On April 10, 1931, Felix Sepagan applied  for the confirmation  and  registration in his name in the registry of deeds, pursuant  to the  provisions of  Act  No. 496, of his alleged title or right to the two parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Bula and Nabua of  the Province of Camarines Sur, described in his application and more particularly in his plans Exhibits A and B, and in the technical description sheet  attached thereto.

After the publication of the notices required by  said Act, and  also  after the issuance of the order of December 15, 1931, declaring in default  all those persons who,  pretending to have an interest in the lands claimed by Felix Sepagan to belong to him, failed to  appear  to  file  their opposition to said application, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, after due hearing, rendered its decision and judgment on March 10,  1932, decreeing the adjudication and registration of the parcels  of land in question in the registry of deeds, in the name of Felix Sepagan.  The final decree of registration in the registry was issued by the Chief of the  General  Land Registration Office on December 23, 1932.

Two  years  later,  or on August 7, 1934,  the applicant asked for the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in his favor and his petition was granted in the orders of September 10th and 12th of said year.  Before the writ authorized by said two orders could be executed, Paulino Dacillo, who claimed  to be one  of  the twenty  occupants of one of the parcels of land in question (land in Bula, parcel 1, plan Exhibit A), filed a motion in the lower court on October 22, 1934, praying: (1) That he be not ejected from the portion of the land in Bula where, according to  him, his house is built and where he has  been exercising acts of possession  under claim of ownership continuously for more than twenty-seven years, and (2) that the provincial sheriff be restrained from executing the writ of possession in question to his prejudice.  He alleged in his motion that he had not been a  party to the  registration  proceedings instituted  by  the applicant; that said  applicant did not notify him of the filing of his application, notwithstanding the fact that they had met several times, and that for said reasons he was informed of the  proceedings  had in this case only a few days before the filing of his motion in question.

The lower court,  after hearing the reasons  invoked by Paulino Dacillo and those invoked,  in turn, by the applicant, decided  to deny the former's  motion in  an order  of November 3,  1934,  issued to that  effect, which reads  as follows:

"There has been filed by Paulino Dacillo a motion praying that the petitioner be not ejected from the  parcel of land which is the subject matter of the application for registration,  upon a mere  writ  of  possession issued  by this court in favor of the applicant Felix Sepagan,  and that the provincial sheriff be restrained  from executing said  writ of possession against the petitioner.  It  is  admitted  in the motion of Paulino  Dacillo as well as in the answer of the attorney for the applicant  Felix  Sepagan to said motion, that the petitioner  was in possession of the land sought to be registered long  before the filing of the  application and long before the issuance  of the decree of registration.  The record shows that  the notices of  the hearing of Felix Sepagan's  application were posted  on the  land involved  in these proceedings,  and if the oppositor was  in possession of the land he should have appeared and filed his opposition to said application, if he believed himself to  be the owner of all or part of  the land.

"Not having done so,  he  is estopped from  opposing the writ of possession  sought by the  applicant, and for these reasons the  court  denies the petitioner's motion and the writ of possession  issued by this  court remains in force.

On December  12, 1934,  Paulino  Dacillo asked for the reconsideration of the order in question, invoking therefor the  doctrine laid  down  in  the  case   of  Manuel  vs. Rosauro  (56 Phil., 365).   His  petition  was  denied on the 15th  of said month and year and,  not agreeing  to both orders,  he appealed therefrom and now contends that the lower court erred: (1)  In authorizing  the issuance  of the writ of possession applied for by the applicant, against him, for the reason that  he  was never a party to this case; (2) in denying his motion,  it being in fact without jurisdiction to order his ejectment from a property  which was his, not having been defeated in a lawsuit  by the applicant; (3) in depriving  him of his property without due process of law, and (4) in  denying  his motion for reconsideration.

The parties do  not dispute the fact that, before the order of general default and the decision and judgment which it was attempted to carry  out by means of the  writ of possession in  question were rendered, it was proven that all the requisites of the law relative to the publication in the Official  Gazette  and in the customary public places, particularly on  the same parcels of land sought  to  be registered, of the necessary notices  to  the  effect  that Felix Sepagan had filed his  application giving  rise to this case, were  complied with.   Notwithstanding the  fact that  the name of Paulino Dacillo is not expressly  mentioned in the notices  in  question, there  appears therein the injunction to the whole  world for all those who believe themselves entitled or having cause to oppose Sepagan's application, to appear  and oppose it,  warning them that should they  fail to do so on the date and at the hour therein  specified, they would be declared  in default and would  not later  be permitted to impugn the  application of said Sepagan or  any decree that may be issued in said case.

Knowing the foregoing facts, let us now proceed to consider the question  raised by the appellant, which  may be summarized as follows: Was the appellant a  party  to these registration  proceedings or  not?  and  if he was,  Can he now prevent the  carrying out of the writ  of possession issued?

This  question is not  new because  it has already been held over and over again  that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rent, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice  to the owners or claimants  of the land or lands sought to  be  registered, to give the courts jurisdiction  or authority to pass upon the questions arising from the actions whereby said right is exercised  (Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil., 31;  Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil.,  49).

In the case of Roxas vs.  Enriquez, supra, it was  said:

"The requirement that personal notice shall  be a pre-requisite to the validity of  registration  would  absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to 'unknown claimants'.  The great difficulty in land titles arises from  the existence of  possible unknown  claimants.  Known claimants can be dealt with.  They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles.  Courts have held that in actions in rem,  personal notice to  owners of a res is not necessary to  give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res.  *  *  *"   (29 Phil., 31.)

In the  case of Grey  Alba vs.  Be  la  Cruz,  supra, it appears that although the appellee was not expressly mentioned  as one of those who had an interest in the  land questioned therein, he was joined as a party to the case by virtue  of the general notice or summons to the effect that all those who wished to oppose the application must appear at the trial in order to do so.  The  court, well informed of said facts, held  in said case that the decree issued therein was conclusive against the appellee as well as all the world, considering him necessarily  included  in the last phrase "all the world",  or, using the same  language of the notice: all whom it may concern".   It was said in said case:

The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in  rem, and not in  personam.  A proceeding in rem, dealing  with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service  upon  the claimants within the State or notice by name  to those out- side of it.  Jurisdiction is secured by the power  of the court over the res.  Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar  all."   (17  Phil., 49.)

In the  case  of Lopez Castelo vs.  Director of  Lands (48 Phil., 589),  it was  held:

"A land registration proceeding is in the nature  of a suit in rem; the decree entered therein operates directly on the land and, in the absence of fraud, is 'conclusive upon and against all persons'  (sec.  1, Act No. 496) though  they may not have received actual notice of the proceedings."

If it is true that the appellant, as affirmed by him in his motions of October 22,  1934, and  December  12th of said year, was occupying the land which he claims to have belonged to him for about twenty-seven years, and that he has  been actually living  there because  he built a house thereon,  he and his family must  have necessarily seen the notices posted thereon, inasmuch as the evidence, particularly the return made by the sheriff appearing on page 20 of the record, shows that the notices in question had really been posted on the land.  If he saw them, and yet he refused to take action by appearing, as was required of him, in order to file his  objections to the confirmation and  registration applied for, he now has no cause to complain against anybody.  He is to  blame for his carelessness and negligence.

After  the issuance of a decree in conformity  with the provisions of Act No. 496, which is in accordance with the Torrens  system, and after the lapse of  the period of one year fixed by law (sec. 38), to question the validity of said decree in a review proceeding,  the title becomes perfect and  unimpeachable, because if  it were not so,  there would be no end to litigations (Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil., 791;  Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David, 50 Phil., 797).  The veiled  purpose  of the appellant's motion,  which was denied by the  lower court in its order from which the appeal now under consideration was taken, is no other than to  reopen the case in order to give him a chance to prove that the land claimed by him is really his; that his own house is built thereon, and that the appellee succeeded in registering it in his name fraudulently and behind his back.

The ruling invoked  by the appellant  in  support of his contention is  not applicable to  the case  at bar because Pedro Manuel,  the petitioner in  said  case of Manuel vs.  Rosauro, supra,  did not  begin  to exercise acts  of possession over the  land  in  question until long after the issuance of the  decree of adjudication and registration in favor of Jeronimo de Leon, and  the possession of said petitioner  thereafter continued  uninterruptedly for  eleven years.  It was only after the lapse of these eleven years that when Pedro de Leon, Jeronimo de Leon's successor in interest, sought  the  issuance of a  writ of possession in his favor.  From this  it naturally follows that Pedro Manuel was really not a party to the  registration proceeding wherein the writ of possession was issued because while said proceeding was pending he did not yet have any  interest or right in the  land in question.  This case is different.  According to  his own allegations,  Paulino Dacillo began to possess the land claimed by him many years before this case was instituted by the applicant.  Under such circumstances it cannot be denied that he was a party thereto.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we hold that the errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are not true and that his appeal is unfounded.

Wherefore, after overruling the  appellant's  appeal,  the two  orders  appealed  from  are  hereby affirmed, without prejudice, however, to whatever right he may have arising after the judgment of adjudication had  been  rendered, with the costs of this instance to the appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur