This is an original application for  the writ of certiorari wherein the petitioners seek an  order annulling a preliminary injunction  issued  by the respondent  judge in civil case No. 2643, of the  Court of First Instance of Capiz; and the cause is now before us upon answer of the respondents and proof submitted by the parties before the clerk of this court, as commissioner.

On January 28, 1929, the respondent Josue Soncuya filed an original complaint in the  Court  of First Instance of Capiz (civil case No. 2541)  against  six individuals of the surname Azarraga,  with whom was joined the husband of the defendant Rosario.  The purpose of said action is to recover damages from the  Azarragas for an alleged mifeasance in procuring a Torrens title to certain  property claimed by Sonouya, and for various acts of waste committed by them in connection with  the misappropriation of the property mentioned,  said alleged damages amounting all together to the sum of more than P125,000.  The land out of which the cause of action is supposed to have arisen consists of four parcels, constituting a portion of the larger of the two lots described in the original certificate of  title No.  9785,  of the  registry of Capia.  In connection  with said complaint,  the plaintiff  Soncuya  asked for the  inscription of a notice  of lis pendens on certificate of title No.  9785, and also for a writ of attachment against  two other parcels of land  belonging to the defendants  and covered by certificates of title Nos. 9804 and 10351.  In response to this application an attachment was issued upon the filing of a bond by Soncuya in the  amount of P1,000; and  the same was levied on the properties covered by the two  certificates  last  mentioned.   On September 7, 1929, upon motion of the Azarragas, said attachment was  discharged by order of the respondent judge, upon the filing by the Azarragas of a bond  in the amount of P12,500. Upon the filing of said bond  the respondent judge also canceled the notice of lis pendens with respect to the land included in certificate No. 9785.

Prior to the incident  above mentioned a corporation had been organized  in Capiz known as the Panay Municipal Cadastre, Inc., for the purpose of effecting a cadastral survey of lands in the municipality of Kalifoo; and the Azarragas had obligated themselves to said corporation to supply money for the purpose of effecting the contemplated survey.   Furthermore, at the time with which we are dealing, the Azarragas found  themselves without the ready funds to meet  said obligation.   They therefore applied  to  the partnership Hijos de  I. de la  Rama,  one of  the plaintiffs in the present petition, for a  loan of P25,000 to be  used for the purpose mentioned.  This amount the partnership, hereinafter referred to  as the  De la Rama firm, agreed to advance the required  loan in monthly instalments, at  the rate  of P3,000 a  month.  In order to secure the money thus to be advanced, the Azarragas executed a mortgage in favor of the De la Rama firm on the land covered by certificates of title Nos. 9785, 9804, and 10351.  The credit thus procured was intended exclusively for financing the expenses of the  cadastral survey to be undertaken by the Panay Municipal Cadastre, Inc.; and it was expressly provided in paragraph 5 of the mortgage that the sums  drawn from the De  la Rama firm against the credit mentioned were to be applied exclusively to this purpose.

After the mortgage had been made, and while the original damage suit (case No. 2541)  was pending trial, as it still is,  Josue Soncuya, the plaintiff in said action, began, on October 17, 1929, a second civil action in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against the Azarragas and the De la Rama firm.  By referring to the  petitory part of  the complaint in this second action  (case No. 2643), it is  ap- parent that the purpose of the action  was to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent the Azarragas and the De la Rama firm from carrying into effect the contract secured by the mortgage mentioned.  Nevertheless the Panay Municipal  Cadastre, Inc., was not made  a party in case No. 2643, although it was directly interested in the performance of  the contract which was sought to be enjoined.  For a  more  complete elucidation  of  this point we here transcribe the prayer of the complaint  in case No.  2643, which is as  follows:

"For  all the foregoing, the plaintiff  respectfully prays this court to render judgment against the defendants, and to immediately issue a writ of injunction against the same:

"1st,  restraining the defendants Azarraga from asking from  their codefendant Hijos de I. de la Rama more money from  their credit than that which  corresponds to the first month, if it had already been delivered to them, according to the mortgage contract aforementioned;

"2nd,  restraining at the same time  the defendant Hijos de I.  de la Rama from delivering to its codefendants any sum  on  account of the said credit beyond the amount  already delivered;

"3rd, equally restraining all the defendants  from  rescinding the mortgage contract aforementioned until further order of the court;

"4th, the plaintiff also prays that a copy of the injunction be remitted to the register of deeds with instructions to annotate it in the registry and in the certificates of title Nos. 9785, 9804, and 10351, and to abstain from registering any annotation relative to transactions with respect to said properties until further order of the court, and

"5th, likewise prays that costs in this case be adjudged against the defendants Azarraga."

On October  21, 1929, the respondent  judge issued  an order for the preliminary injunction in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, upon the filing of an undertaking by  the plaintiff Josue Soncuya in the amount of P2,000; and on the next succeeding day the preliminary writ of injunction was issued (Exhibit L) enjoining the De la  Rama firm from extending the credit stipulated  for in the  mortgage and the Azarragas from receiving any portion of the money intended to be advanced.   The issuance of this writ was followed by a motion for reconsideration and various other interlocutory proceedings,  but  His  Honor, the respondent judge, refused to abrogate his order and dissolve the injunction, and it was for the purpose of abrogating the same that the present petition was filed in this court. It may be added,  by the way, that on March 12, 1930, the Panay Municipal  Cadastre, Inc.,  which, according to  the mortgage, was  to receive  the amounts to be advanced  by the De  la Rama firm, filed a  motion in  intervention and moved the respondent judge to set aside and annul the injunction, but this motion was likewise denied.

From what has  been stated it  will  be seen that the injunctive order against which relief is sought in this case was issued  in a case  (No. 2643)  in which no other  relief is sought than the issuance of a preliminary injunction in aid of the prior pending action in case No. 2541.  No ultimate substantive relief whatever was sought in this second action (No. 2643).  A perusal of the petitory part of the complaint,  transcribe above, shows this clearly.

Upon these facts it is obvious that the granting of the preliminary injunction  against which relief is sought in this  petition was an irregular act and  beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent judge.  The preliminary injunction  is so purely subsidiary remedy, available in aid of the right which is to be vindicated in the action wherein the preliminary injunction  is issued.   An independent action will  not lie  merely  to  obtain  a preliminary injunction. There must be some substantive right to be enforced in the action  in which the preliminary injunction  is sought and which  right is intended to be conserved  by the injunction.  This rule  is fundamental; and a contrary practice cannot be tolerated, since it would tend to a  multiplicity of actions and lead to unnecessary expense in litigation.  Any conservative remedy to which  the plaintiff might really have been  entitled could have been obtained by motion in the original action (No. 2541).

For the reasons stated the petition must be granted and the order of October 21, 1929, and the subsequent writ of injunction  of October 22, 1929,  (Exhibits  K and L) are hereby abrogated,  as prayed in the petition with, costs against the respondent Josue  Soncuya.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson,  Malcolm, Villamor,  Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.