The defendant was prosecuted  for attempted robbery in an inhabited  house  upon the following information:

"The  undersigned  accuses  Leoncio  Villegas  y Tuliao (alias) Lucio Villegas (alias) Francisco Bravo  of the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 9th day of July,  1930, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and against the consent of the  owner thereof,  enter the  dwelling  house  (first floor)  of  Miss  S.  H.  Olson, situated at No. 558 San Luis Street, of said city,  by means of force  upon things, to wit:  by  cutting off and forcibly breaking open the wire screen of a window of said premises,  an opening not intended  for  entrance  or egress, thru  which said accused gained  entrance  to said  house, thus commencing the commission of the crime of robbery directly by overt acts; that if said accused  did not accomplish his unlawful purpose, that is, to take,  steal and carry away by means  of force upon things, personal property valued at P1,000 contained in the said dwelling house, it was not because  of his own and voluntary  desistance, but because of the timely  detection and intervention by third persons who caused the arrest of said accused.

"That the said accused has  heretofore  been  convicted eight (8) times  of the crime of theft and twice (2) of estafa, by virtue  of final judgments rendered by competent courts, the last date of conviction  being on  February 3, 1925, and is therefore a habitual delinquent under the provisions of Act No. 3586 of the Philippine Legislature.

"All contrary to law."   (Pp. 2 and 3, record.)

The defendant  appeared in the court below and upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.  On the following day, however,  accompanied by his lawyer, the accused withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered one of guilty.   The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and as recidivist and habitual criminal,  as alleged in the information, and sentenced him to  suffer two months' arresto mayor, under paragraph 2, subsection 5, article 508 of the Penal Code, plus twenty-one years' imprisonment  under Act  No. 3586, with costs.

The instant appeal has  been taken from that  judgment, based upon the following assignments of error:

1. In finding the defendant guilty of the crime of robbery in an inhabited house.
   
   
2. In sentencing the defendant to the additional penalty of twenty-one years, in addition to the two months, because the information  alleged  that the  defendant  had been  a recidivist ten times."

In support of the first assignment of error, the defense contends that the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty  was not attempted robbery in an inhabited house, but, at most,  trespass to dwelling. When the defendant pleaded guilty, he  admitted certain  facts  alleged in the information.   It is  contended that the allegation in the information touching the  defendant's purpose in  breaking into the house, together with  subsequent statements, are mere conclusions drawn by the fiscal.  We think otherwise. That part of the information explains the defendant's intent of gain, setting forth as facts that he proposed to take, steal, and carry away by means of force upon things, personal property valued at P1,000 contained in the dwelling house,  and that if he failed to  accomplish said purpose,  it was not because of his own voluntary desistance, but because of the  timely detection  and intervention  by  third persons who  caused the arrest of said accused.  Perhaps the information could have been  drawn  up with greater clearness, but considering its Contents, we deem it sufficient. The use of the words of the law in the information is not a defect.  (U. S. vs. Salcedo, 4 Phil., 234; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy,  18 Phil., 122; U. S. vs. Go Changco, 23 Phil., 641.)  The absence of a detailed list of the personal property found in the house on that occasion, the value of which is specifically  alleged in the information, vitiates neither the proceedings nor the judgment, not being jurisdictional in nature.  The defendant could have demanded such  a detailed list, but he failed to  do  so  and thereby  waived the objection, and, therefore, that question cannot be raised for the first time in the present instance.  (U. S. vs. Del Rosario, 2 Phil., 127; U. S. vs. Mack, 4 Phil., 185 and 291; U.  S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil., 566; U. S. vs. Paraiso, 5  Phil., 149; U. S. vs. Aldos, 6 Phil., 381; U. S. vs. Eusebio, 8 Phil., 574; U. S. vs. Lampano and Zapanta, 13  Phil., 409.)

The  second  assignment of error is based upon the fact that Act No.  3586, by virtue of which the appellant was sentenced to twenty-one years of additional imprisonment, took effect in the year 1929  (the  original Act,  No. 3397, was  passed in 1927), and upon the contention that said Act should not be given retroactive effect  unless therein expressly provided; and, that the former offenses alleged in the information had been punished by judgments rendered prior to the  enforcement of said Act.  It must be  borne in  mind that it is a principle of law in this jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by statute, that in order to apply such a law as Act No. 3586,  it is  not necessary that the former felonies constituting the habitual criminality have been committed after  the law  regarding habitual criminals took  effect; it is sufficient that the crime, the prosecution of  which gives rise to the application of the additional penalty for habitual criminality, has been committed after said law became effective.  And this rule is in accord with the North American jurisprudence:

"Unless otherwise provided by statute, in order to authorize the infliction of a  more severe penalty upon conviction for a second or a subsequent offense, it is not necessary that the first conviction should occur  subsequent to the  enactment of the statute."   (16 C.  J.,  1341.)

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the understanding that the  appellant is further condemned to the accessory penalties, and the costs  of both instances.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street,  Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns,  and  Villa-Real, JJ.,  concur.