At midnight on October 9,  1935, the spouses Leon or Leonardo Nacpil  and Marcelina Mercado  were attacked and killed, and their son Jose Nacpil, 13 years of age, seriously  wounded, while they  were sleeping in  their  own house where they lived alone, in Maunani, within the barrio of Ungut in the municipality  of Porac, Province of Pampanga, the house having later been burned by the person or persons who committed the attack.   It having resulted from the  first  investigations  conducted  by  the  authorities and theiragents that Ciriaco Piring, Leoncio Piring, Felix Capili and Flaviano Capili committed said acts, they were arrested and charged with double murder and serious physical injuries in two separate cases, it having been alleged in the information for double murder filed against them  that they committed the crime with the  aggravating circumstances  of uninhabited place, disguise, dwelling,  nighttime, cruelty and aid of armed persons.  Upon their petition  they were granted two separate trials in the case for double murder,  one for Felix  Capili and Flaviano Capili, and another for Ciriaco Piring and Leoncio Piring.   For lack of  evidence, everybody was acquitted except Ciriaco Piring  who was  found guilty of said  crime by the  Court of First Instance of Pampanga which sentenced him to reclusion  perpetua, having taken into consideration the mitigating  circumstance of  lack of instruction in his favor,  in spite of having  stated that the aggravating circumstances of  disguise, dwelling and cruelty, in addition to  the  qualifying circumstance of treachery, were also present in the commission of the crime.  Ciriaco Piring  appealed from the  sentence imposing upon him  the penalty in question and  that of indemnity  in the  sum of  P2,000 to the heirs of  the deceased spouses, alleging that the  lower court erred:  (1) In giving credit to the testimony of the minor Jose Nacpil; (2)  in admitting Exhibit D-1-A, which is  his confession made before  the justice of the peace, as  evidence against him; and (3) in sentencing him to the above-stated penalty.

It has been proven by the prosecution and  not disputed by  the defense, that at midnight  on October 9, 1935, a man  whose face was  covered by a handkerchief climbed into the house of Leon or  Leonardo Nacpil and Marcelina Mercado, attacked them and their son Jose Nacpil with a bolo, while they were asleep, and later set fire to their house in order to burn it, as it in fact, burned.  Leon or Leonardo Nacpil and Marcelina Mercado died instantly of the wounds received by  them and their bodies were found burned and charred on  the  following  day.  It is also proven  by the prosecution  and not disputed by the defense  that in the barrio where the deceased lived, there were some people who considered them witches; that one month or some weeks prior to the night in question, the accused Leoncio Piring, Ciriaco Piring and others went to the house of the deceased spouses to ask the deceased Leon or Leonardo Nacpil to explain why he had been  circulating the  story that they had robbed  him of a plow; and as he told them, after a slight altercation, that he really suspected  Leoncio Piring, Leoncio, together with his  brother Ciriaco Piring and one De la Pena, challenged him to a fight, surrounding him later, holding him by the hands  in order to take away his  bolo, and wounding him  in the little finger.

The boy Jose Nacpil testified that on the night in question he was awakened by the cries of his  father; that he saw a man, whose face was covered by a handkerchief, attacked his father  and mother with a bolo; that said man forthwith approached him  saying "there is the boy",  as if he were addressing somebody; that he was later struck in the  face with a bolo, which rendered him unconscious; that when he regained consciousness,  their house was already on fire; and had it not been for a  voice that told him to "come down right away", he would not have gotten up because he had no strength  to move.  He further testified that the man whose face was covered by a handkerchief, who attacked him and his parents, was no other than the appellant; that he recognized the man not only by his voice with  which  he was already  familiar, according  to  him, but also by the clothes he wore, which were the same as those worn by him in the morning of the following day, when the constabulary took him from his house for investigation.

The defense contends that the testimony of the boy Jose Nacpil  should be disregarded because it is unworthy of credit; because his version of the incident, which he claims to have witnessed, is improbable, being based upon a miracle, and because miracles are  unbelievable.  In addition to the foregoing, said boy really testified that it was the child Jesus who, after he had jumped from their house to escape from the lire, led him to that of his sister Josefa  Nacpil about a kilometer away.  Be it a miracle or a hallucination that gave Jose Nacpil strength to arrive at his sister's house on  the night in question, after he had already been wounded, the truth  is that the  appellant himself, in a confession made by him before the justice of the peace Ramon Miranda, on November 7, 1935  (Exhibit D-1-A) which confession he did not even attempt to contradict be- cause, on  the contrary, his counsel stated in his brief that had the appellant testified at the trial, the only thing he could have stated would be the same as that contained in his confession admitted that upon the invitation of his uncle Felix Capili,  he accompanied the  latter,  together with Flaviano  Capili and  Leoncio  Piring, to the house  of  the deceased for the purpose of killing them for being witches, although to lessen  his  liability he stated that at first he had refused to accompany him, telling that he did not want to take  a life; that he finally decided to follow his uncle because the latter threatened  to  kill him  if  he did not do so; and that, at any rate, he did not directly participate in the commission of the crimes imputed to him and his co-accused, because  the only one who went up the house to commit them and  later set the house on fire was Felix Capili.  Therefore, the testimony of the boy Jose  Nacpil is neither, unworthy of credit, nor improbable, particularly, if it is taken into consideration that the clothes worn by the appellant in the morning after the night of the crime were similar if not the same as those which the boy saw were worn by the man who attacked *him and his parents. If to this is added the fact that the voice which  uttered the words "there is  the  boy",  referring to  Jose  Nacpil, before he was wounded, belonged to the appellant himself, according to said witness there would be  no doubt  that said appellant  directly participated  in  the  commission of the murder of  Leon or Leonardo Nacpil and that of Marcelina Mercado.

It is not strange that  the appellant has not admitted having  personally committed the two crimes in question before  justice  of the  peace Ramon  Miranda, because, ordinarily, it is the natural tendency of every transgressor, with very rare exceptions, to acquit  himself of all liability while he can do so, or at least  mitigate it  in the eyes of the  law and  of his fellowmen.   Let  it not be said that as the  appellant's admission contained  in Exhibit D-1-A is based upon the fact therein stated that he was threatened with death by his uncle Felix Capili,  instead of prejudicing him, greatly favors him, for it supplies him with evidence exempting  him from all  responsibility inasmuch as  evidence of such nature, if  admitted, must be  admitted and accepted in its entirety,  because it  does  not appear that the  threat has been continuous and  he had  had no opportunity to evade it.  It appears, however, that he had said opportunity because Felix  Capili had left him and his companions Flaviano Capili  and Leoncio Piring alone, when Felix Capili went up to  the house of the deceased.  The part of said document  proving  this reads: "*  *  *   my  uncle  Felix  Capili,  his  son  Flaviano Capili, my  younger brother Leoncio  Piring and I were on our way to  the  house  of the spouses Leon Nacpil  and Marcelina Mercado, when we reached a place overgrown with  cogon near  Leon  Nacpils  house, my uncle Felix Capili instructed us to stay there because it was too early* that at about 12 o'clock at  night, according to his calculation, he brought us to the house  of Leon Nacpil  and Marcelina Mercado.   Upon arriving there  my uncle Felix Capili went up to the house.  He wanted us to follow  him but we three did not go  up; we remained downstairs."

The foregoing  confession of the appellant disproves everything he may say about his having been threatened to death by Felix Capili and  his not having conspired with the latter and the other two persons above-stated.

On the other hand, the rule that a confession should be admitted and considered in its entirety, whether a  part thereof be favorable or unfavorable to the accused, stated in general terms in the case of United States vs. Alano (32 Phil., 381), is not absolute as this court has  already held in People vs. Layos (60 Phil., 760).   The reason for this is that there  may be instances, and in fact there are some  instances, where only a part of confessions or admissions  of  the nature  of Exhibit  D-1-A  is admissible, rejecting the rest by reason of the improbability of the facts or statements contained therein, or because there are other reasons or facts showing that  they are false thus  making them unworthy of credit.  In  the present case, the testimony of Jose  Nacpil, the clothes worn by the appellant on the morning of his arrest, his antecedents with the deceased Leon  or Leonardo Nacpil, and the belief of some people of his barrio that Leon or Leonardo Nacpil and his wife were witches, disprove and destroy everything favorable to the appellant contained in his said confession,  Exhibit  D-1-A.

In  view of the  foregoing, it seems clear that the  first two errors  attributed to the lower court by the appellant are unfounded, and we are of the opinion that said appellant should be found guilty  not  of only  one  crime of double murder but of two crimes of murder:  the one  committed on  the person of Leon or Leonardo Nacpil and that committed on  the  person of Marcelina Mercado.   Treachery should be considered as a qualifying circumstance of said two  crimes,  and as  aggravating circumstances those of disguise, as the fact that one covers his face with a handkerchief constitutes disguise because he thereby avoids recognition ; and dwelling, because said crimes were committed in the  very  house where the deceased lived.  The only mitigating circumstance  to be  taken into consideration in favor of the appellant is his lack of instruction.

The  circumstances  of nighttime,  uninhabited  place, cruelty  and  aid of  armed persons  cannot  be taken into consideration as aggravating  circumstances  because the first,  or nighttime,  was  necessarily included  in  that of treachery; that of uninhabited place, because it  has not been proven  that there were no houses near the house of the deceased; that of cruelty, because the fire, which is the fact in  which said circumstance is  made to consist, took place after the victims were  already dead,  the appellant not having taken advantage of said means  to deliberately augment the seriousness of the crime; and that of aid of armed persons, because the appellant  as  well as those who cooperated with him in the commission of the crimes in question acted  under the 3ame plan and for the  same purpose.

Were it  not for  the fact that there has  been no  unanimity in  imposing the death penalty upon  the  appellant, this penalty  should be the one imposed upon him, because by compensating the aggravating circumstance of disguise with  the circumstance of lack of  instruction  there  still remains the  aggravating circumstance of dwelling which, by  itself alone, is sufficient to warrant the  imposition of said penalty.  However, as there has been  no  unanimity in the  decision, the penalty next  lower  to death,  which is reclusion perpetua in each case,  that is, for the murder of Leon or Leonardo Nacpil and for the murder  of Marcelina Mercado, should be  imposed upon him, by  virtue of the provisions  of section 133 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 2  of  Commonwealth Act No. 3.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is modified, sentencing the appellant  to reclusion  perpetua for  the murder of  Leon or  Leonardo  Nacpil,  and to another penalty of the same nature for the murder of Marcelina Mercado; and in each case to indemnify the heirs of  each  of the deceased in the sum of P1,000.  The judgment in question is affirmed  in  all other respects,  except in  regard to the pronouncement thereof relative  to the  crime of serious physical injuries committed on the person of  Jose Nacpil, which is left open for the decision of the Court of Appeals, with  the  costs  of this instance to the  appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C  J., Villa-Real, Imperial,  Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.