This is an appeal taken by the accused Dominador Flores y Aguilar from the judgment of the  Court of First Instance  of Manila  finding him self-confessed and guilty of the crime of frustrated theft provided for and punished in article 309, case 5, in connection with article 50, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to the principal penalty of eleven days of arresto menor  and the additional penalty of two  years, four months and one day of prison correctional for being a habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law and costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant contends that the court a quo erred in sentencing him to the principal penalty of eleven days of arresto menor.

The penalty  prescribed by article 309,  case  5, of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of consummated  theft is arresto mayor to its full extent, if the value of the  thing stolen is over P5 but  does not exceed P50.  As the crime of which the defendant-appellant pleaded  guilty is  frustrated theft, the penalty which should be imposed  upon him is the one next lower in degree to arresto mayor, which is arresto menor, in accordance with the provisions of article 50, in connection with articles 61 and 70 of said  Code. Inasmuch as the aggravating  circumstance of recidivism (art.  14, subsec. 9 of the  Revised Penal Code), which is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilty (art. 13, subsec. 7, of said Code), was present at the commission of the crime,  said  penalty of arresto menor should be imposed in its medium period,  or from eleven to twenty days  of arresto menor, pursuant to rules 1 and 4 of article 64 of said Code.  The principal penalty imposed by the trial court is, therefore, in accordance with law.

The defendant-appellant does not  assign as error  the fact that he was declared a habitual delinquent and imposed the corresponding  additional  penalty by the trial court. Having pleaded guilty of the crime of frustrated theft with which he is charged in the information, and having admitted thereby only the facts alleged therein, which facts are insufficient to prove the existence of habitual delinquency because neither the dates of the former convictions nor those of the commission  of the crimes of which he was convicted are  specified  in said information, the  additional penalty prescribed for habitual delinquency cannot "be imposed upon him and, therefore,  the court a quo committed an error of law  in declaring the defendant-appellant a habitual delinquent.   (People vs. Santiago, 55 Phil., 266; People vs. De la Cruz, G. R. No. 33786, promulgated  February 7, 1931, not reported; People vs. Ventura, 56 Phil., 1; Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140; People vs. Morales,  61 Phil., 222; People vs. Artigas, G. R. No. 43901, promulgated November 27, 1935 [62 Phil., 972]; People vs. De la Rama, G. R. No. 43744, promulgated November 27,1935 [62 Phil, 972]; People vs. Venus, p. 435, ante.)

Wherefore,  the appealed sentence is reversed in so far as it declares the accused a habitual delinquent and,imposes the corresponding  additional penalty upon  him, and it is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs of  both instances to the appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.