On March  16, 1936,  the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed  with  the Court of  First  Instance  of that city  an information  charging the  defendant, Bienvenido Venus, with  the crime of robbery  in an  inhabited house. The  information alleges that  on  or about the 9th  day of March, 1936, the defendant entered the house then occupied by Zoila de Talaban at 1328 M. Natividad Street,  Manila, Philippines, by breaking the hasp of the door of said house which was secured by a padlock and once inside took  and carried  away, with the intent of  gain  and  without  the consent of the owner thereof, various personal properties belonging to Zoila de Talaban of the  total value of one hundred and eighty-eight  pesos and fifty centavos.  The information further alleges "that the  said  accused is a habitual delinquent, he having previously been convicted by final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934."

The  accused, in the court below, pleaded  guilty to the information whereupon the trial court rendered judgment imposing upon him  an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to three years, three months and twenty-one days of prision correctional,  with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the complainant Zoila de Talaban in the amount of P97.60, which represents the value of the personal properties not recovered  from  the accused,  with subsidiary  imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.  The articles recovered from the accused were ordered returned to the complainant.   From this decision, the defendant has appealed to  this court.  The trial  court, in imposing the prison  sentence  upon the  defendant-appellant, took  into account the aggravating circumstance  of recidivism because the date of the conviction of the accused for the crime of theft is specified in the  information, but it refused  to consider  the defendant-appellant  a  habitual  delinquent under the provisions of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code for the following reason:

"El Juzgado, sin embargo, considera que la alegacion de delincuencia  habitual es deficiente,  y sobre  la misma no puede ser condenado el acusado con una pena adicional correspondiente a la alegacion de  habitualidad, pues las palabras 'That the said accused is a habitual delinquent, he  having previously been  convicted by final judgments rendered by  a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his last  conviction being November 14, 1934', no especifican cuando cometio el delito de tentativa de robo y cuando fue condenado por dicho delito."

There is no question as to the guilt of the defendants appellant, Bienvenido Venus.  The only question before us now refers to the propriety of the penalty imposed  upon him.  Counsel de oficio for the appellant recommends confirmation of the decision of the lower court.  The Solicitor-General,  however, recommends that the  defendant-appellant be also adjudged a  habitual delinquent.

We are of the opinion that  the circumstance of multi-recidivism, known in our  law as habitual  delinquency, can not be taken into account in the present case because of the insufficiency of the allegation on this  point in the city fiscal's information.   In the recent case of People vs. Masonson (G. R. No. 44527, promulgated March 31, 1936, p. 92, ante), the allegation  in  the information as to habitual delinquency was as follows: "That the said  accused is a habitual delinquent, having  been convicted four times of a similar offense by virtue of final judgments  rendered  by competent courts,  the date  of the last of said convictions being September 9, 1935."  This court,  speaking through its Chief Justice, said: "*  *  *  The allegation in the information that the appellant was already convicted  four times of similar crimes, is not  sufficient to show that said crimes were precisely those enumerated by the law and for the conviction of which the appellant should be considered a habitual delinquent. The word similar has no legal definition in  the  Penal  Code and it is too abstract in its general acceptation.   There may be crimes similar in some sense to  that charged in  the present case, which  are not those enumerated in  the law the conviction of which constitutes an element of habitual delinquency.

"Aside from this, it appears in the information that the last of these former convictions was on September 9, 1935, and  the crime charged was committed prior thereto, that is, on  August 6th of said year.   This  court has  already held in former cases that in order that former convictions may constitute an element of habitual delinquency, they must precede the commission of the crime charged (People vs. Santiago, 55 Phil., 266).

"Discarding this last conviction of September 9, 1935, it appears that the information no longer contains any allegation of the date of the other three former convictions, and it cannot be stated whether they also were subsequent to the commission of the crime charged, or, if prior thereto, they were rendered  more than ten years before the commission of the crime charged.   In either case, there would be no habitual delinquency herein."

The Solicitor-General correctly asserts that  the information in the case before us, unlike that in the case of Masonson, specifies the  particular offense (attempted robbery in an inhabited house)  for which the defendant-appellant was alleged to have previously been convicted and also the date of the last conviction for theft which occurred  prior to the date of the  commission of the offense now charged. But this does not make the information sufficient in law for it fails to specify the date  of the conviction of the accused for the crime of attempted robbery.  For all we know, the two previous convictions for attempted robbery in an inhabited house and theft may have taken  place on the  same date (November 14,  1934) or on two different dates so close together as to  warrant the court in considering the two convictions as  only one for the purposes of the application of the habitual  delinquency law  (People  vs. Santiago [1930],  55 Phil.,  266; People  vs. De  la  Cruz, G. R. No. 33786, promulgated February 7, 1931, not reported; People vs. Ventura [1931], 56 Phil., 1; Paguntalan vs. Director of Prisons [1932], 57 Phil., 140; People vs. Kaw Liong and Yu Siong [1933],  57 Phil.,  839; People  vs. Morales, 61 Phil., 222; People vs. Artigas, G.  R. No. 43901, promulgated Nov- ember 27,1935 [62 Phil., 972]; People vs. De la Rama, G. R. No. 43744, November 27, 1935 [62 Phil., 972]).  Upon the other hand, it may happen that a person accused of  robo, hurto, estafa or fdlsificacion may have been  convicted of any of said offenses after the commission of the crime with which he is charged.  We nave already held that previous convictions  in  order to be considered for the purpose of imposing the additional  penalty  for  habitual delinquency, must precede the commission of the crime charged.   (People vs. Santiago, supra; People vs. Masonson, supra.)  Other instances may  be mentioned but  those given suffice to demonstrate the  necessity  of charging the existence of habitual delinquency with  sufficient clearness and certainty to enable the courts to properly apply the provisions of our law on the  subject.

It is therefore urged  upon prosecuting attorneys  that in the prosecution of cases of this nature, they should not content themselves  with  a general averment  of habitual delinquency but should specify the dates  (1) of the conumission of  the  previous crimes, (2)  of the last conviction or release,  and (3)  of the other previous  convictions or release of the  accused.  Informations filed  in  these cases should be sufficiently clear and specific to  avoid the improper imposition of the additional penalty on a  plea of guilty to a  general allegation of habitual delinquency, no less  than the  frequency  with which hardened  criminals escape the imposition of the deserved additional  penalty provided  for by law.  As early as 1923, this court, in the case of People  vs. Nayco (45 Phil, 167), had  occasion to refuse the  imposition of the additional penalty provided by law for  habitual  delinquents on account of the insufficiency of the allegations  in the information.  In that  case of Nayco, the information alleged that "the herein  accused has heretofore  been  twice convicted of theft "in the municipal court, by virtue of final judgment".  This  court said:

"For want of an  allegation in the information  in the instant case to the effect that the defendant was an habitual delinquent, under the terms and provisions of Act No. 3062, all of the sentence under that Act is error, and must be eliminated  from the judgment."

In the case  of People vs. Dominguez (G. R. No. 44221, promulgated January 8, 1936 [62 Phil., 975]), the information  alleged "That the said accused has already been convicted eleven  (11) times  of the crime of estafa and eight (8) times of the crime of theft, by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts."   This court held that:

"The  allegation in the information that the accused has already been  convicted eleven times of  estafa and eight times of theft by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts is not sufficient  on a plea of guilty to sustain  a finding that the accused is  a  habitual delinquent.  It is provided in article 62 of the Revised Penal Code that a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if  within a  period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa,  or falsification,  he is found guilty of said  crimes a third time or oftener.   In the case before us there is no allegation as to the date of the last conviction or release of the defendant, or as to the date  of his other convictions or  when  the crimes for  which he was convicted were committed.  It is  important whenever the evidence warrants it that prosecuting attorneys should take pains to allege and prove the facts necessary to constitute habitual delinquency.  In the present  case the accused, a criminal by profession, who has already been convicted eleven times of estafa and eight times  of theft, cannot be declared a habitual delinquent because of the insufficient allegations of the information.  After a short term in prison, he will be free  to prey again upon society.   (People  vs.  Santiago, 55 Phil., 266; People vs. De la Cruz, G. R. No. 33786, promulgated February 7, 1931, not reported; People  vs. Morales, 61 Phil., 222.)"

In the case of People vs. Morales  (61 Phil.,  222), the information alleged "That the herein accused is a habitual  delinquent under the  provisions of article 62  of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 6 (c), in that he has been five times convicted  of the crime  of estafa  by  virtue of final judgments handed down by competent courts, the last one herein  complained  of having  been  committed  within the period of ten years from the date of his last conviction." This court held  that:

"While it is well settled that a plea of guilty admits all the material allegations in the information, including that of habitual delinquency, in the case before us the information failed  to allege the date of the appellant's last conviction or release.   It simply averred  that the  crime  herein complained of was 'committed within the period of ten years from  the date  of his last  conviction.  Apart  from  the fact that such averment is a mere conclusion of fact, the law specifically  provides that a person  shall  be  deemed  a habitual delinquent if within a period  of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction, he is found guilty of the crime of  estafa a third time or oftener.   It is thus clear  that what is material is not the date of commission of the subsequent offense, but that of his conviction thereof, in relation  to the date of his release or last conviction. As stated by this court in People vs. Siojo (G. R. No. 36835, 57 Phil., 1005): 'It is true that there is an admission that the appellant had previously been convicted four times of the crime of theft, but there is no showing that the judgment  appealed from was rendered within the  period of ten years from appellant's last conviction or from his last release.'  *  *  *"  (See also People vs.  Ilanan [C. A.] 34 Off. Gaz., 1238.)

The defendant and appellant in the case at bar can not be considered a habitual  delinquent but only a  recidivist. As the plea of guilty offsets the  aggravating  circumstance of recidivism, the penalty provided for in article 299  of the Revised  Penal Code for the crime of robbery in an inhabited house by  means of unlawful entry where  the criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen does not exceed 250 pesos, should be imposed in the medium degree in accordance with the provisions of  article  64 of the Revised Penal Code.   Applying the provisions  of  the Indeterminate Sentence Law (People vs. Co Pao [1934], 58 Phil., 545;  People vs.  Gayrama  [1934], 60 Phil.,  796), the principal penalty imposed by the court a quo is modified and instead  the  penalty  of  six  months  and  one  day to two years, eleven  months and  eleven days  of prision correctional, is hereby imposed upon the defendant-appellant, Bienvenido Venus.  With this only modification, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the appellant in both instances.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto,  JJ., concur.