This is an appeal  taken by the defendants Matilde Menendez Donado, Mercedes  Montehermoso, and Miguel Peñaranda, from the judgment of the  Court of First  Instance of Iloilo rendered in civil cases  Nos. 7651 (G. R. No. 33658), and 7652 (G. R. No. 33659), the dispositive part of which reads  as  follows:

"By virtue  of the foregoing,  the  plaintiff Heradio  F. Donado  is held  to  be an acknowledged natural  child  of Gertrudis Donado, by her express and voluntary  act,  and as such is entitled to participate in the estate of his deceased mother, Gertrudis Donado.

"It is ordered that the property set forth in Annex A of the amended complaint in case No. 7652 be partitioned  between the plaintiff and the  defendant Mercedes Montehermoso.

"It  is ordered that the property set  forth in Annex A of the complaint in  case  No. 7651, and in the  supplement filed on the 17th of July, 1929, page 71 of the record, be partitioned between the plaintiff Heradio  F. Donado, and the defendants Mercedes Montehermoso and  Matilde Menendez.

"It is ordered  that defendants Mercedes Montehermoso and Matilde Menendez Donado each render an accounting to the plaintiff of all the products of the property referred to in the aforesaid Annexes, within sixty days from receipt of notice hereof, and thereafter let the case be again set for trial with a view to finally determining what portion of said products shall appertain to the plaintiff.

"And lastly, the defendants Mercedes Montehermoso and Matilde Menendez Donado are  ordered to submit to this court within the  said period of sixty days from receipt of notice hereof, the proper schemes of partition with reference to the aforesaid property, so that the portion to which the plaintiff is entitled may be adjudicated to him in accordance with article 942 taken in connection  with  article 840 of the Civil Code; and the scheme of partition presented in  conformity  with this order  shall be  set  for hearing with the accounts mentioned above.

"No special pronouncement of costs is  made.

"So ordered."

In support of their appeal the appellants assign the following alleged  errors as committed by the trial court in its  judgment, to wit:

1. The  court  erred in its  order of March  15, 1929, to strike out paragraph IV of the cross-complaint.
   
2. Having declared in said order that 'the parties agree that the plaintiff's  status must be governed by the  law in force prior to the enactment of the Civil Code,' the lower court erred in preventing the defendants by said order to strike out the aforesaid paragraph, from showing that, in accordance with said prior law, the plaintiff is not a natural child.
   
3. The lower court erred in holding that the  acknowledgment of a natural child by its father as required by Law 11 of Toro, is not an absolute condition to qualify its natural filiation, but only with regard to its father.
   
4. Having admitted  in said order that, under the law prior to the  Civil Code,  neither the investigation of the paternity nor the revelation of the person by whom a child was begotten, was prohibited in case of separate acknowledgment by the father or the mother, the court below erred in inferring that the mention of the name of such person was deemed never to have been made, and could not produce any effect, and in making the other inference based  upon the former premise; that when  the acknowledgment was made by the  mother alone, without revealing the name of the person by whom she had the child, the investigation of the child's paternity can in  no case be made.
   
5. The court having held that under the former law, the separate acknowledgment of a child could only be attacked when the  father  or the mother was not in  a condition to acknowledge  the natural child,  it also erred in applying to the instant case the  interpretation made by Manresa  upon article 119 of the  Civil Code in connection with articles 130 and 132 thereof.
   
6. The  trial court erred in restricting to sacrilegious children the provision of  Law 9 of Toro, prohibiting  them from inheriting from their mothers.
   
7. The trial court erred in holding in said order that the investigation of paternity  with a view  to impugning the status of a supposed natural  child, cannot be  made after the  promulgation  of the  Civil Code, even  where the child was  born prior thereto.
   
8. The trial court erred in applying the doctrine laid down in Borres and Barza vs. Municipality  of Panay (42 Phil., 643), to the present case.
   
9. The lower court also erred in using as the basis for its  order  against paragraph  IV of the cross-complaint, saying: that  in said paragraph the defendants in violation of the law attempted to  investigate the plaintiff's paternity.
   
10. The lower court erred in its  theory  regarding, the acknowledgment of natural children according to the prior law.
    
11. The lower court erred in holding that the documents Exhibits A, B, C,  and D, were duly identified as referring to the plaintiff and establishing his identity.
    
12. The lower  court erred in holding that the plaintiff gave  his consent, in accordance with article 133 of the said Code, to the acknowledgment alleged  to have been made in his favor in Exhibits A, B, C, and D.
    
13. he lower court erred in holding that  said  documents are the public documents referred to  in article 131 of the Civil Code.
    
14. The lower court erred in holding  that the plaintiff's right of  action has not prescribed.
    
15. The lower court erred in holding that since express acknowledgment is superior to tacit  acknowledgment, and inasmuch as the plaintiff had been expressly  acknowledged by Gertrudis Donado after the Civil Code went into effect, said acknowledgment must be governed by the provisions of said Code,  as well as the plaintiff's alleged rights with regard to the inheritance of said Gertrudis Donado.
    
16. The court  also  erred in holding  that even  if the express acknowledgment had not taken place,  with the tacit acknowledgment alone, the plaintiff's alleged rights with reference to Gertrudis Donado's inheritance should  still be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, in spite of the fact that he had no capacity to inherit from said Gertrudis Donado, and that Mercedes Montehermoso and Matilde  Menendez Donado being legitimate relatives  of the decedent they  exclude the plaintiff from  her inheritance.
    
17. The court also erred in  holding  that the doctrine applicable to the case is that laid down in De Gala vs. De Gala and Alabastro (51 Phil., 480), and not that enunciated in Rocha vs,  TUason and  Rocha  de  Despujols  (39 Phil., 976).
    
18. The court erred in holding that the latter portion of Rule 1 of the transitory provisions found in the Civil Code is not applicable to the  present case, but rule 12 of said transitory provisions.  
    
19. The  court erred  in  ordering  the partition of the property mentioned in the lists attached to the complaints, the rendition of accounts regarding the products of said property, and the presentation of the scheme of partition of the said property.
    
20. Lastly, the court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial."

The present judicial proceedings originated in two complaints filed by Heradio F. Donado, one of which was against Matilde  Menendez Donado  et  al., and  the other against Mercedes Montehermoso et al., praying that he be adjudged entitled to participate in the estate  left by  his deceased mother Gertrudis Donado, as well  as in the property inherited by the latter and the defendant Matilde Menendez Donado from their mother,  Marcela Donado, and that the aforementioned  defendants, Mercedes Montehermoso and Matilde Menendez Donado, be ordered to render an accounting of the products obtained from said property, and meanwhile to pay said  plaintiff his share of such products to which he is entitled by law, upon the ground that he is a natural  son voluntarily  acknowledged  by  his deceased mother, Gertrudis Donado, who, at the time of his conception had legal capacity to marry.

The defendants, in  answer to the respective complaints, deny  that the plaintiff has ever been voluntarily acknowledged by Gertrudis Donado as her natural son, and by way of cross-complaint allege that the said Heradio F. Donado is not a natural son of Gertrudis Donado but an illegitimate son of a priest  of the Roman Catholic  Apostolic Church ordained in sacris, who,  at the time of the conception and birth of said Heradio  F. Donado had no legal capacity, and was prevented under the laws then in force, to contract marriage; that  his contention that he  is a  natural child voluntarily acknowledged prejudices considerably the rights and interests of the cross-complainants, for which reason they  attack  such  contention  and  any acknowledgment, whether tacit or express, made in favor of the cross-defendant, Heradio F. Donado, to the prejudice of the rights of the cross-complainant Mercedes Montehermoso as a legitimate daughter of Gertrudis Donado; and that the  action instituted  by  said plaintiff has already prescribed.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, the lower court ordered that paragraph  IV of  the cross-complaint be stricken out, upon the ground that it would lead to an investigation of the paternity, which is prohibited by the Civil Code now in force, and that, therefore, the facts therein alleged,  even  if true, are irrelevant and redundant, and cannot be established by the evidence.

It will be seen that in the two complaints  filed by Heradio F. Donado, he does not ask to  be declared a natural child voluntarily acknowledged by his deceased mother, Gertrudis Donado, but that, taking such voluntary acknowledgment for granted, he be  adjudged entitled to participate in the property left by  his aforesaid  mother.

The two cases were jointly tried, and the following facts were  established, some by agreement  of the parties,  and others by evidence adduced by the plaintiff,  to wit:

Mercedes Montehermoso, one of the defendants, was born in May, 1882, being the only legitimate surviving child of the spouses Bernardo Montehermoso and Gertrudis Donadov who were married in the year  1877. Bernardo Monteher moso died  on the 9th of April, 1883, and was survived by his wife, Gertrudis Donado.  Two or three years after the death of her husband, Gertrudis Donado gave birth to the plaintiff.   Gertrudis Donado lived in the house of her mother,  Marcela Donado, but when she  was about  to give birth to the plaintiff, she left the house on  account of some difference, and went to live in another house near the beach. There were other persons living in the house where Gertrudis gave birth to the plaintiff.  Gertrudis Donado raised the plaintiff and defrayed  the  expenses of his education, clothing, and food.  The initial F between his name and surname stands  for Firmeza,  so that his full  name  is Heradio Firmeza Donado.   Gertrudis  Donado died about the 25th or 26th of April, 1919.

The plaintiff presented at the trial Exhibit A, a copy  of the decision of  the  Court  of First  Instance of  Antique, rendered on March 9, 1911, making mention of Heradio  F. Donado as a minor  child of Gertrudis Donado;  Exhibits B, C, and D, which  are certified copies of the complaints filed in  three cases instituted by  Gertrudis Donado in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Dao, Province of Antique, all dated April 13, 1918,  wherein said Gertrudis Donado alleged that  she was the guardian and administratrix of the  property  of her  son, Heradio  F. Donado; and Exhibit E, which  is a copy of a power of attorney executed by Heradio F. Donado in favor of his mother,  Gertrudis  Donado, authorizing  her to sell certain animals the credentials of which were in his name.

The defendants adduced  the  following evidence:   "Matilde  Menendez  Donado,  Gertrudis Donado's elder  sister, had she been permitted to do so, would have testified that she knew the plaintiff to be the son of Fr. Justo  Firmeza, with whom she had  lived when the latter was a curate  in Pototan, and who had presented the plaintiff to his intimate friends as  his son, and that Fr. Firmeza told Matilde Menendez several times that Heradio  F. Donado was  his son.  The  defendants  also offered  in evidence through Tomas  Lamberto that, had the court permitted the latter, he would have testified that the plaintiff is the son of Fr. Justo Firmeza;  that the latter lived maritally with Gertrudis Donado in a  house; that Fr.  Firmeza, admitted  in the presence of  several persons, among them, Lamberto, that he was the plaintiff's father; that  Fr.  Firmeza had been  living publicly in Eusebio  Muchala's home for two years with Gertrudis Donado, who during that time gave birth to a boy;  and  in Felix Donato's house,  to which Fr. Firmeza and Gertrudis Donado removed,  the latter gave birth to a girl.  Fr. Gregorio Rosaldez would also have testified, had he been allowed to do so, that Fr. Justo Firmeza was a clergy in the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church prior to the year 1886 and up to the year 1902, when he died."

The  first  question  to  decide  is  that of procedure: Whether the court below erred in ordering paragraph IV of the cross-complaint stricken out.

This will depend upon the question as to whether  or not the defendants may attack the acknowledgment with evidence tending to investigate the plaintiff's paternity with a view to showing that he  does not possess the status  of a natural child.

The defendants argue in the affirmative, contending that inasmuch as the plaintiff, Heradio F.  Donado, was born previous to the enactment of the Civil Code, which did not prohibit the  investigation of  paternity, they are entitled to attack Gertrudis Donado's acknowledgment of the plaintiff as her natural child, even if this would involve an investigation of his paternity.

The fourth paragraph of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code reads as follows:

"4. Actions and rights which accrued before this Code became operative,  but which have not been enforced, shall continue to subsist with  the same force and effect given them by the prior law, but shall be subject, with respect to their exercise, duration, and the  procedure for enforcing them, to the provisions of this Code.

"If official  proceedings for the enforcement of the right or action, commenced under the provisions  of the prior law should be pending and such proceedings should be different from those prescribed  by this  Code the parties may  elect to make use of either procedure."

According to the transitory provision quoted, the actions which accrued before this Code became operative but which have not been enforced shall continue to subsist with the same force and effect given them by the prior law.  The right to impugn  the acknowledgment of a natural child is recognized by the law and is intended to protect the rights of those who may be prejudiced by such acknowledgment. Inasmuch as the rights of truly natural children in contemplation of law or of legitimate children are not really threatened  or  prejudiced in such a way as to need protection, except when a definitive voluntary acknowledgment is made or a judicial declaration sought of the acknowledgment of a child not in enjoyment of the status of a natural child, the right of action to attack it does not accrue and cannot be exercised except from the time the acknowledgment is made either voluntarily or judicially.  Since the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of the plaintiff Heradio F. Donado by Gertrudis Donado as her natural son, was made under the Civil Code and in accordance with its  provisions, the right of action appertaining to the  defendants-appellants Mercedes Montehermoso, the legitimate daughter of Gertrudis Donado, and Matilde Menendez Donado, sister of said Gertrudis Donado, accrued under said Code; it is therefore the provisions of this  Code that must govern the  exercise  of  the said defendants' right to impugn the acknowledgment  in question, and not the provisions of the  prior law, notwithstanding the  fact that both the plaintiff Heradio F.  Donado and the defendant Mercedes Montehermoso were born under the prior law, for the latter's  right  of  action to  impugn the former's  acknowledgment  in  question accrued under the Civil Code.  And following the doctrine laid down in Borres and Barza vs. Municipality  of Panay (42 Phil., 643), which states the rule  applicable to the case, the investigation of paternity cannot be permitted except in the cases authorized by law, even for the purpose of attacking the  acknowledgment of a natural child.  Since the present case is not one of those wherein the law permits the investigation of paternity, the allegations contained in paragraph IV  of the cross-complaint are irrelevant and  unnecessary, and, therefore, the court of origin did not err in ordering that said paragraph be stricken from the record.

The second procedural question raised by the appellants refers to the prescription of the plaintiff's action.

As stated above, this is not an action for a judicial declaration of a tacit or express acknowledgment of the plaintiff-appellee made by his mother Gertrudis Donado in a private instrument, but of his right to participate in the inheritance of his said mother Gertrudis Donado by virtue of a voluntary acknowledgment made in a public document,  that is, an action for the partition of inheritance, for which reason the provisions of article 137 of the Civil Code with reference to the duration of actions to compel the acknowledgment of a natural child, are not applicable.

As an action of  partition and recovery of property,  that brought by  the  plaintiff-appellee has not  prescribed,  inasmuch as Gertrudis Donado, whose inheritance is in question, died on the  25th of April, 1919, and the complaints in the two cases were filed on the 19th of October, 1928, before the expiration of ten years from the time plaintiff's right of action accrued, that is, from the time the  defendants  took possession of the property.left by the late Gertrudis Donado to her death.  (Sec. 40,  Act No. 190.)

Coming now to the merits of the case, the first question presented is that of the sufficiency of the documents Exhibits A, B, C, and D, as instruments of the acknowledgment established in article 131 in connection with article  129 of the Civil Code,  which read as follows:

"ART. 129. A  natural child  may be acknowledged by the father and mother jointly or by.either of them alone.

"ART. 131. The  acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document."

There can be no doubt that the  documents Exhibits A, B, C, and D, being integral parts of judicial records, and having been subscribed to by a notary public, are public documents.   (Arcenas vs. Laserna, 27 Phil., 699; U. S. vs. Asensi, 34 Phil., 750.)

But, do these documents constitute the acknowledgment required by article 131 quoted above?

In Cosio vs, Pili (10 Phil., 72), the court said:

"*   *   *  and it having been further proven that Tomas Cosio, as cabeza de barangay, entered in his poll list, under his signature, the names of the two brothers as the  sons of himself and his wife, the express recognition contained in an official document is then obtained, thus complying  with the provisions of article 131 of the Civil  Code;   * *  *   ."

Manresa, commenting upon article 131 of the Civil  Code with reference to the acknowledgment of a natural child, says the following:

"The terms in which the acknowledgment is made are immaterial, and Goyena's opinion is admissible that,  with reference to article 124 of the bill of 1851, the law inclines favorably to  an acknowledgment made incidentally or in any terms, so long as the  intention to acknowledge  sufficiently appears. 'It  is enough/ he adds, 'that the testator mention the legatee as his natural child  who may thence forth demand his rights as  a natural child, even if the will is revoked."

According to the cases cited above and Manresa's opinion, acknowledgment made in a public or private document  need not be direct, but may even incidentally admit that the person whose name appears in the document in question is the subscriber's child.

The  defendant-appellant  also  discusses the plaintiff-appellee's identity as the  child to  whom Gertrudis Donado gave birth.

Aside from the statements made by Gertrudis Donado in the public documents Exhibits A, B,  C, and D, that Heradio F. Donado is her son, the witnesses Honorio Nuevacubeta and Angel Flores, whose respective mothers were sisters of Gertrudis  Donado, testified that they lived in the same house with Gertrudis Donado and saw her give birth to Heradio  F. Donado; that Gertrudis Donado nursed and brought up the plaintiff-appellee, whose education she paid for; and that after his marriage he continued to live in his mother's house;  and that Gertrudis Donado always considered the plaintiff-appellee as her son.

These  statements  of  the mother, made in public documents, and the testimony of those who were present at the birth and saw the child nursed and reared by the mother, and  later living with her, are conclusive evidence of the identity  of Heradio F.  Donado, the plaintiff-appellee,  as Gertrudis Donado's son.

The appellants also contend that as Heradio F. Donado was already of  legal age when his mother acknowledged him as her natural child, his consent was  necessary to give legal effect to the acknowledgment,  according to article 133 of the Civil Code,  which provides that a child of legal age shall not be acknowledged without his consent.

Since said article does not prescribe the manner in which the consent should be given, it may be given either expressly or tacitly.   The plaintiff, Heradio F. Donado gave his consent impliedly not only when he put in a claim to the property  left by  his  mother,  Gertrudis Donado, upon  the strength of her  express voluntary acknowledgment of him in a public document, but also when he empowered her in Exhibit E to sell certain cattle belonging  to him.

As it has been shown that the plaintiff-appellee Heradio F. Donado has been voluntarily  acknowledged in  a public judicial document  by Gertrudis Donado as her natural son; that Gertrudis Donado could marry with or without dispensation at the time of the conception and the birth,  being a widow presuming that the man by whom she was pregnant could also marry  her with  or without dispensation and that the issue was therefore a natural child both according to Law 11 of Toro and  according to article 119 of the Civil Code; and that Heradio F. Donado has consented to such acknowledgment, the question arises as to whether the said Heradio F. Donado is entitled to participate in the property left by his deceased mother, Gertrudis Donado, in accordance with the provisions of the  Civil Code, or whether he is not entitled to do so, according to Law 9 of Toro, because of the  existence of a  legitimate daughter,  namely,  the defendant-appellant, Mercedes Montehermoso.

The appellants contend that Heradio F. Donado is  not entitled to participate in the property left by his mother. Gertrudis Donado, because being a natural child born under the law  prior to the Civil Code of a woman who also had a legitimate child, he cannot claim  the rights granted by article 340  of the Civil Code to legally acknowledged natural children concurring with legitimate children, because that would prejudice the right of the defendant-appellant Mercedes Montehermoso,  in accordance with the first paragraph of the transitory provisions of  the Civil  Code, citing the doctrine laid down by this court in Rocha vs. Tuason  and Rocha de Despujols (39 Phil., 976).

In said case the natural daughter  Maria Eloisa Rocha and the legitimate daughter Maria Rocha de Despujols were born prior to the enforcement of the Civil Code, and in accordance with Law 9 of Toro the former,  even if acknowledged as  a natural daughter  under the prior legislation, would not  be entitled to participate in the inheritance of her natural father Jose Gregorio  Rocha, but only to support, because he had also left a legitimate daughter.

In the case at bar, while Heradio F. Donado, the natural son of Gertrudis Donado,  was born under the prior law, like  Mercedes Montehermoso, the legitimate  daughter of Gertrudis Donado, nevertheless,  the former's  acknowledgment by his mother as her natural child took place during the enforcement of the Civil Code, and in accordance with the requisites established thereby.

The right to inherit pertaining  to the natural  daughter and to the legitimate daughter in  the Rocha case were of the same origin, i. e., Law 9 of Toro; whereas the origin of the right to inherit pertaining to the  natural son  and to the legitimate daughter  in the present case is different, the former arising under the Civil Code, by virtue of the acknowledgment made thereunder according to its provisions, and the  latter under  Law 9  of Toro.   Heradio F. Donado, as  an  acknowledged natural  child,  is entitled to the portion of  the inheritance granted  by article 840 of the Civil Code to natural children concurring with legitimate children, although such right is for the first time set forth in the Code, inasmuch as the fact which originated it, that is, the acknowledgment,  was made under the present law, and is not derived from the same  origin as the right acquired by Mercedes Montehermoso, as a legitimate daughter, which arose under the prior law, by virtue of her birth, and therefore, the doctrine applicable to this case is that laid down in De  Gala vs. De Gala y Alabastro (51 Phil., 480), which states:

"SUCCESSION  RIGHT OP RECOGNIZED NATURAL CHILD TO PARTICIPATE IN ESTATE OF FATHER. A natural child born before the Civil Code went into effect but recognized after that date is entitled to the hereditary portion of his father's estate given to him by said Code as against a half brother legitimate son  of the same father who was also  born before the Civil Code went into effect."

In that  case, Sinf oroso de Gala, a natural son of Pedro de Gala, born under the prior law the same as Generoso de Gala, a legitimate  son  of said  Pedro de  Gala, had  been judicially  declared to be an  acknowledged natural son of Pedro de Gala under the Civil Code, and it was this judicial declaration that gave rise to his right to inherit, not the mere implied acknowledgment  derived  from  his  possession of the status of a  natural child,  as the appellants erroneously interpret the doctrine laid down by this court in said De Gala case.

Since the plaintiff-appellee's right to inherit from his mother, Gertrudis Donado, originated  in  the  latter's acknowledgment made in a public document, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, and Gertrudis Donado having died while said Code was in force,  the aforesaid Heradio F. Donado is entitled to the portion of the inheritance assigned to him by the Civil Code, in accordance with transitory provision  No. 12 of the said Code, notwithstanding any prejudice to the legitimate daughter Mercedes Montehermoso, inasmuch as  the right acquired by her is not of the same origin as that acquired by Heradio F. Donado, in accordance with the first paragraph of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code.

It is contended in  the  cross-complaint that the property described in the list  Exhibit A, attached to the complaint, was inherited by Mercedes Montehermoso from her legitimate father, Bernardo Montehermoso.   Since the court below did not receive  evidence upon this point to  ascertain the source of said property, the partition thereof  cannot here be ordered.

Summing up all the conclusions set forth above, we are of opinion and so hold:  (1) That the right of action to impugn the voluntary acknowledgment  of a natural child only accrues at the moment when such  acknowledgment takes place; (2) that the voluntary acknowledgment of a natural child, born under the former  law, made separately by  a mother under the Civil Code and in accordance with its provisions, cannot be attacked by a legitimate daughter also born  under the  same prior law, when such  action would involve an investigation of the  identity of the father who did not acknowledge said child, for under the present law such an inquiry  is prohibited;  (3)  that the action brought by Heradio F. Donado on October 19, 1928, praying that he be adjudged entitled to participate in the inheritance of his mother has not  yet  prescribed, since his mother died on April 26, 1919, and the ten-year period required by section 40 of the  Code of Civil Procedure for the prescription of actions pertaining to real property has not yet elapsed; (4) that inasmuch as Gertrudis  Donado died while the Civil Code  was in force, Heradio F, Donado's right to her inheritance must be governed by the Civil Code, in accordance with the 12th paragraph of the transitory provisions of said Code, notwithstanding any prejudice to the right acquired by Mercedes Montehermoso as a legitimate daughter of her deceased mother, Gertrudis Donado, inasmuch as the origins of both rights are different, the latter arising under the prior law by virtue of her birth, and the former arising under the Civil Code, the voluntary  acknowledgment being made thereunder; and (5) that the cross-complaint alleging that a portion of the property to which Heradio F. Donado lays claim derived from the father  ot the defendant and appellant, Mercedes Montehermoso, the partition of the property in question cannot be ordered  without first obtaining evidence  showing the source of said property.

By  virtue  whereof,  the  judgment appealed  from  is affirmed in so far as it adjudges the plaintiff Heradio F. Donado the right  to  participate in the inheritance of his mother,  Gertrudis  Donado,  and  reversed in  so  far  as it orders the partition  of  said property; and let the cause be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without special pronouncement of costs.   So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.