The petitioner, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Concepcion Gerona, filed this petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,  dated February  26, 1936, granting the motion of February 5th of said year and ordering the cancellation of the allegations contained in paragraph 22  of the third amended complaint filed in civil case No. 9137  of said court, and to compel the respondent judge to permit the parties to present evidence relative to the value of the fruits and rentals of the lands which  are the subject matter of the action.

The above-stated  case was  instituted  by the petitioner against the respondents, with the exception  of the judge, to recover the possession of the undivided half of the real properties described in paragraph 2 of the amended  complaint.  In the latter the petitioner alleged that the intestate estate of  which he was  administrator was likewise entitled to the rentals and  fruits of the  real properties claimed by him and that the respondents-defendants had illegally appropriated them, for which reason he  stated in paragraph 20 thereof that he had the right to  demand an accounting of said rentals and fruits from the respondents in order that the court might render judgment  for their entire value  in his  favor.  Several hearings on the case were held and in one of them the attorney for  the  petitioner attempted to prove by means of a  witness the value of the rentals and fruits of the real properties, which the respondents had  received and refused to turn over to the petitioner.  The  attorney for the respondents-defendants objected to the evidence on the ground that it was premature and  that it would engender  delay in  the trial  and determination of the case, because they would  also be compelled to present evidence on the value of the improvements made by the respondents-defendants on the lands. He stressed the fact that the petitioner had asked that the respondents- defendants render an accounting of the rentals and fruits received by them and that the petitioner was not entitled to present evidence tending to show the value thereof until the accounting is submitted  and questioned.  The  court sustained the objection and the  attorney for the petitioner did not insist.   The petitioner later presented  his  second amended complaint,  alleging in paragraph 20 thereof that the value of the rentals and fruits of the properties in Occidental Negros received by Ignacio Arroyo from 1895 to 1924 amounted to not less than P200,000 and that the value of said rentals and fruits received by Mariano B. Arroyo and the testate estate of Jose M. Arroyo from the year 1925 to 1935 was not less than P700,000; that the rentals and fruits of the properties in the Province of Iloilo, which were received  by Ignacio  Arroyo, amounted  to  not less than P100,000,  and asked that the pleading be admitted. Upon the resumption of  the trial and before the second amended complaint was admitted, the court became aware that the Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario  de Molo and the municipality of  Iloilo, as donees, ,s were necessary parties in this pleading but, in spite thereof, they were not joined as defendants.  To cure the defect,  it ordered the  attorney for  the  petitioner  to amend  his  amended complaint by joining said entities as defendants, and the trial was again postponed.  The attorney for the  petitioner filed his third amended complaint, dated January 20, 1936, reproduced in paragraph 22 the allegations relative to  the value of the rentals and fruits of the  real properties during the entire period of time  that they were in the possession of the respondents-defendants and their  predecessors  in  interest, joined the two entities above-stated as new defendants and applied for the admission thereof.  He served the  attorney for the respondents-defendants with  a copy of the pleading with a notice at the foot thereof to the effect that on the following Saturday,  January 25,1936, he would ask the court to admit  the third  amended complaint in question. The court admitted this  pleading without any objection on the part of  the attorney for  the  respondents-defendants.  After the admission of the third amended complaint, the attorney for the  respondents-defendants, in a motion of February 5,  1936,  asked for the rejection of paragraph 22 thereof on the grounds already stated.  The court, in an order of February 26 of said year, granted the motion and  directed the cancellation  of  the allegations  of said paragraph 22 of the third amended complaint, reiterating its resolution that the petitioner could not introduce evidence on the value of the rentals and fruits until the case is determined and it is decided that the account should be rendered.

The petitioner does not claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or exceeded it  in issuing the disputed order but alleges that it abused its discretion in ordering the cancellation of paragraph 22 of  the third amended complaint and in preventing him from presenting evidence to show the  value  of  the rentals  and fruits, as specified in said paragraph 22.  The  respondents, particularly the defendants, claim the contrary and furthermore insist that the third amended complaint was approved surreptitiously because the petitioner's attorney did not previously obtain permission to present it; that had the petition been presented in said sense, the attorney for the respondents-defendants would have been aware of the  nature of the amendment and would have objected to the admission of paragraph 22; that the  court acted correctly in  ordering the cancellation of the  amendment because it is  not authorized by article 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and if the amendment and the  presentation  of  evidence in  support thereof is permitted, the respondents-defendants would likewise  be entitled to Introduce evidence  on the improvements alleged by them in their answers, all  of which would cause unnecessary delay in  the  determination of the case and also prevent the termination and filing of the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ignacio Arroyo and Jose  Ma. Arroyo.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the remedy of certiorari lies when it appears that the court, which  has issued the order in question, has abused the discretion conferred upon it by the  law,  although it has  acted  with jurisdiction and has not exceeded its authority in the exercise thereof (sec. 217 of the  Code of Civil Procedure; De Castro and  Morales vs. Justice of the Peace of Bocaue, 33 Phil., 595; Valdez vs. Querubin, 37 Phil., 774; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182; Salvador Campos y Cia. vs. Bel Rosario, 41 Phil., 45; Larrobis  vs. Wislizenus and Smith, Bell  & Co., 42 Phil., 401).   Consequently, the question to be decided is whether or not the court abused its discretion in issuing the order  of February  26, 1936, directing  the cancellation of the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the third amended complaint and prohibiting the attorney for  the  petitioner from  presenting  evidence in support thereof.   This court holds the affirmative.  Under section 110  of the Code of Civil Procedure, amendments for  the purpose of correcting an erroneous allegation or a mistake in the allegation are permissible, and section 105 provides that a supplemental complaint may  be presented for  the purpose of alleging material facts occurring after the filing of the original complaint.  Both amended and supplemental complaints should, of course, be filed at any stage  of  the trial but  before final judgment is  rendered.  In  the first amended complaint, the petitioner had already alleged that as administrator he was likewise entitled to the rentals and fruits produced by the real properties  in  question during the entire period that they were in  the illegal possession of the respondents-defendants;  that, notwithstanding the  demands made of them, the latter refused to pay  for or to turn them over to him, and that,  not knowing their true value, the respondents-defendants  should be compelled in the judgment  to  render  an  accounting thereof.  In  the course of the  trial, the attorney for the petitioner discovered evidence tending to establish the amount of said rentals and fruits for which reason, he filed  the second and third amended complaints alleging the  value of said rentals and fruits, and, by way of  a remedy, he  asked that judgment be rendered for the entire value thereof.  In view of this, it appears evident that the third amended complaint, whether considered as an amendment or as a supplemental complaint, should have  been admitted sq that  all the controversies raised by the parties in their  pleadings might be decided only once and at the same trial.  It cannot be successfully alleged that the petitioner had changed his mind or that he had  essentially changed the nature of his action on  the rentals and fruits, because from the beginning he had  already invoked his right to recover the rentals and fruits of the properties or to demand payment of their value of the respondents-defendants.  All that happened  was that the petitioner discovered evidence showing him the value of the rentals and fruits  which he claimed, and it is for this reason that he alleged it in the third amended complaint and abandoned his former allegation that the respondents- defendants were obliged to render an accounting.

It is sound procedural practice to ask for previous permission to  present  an amended complaint  or any other amended pleading, but such technicality may be disregarded in this jurisdiction, and  ordinarily  the  motion is  accompanied by the amended complaint or  answer, as the case may be, the court generally granting  both the permission and  the admission of the amended pleading in  only one order.  In this  case,  the respondents-defendants  cannot complain  of any prejudice because their attorney received beforehand notice and a copy of the third amended complaint and it is to be presumed that he had knowledge of its contents when the court admitted it. It is inferred from the foregoing that the third amended complaint was not admitted surreptitiously by the court.

There  is not much  merit in  the contention that if the amendment is accepted and the petitioner permitted to present evidence on the value of the rentals and fruits of the property, the case would suffer much delay and the trial would be  indefinitely and unnecessarily prolonged because the respondents-defendants would also present evidence to substantiate their  allegations on improvements.  If the court were to proceed in accordance with its theory, that is, disregarding the amendment and the evidence on the  rentals and fruits, the result would be that if final judgment were rendered in favor of the  petitioner after an appeal, the case would have to be tried anew by the  same court to compel the respondents-defendants to render  an accounting and to give the parties opportunity to present evidence on the exactness thereof.  Afterwards any of the parties could again  appeal  thus implying1 two appeals.   On the other hand, if the evidence on the rentals and fruits and on the improvements is presented now, the court will render only one decision and there would be only one appeal.  Neither is the assertion that if the amendment and the presentation of such evidence were permitted, the intestate proceedings of the two deceased would suffer delay because they could not  be considered terminated. This court understands that the contrary would happen precisely if the proceeding planned by the court were followed, and the reason is clear because, with the  petitioner and two  of the respondents-defendants intervening as judicial administrators, the intestate proceedings of which they are functionaries could not legally be considered terminated while the principal case and any of the incidents thereof are pending.

For the foregoing considerations, the order of February 26, 1936, signed by the respondent judge, is set aside and the latter is  ordered to admit paragraph 22 of the third amended complaint as well as the other  paragraphs with allegations related to those contained therein; to  permit the petitioner and the respondents-defendants to present evidence on the value of the rentals and fruits produced by. the real properties during the time specified in the third amended complaint, and furthermore, to permit the respondents-defendants as well as  the petitioner to present evidence relative to the improvements allegedly made thereon by the former, with the costs of these proceedings to the respondents-defendants.  So ordered.

Villa-Real,  Abad Santos,  Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.