Appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of theft.   Upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced to suffer  four months and one  day of arresto  mayor, and an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual  delinquency. In support of this appeal counsel de oficio for the appellant contends that the lower court erred (1)  in not advising the  appellant of his right to have counsel; and (2) in sentencing him to suffer the penalty above indicated

1. In  United  States vs. Escalante  (36 Phil., 743), this court held that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to have counsel is not sufficient ground  to  reverse a judgment of conviction.  The  reason for this doctrine, is that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases; and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to  the contrary.  (U. S. vs. Labial and Abuso, 27 Phil., 82; People vs. Del  Rosario, G. R. No. 44239, promulgated January 8, 1936  [62 Phil., 975].)  In the instant case, there is no affirmative showing that the appellant  was not advised of his right  to have counsel. We, therefore, find no merit in the first error assigned by counsel for the appellant.

2. Although the point is  not discussed  in  the  brief of counsel for the appellant, the second assignment  of error is sufficiently broad to raise the question of whether the additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency was properly imposed.  The  only allegation in the information concerning this matter is the following:

"That the accused  Bruno  Ocbina y De los Santos (alias Bruno Ocvina) is an habitual delinquent, he having already been convicted three (3)  times  of the  crime of theft, by virtue of final judgments of a competent court, the date of his last conviction being December 13, 1935."

In the recent case of People vs. Venus (G. R. No. 45141, p. 435, ante),  this court  held  that an  allegation of  this nature in an  information was too general and therefore insufficient to sustain a conviction  for habitual delinquency upon a plea of guilty.   It follows that the additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor imposed on the appellant must be eliminated from the judgment below.

Modified as above indicated the judgment is affirmed with costs de oficio  in this instance.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.