Tomas Tapel was charged with and convicted of the crime of theft  and sentenced  by the Court  of  First Instance of Manila to one month and one  day of arresto mayor, to indemnify Hamilton Brown, owner of the stolen articles, in the sum of P14, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and  to pay the costs of the suit.  Being a habitual delinquent,  he was furthermore sentenced to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor.

Not agreeing to his sentence, Tomas Tapel appealed therefrom, alleging that  the lower court committed  the  three errors relied upon in his brief  as follows:

"I. In taking into consideration, for the purposes  of a conviction under article 62, subsection  5, of the  Revised Penal Code, and  to declare him a habitual delinquent, the evidence presented in the municipal court wherein this case was originally brought, said court not being a  court  of record in accordance with law.

"II.  In not taking into account the information filed in this case and the defendant's- spontaneous plea of 'guilty' made therein in open court, and

"III.  In imposing upon him an excessive penalty contrary to and outside the law."

When the appellant was arraigned in the lower court, he  spontaneously confessed  having committed  the crime with which he was charged therein, thereby admitting not only his guilt but also all the material facts alleged against him.  One of said facts is that he had been previously convicted twice of the crime of simple  theft and four times of the crime of qualified theft, but the information is silent as to the dates of said convictions except one, which was December  5, 1929.  It  is evident, therefore, that in the commission of the crime herein  imputed to the  appellant, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession, which mutually compensate each other, must be taken into account thus  producing the effect  of imposing the penalty corresponding to said appellant's crime in its medium period (art. 64,  rule 4, of the Revised Penal Code).

By reason of the amount involved therein, the crime imputed to the appellant is punished in article 309, subsection 5, of said Code, with arresto mayor in its full extent, and the medium period of said penalty is from two months and one day to four months.

The allegation in the information that the appellant  is a habitual delinquent reads  as follows:

"That the said accused is a habitual delinquent under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, he haying been previously convicted twice or the crime of theft and four times of the crime of qualified theft, by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts, having been last convicted on  December 5, 1929."

We have already stated more than once that an allegation of this nature is insufficient to warrant the conclusion that if the accused in one case pleads guilty, he actually admits that he is a habitual delinquent.  In the cases of People vs. Santiago (55 Phil., 266),  and People vs.  Venus  (p. 435, ante), not to mention others, we extensively stated the reasons why this is so and it is not amiss that we reiterate the recommendation made by us in the latter of said two cases.  Prosecuting attorneys  should take case that in preparing their informations in cases wherein an averment of habitual delinquency  must be made against the  accused, the dates of the commission  of his previous crimes, the dates of his  convictions and those of his release for service of sentence are clearly expressed so as to avoid the inconveniences stated in said case of People vs. Venus.

The principal penalty that should have been imposed upon the appellant is four months of  arresto mayor, which  is included within  the medium period of that prescribed by law.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is modified, sentencing the appellant to  four months of arresto mayor, instead of one  month  and  one day thereof,  without  the  additional penalty imposed  upon him by the lower court, it not having been proved that  he  is  a habitual  delinquent, and it is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J.,  Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Recto, and  Laurel, JJ., concur.