granting of another similar license to the petitioners would operate as a real injury to Monserrat.   He is the first in the field and so long as  he maintains good and  efficient service and meets the demand of the public, it is fair to assume  that he will hold his present customers and would have nothing to fear from the granting  of  a license to the petitioners, and  if for any reason he does  not give  the required  kind of service  or satisfy the needs of the public, then he would have no right to complain.

If, as contended, the use of a taxi is largely one of education, then it must be conceded that the operator prior  in time  does not have any  exclusive right to and  over the people who are not educated to travel in taxies.

It is  admitted that the Public Service Commission had granted a certificate of public convenience to Monserrat to operate a taxicab service within the limits of the City of Manila  prior to the filing of petitioners'  application  for a certificate, and it is contended that because he is prior in time,  he is prior in right, and the granting of the certificate  to the petitioners  would not be fer the benefit  of the public.  That it would create unfair and unjust competition and injure and impair Monserrat's investment, and for such reasons the granting of another certificate would be in conflict with and overrule  the decision of this  court in the case  of the Batangas Transportation  Company vs. Orlanes¹ and other  like decisions, which have become and are now the law of this court.   But from an examination of those decisions and the authorities therein cited, it appears that the questions there presented  and decided were the legal rights  of  an  operator  under a prior license  to operate an autobus  line between certain  points on a fixed schedule over a provincial  road as against a subsequent applicant for a license to operate between those points and over the same route of travel.

In the final analysis, there is a very marked distinction between all of those cases  and this case.  Here, there is no schedule for operation, and there  is no fixed route of travel between points.

In the one, you go  to some  point on a provincial road or to the office of the company and wait for the autobus to come along and pick you up and take you to some particular place on a specific route, over which the operator has a license to operate his autobus on a fixed schedule.

In the other, in response to a telephone, a  taxi at any time comes to your home or any other place you may direct, and takes you over any street in the City of Manila, in any direction, and to any place that you may wish to go.

That is to say, taxies are not operated on any schedule or over any certain  route or between  certain points  or in any direction, and that the certificate granted to Monserrat is in the nature of a blanket franchise to operate a taxicab service  over any and  all of the  streets and alleys of  the city, in any direction, from any place, and at  any  time, subject to the call and wish of the customer only both as to time, place, and route of travel.  That is to say, it is in the sole discretion of the person desiring to travel whether he shall call a taxi or an auto garage  car, and  as to when he shall call it, and  where he shall go, and in  the operation of an autobus line, the operator must maintain a fixed schedule  over a specified route between certain points, and must make his trips with or without passengers.

In the granting or refusal of a certificate of public convenience,  all  things  considered, the  question is what is for the best interests of the public.   Tested by that rule, it is hard to conceive how it would be for the best interests of the public to have one  taxicab service only, and how the public would be  injured by the granting of the certificate in question, for it must be conceded that two companies in the Held would stimulate the business, and that the public would much sooner and much easier become educated in the use of the taxi.

As stated, counsel have not cited decision of any court in which the exclusive rights of a prior operator of a taxicab company in a city of the size of the City of Manila have been sustained, and there is no valid, legal reason  why Monserrat  should  have the  exclusive right to operate a taxicab service in the City of Manila or that such exclusive right would be for the benefit of the public.  Neither  does he have a vested right in the business of any person  that might want the use of a taxi,  for the simple reason  that the use of any taxi is in the sole discretion of the customer.

We are clearly of the opinion that the same  rule of law does not apply to  the granting of a certificate of public convenience over the numerous crowded streets of a densely populated city for  the operation "of  a taxicab service  and the granting of such a certificate for the operation of an autobus  on a  fixed schedule in a given direction  between certain points on a provincial road, and that under the conditions existing in the City of Manila, it would not be for the best interest of the public, in particular, that Monserrat should  have  the exclusive right to operate a taxicab service within the city limits, and if, as Monserrat contends, the field is open, the business is more or less of an experiment, and the public is not educated to the use of the taxi, how can it be claimed or  asserted that he has such a prior or vested right in the business as would inhibit or prevent the granting of a certificate to the petitioners for like service?

If, on  the other hand,  as the petitioners claim,  there is now a large and general  demand  by the public for an increased taxicab service, and that the service rendered by Monserrat does not meet the demands of  the public, then he would have no just cause to complain for the granting of a certificate to  the petitioners, and in either event, it might well be contended that the granting of another certificate would promote and stimulate the use of the taxi, and give the public better and more efficient service.

In  the very nature of things, the granting of a license to the petitioners would not be "the granting of a subsequent license to another for the same thing over the same route of travel," for as to whether or not the taxi travels at all or where it goes or when it goes or how far it goes is a matter  exclusively at  the call and in the discretion of the customer; otherwise,  the  taxi  would remain idle not so with  an  autobus  operating on  a fixed schedule between certain  points on a provincial road.

There is no valid,  legal reason why Monserrat should have  the exclusive right  of  operating a taxicab  service within  the limits  of  the  City  of  Manila,  and  it is very apparent that such an  exclusive right would be against the best interest of the public.  Neither is there any valid reason why the petitioners should not have a like certificate of public convenience, subject only to the reasonable rules and regulations of the commission.

In the last  analysis, the  only real question presented in the record is one of law.  The  decision of the commission denying the petitioners  a  certificate of public convenience is reversed and the case is remanded to  the commission, with instructions to grant the petition and for such other and further proceedings as are not  inconsistent with this opinion, with  costs against Monserrat.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm,  Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J.:

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¹ 52 Phil., 455.