This is a petition for a writ  of certiorari filed by Eduardo C. Guico praying for the review  of the proceedings had by the Court of Appeals in his two petitions  (G. R. Nos. 155 and 156) for the issuance of writs of mandamus addressed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

It appears  that Eduardo C. Guico applied to the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering the Court of First Instance of Rizal to approve and certify the bills of exceptions filed by him in registration proceedings Nos. 657 and 976 of said court; that the Court of Appeals, denying the application, made the following findings of fact in its decision, to wit:

1. On August 21,  1935, the herein petitioner received copy of the decision rendered on August 19, 1935, in cases Nos. 657 and  976 and filed an exception and a motion for new trial on September 5, 1935, based on  the ground  that the judgment is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence.
   
   
2. On September 28,  1935, the herein  petitioner received notice  of  the order of the court of September 26, 1935, denying his motion for new trial, and on the same date he filed an exception and a motion for reconsideration based on the  same grounds as those upon which his  first motion  for new trial was founded.
   
   
3. On November 7, 1935, the  attorney for  the herein petitioner was duly notified of the order of the court dated November 5, 1935, denying the motion for  reconsideration, and filed an exception thereto on November 12, 1935.
   
   
4. On November 21, 1935, the attorney for the herein petitioner filed a writing, dated November 18,1935, entitled Pieza de Excepciones Adicionales de Eduardo C. Guico, whereby he makes as  his own the joint bill of exceptions submitted by Azarraga and Ortega, attorneys for the other appellants, which was  disapproved by the respondent court on the ground that it was presented out of time.
   
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   "It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that his bill of exceptions was erroneously disapproved  by the respondent court,  alleging  that  his  motion  for  reconsideration presented September 28, 1935, had the effect of a motion for new trial inasmuch as the points raised by him in his previous motion (filed  September 5,  1935), one of which relates  to  an allegation of  unavoidable accident  in that the trial judge failed to consider in  his  decision certain documentary evidence, and the other relates to his prayer to clarify said decision with  respect to the adjudication of certain  lots mentioned therein, were  never decided at all.' Consequently, he  argues,  the running of the remaining period of 15 days, within  which he could still  perfect his appeal,  is deemed to have been suspended from the date of filing the said motion.
   
   "After reading the original motion for new trial  and the motion  for reconsideration in relation to the order of the court denying the previous motion, we find that both  motions are based on identical grounds all of  which, including the petition contained  in the prayer thereof, were passed upon and decided  in the  above cited  order of the court.  We hold, therefore, that the  aforementioned motion for reconsideration did not suspend the running of the period for perfecting the appeal.
   
   "Counting from September 28, 1935, when counsel for the petitioner was duly notified of the court's order  denying his motion for new trial, we find  that the remaining period of 15 days expired  on October  13, 1935; but  the bill of exceptions was not presented until November 21, 1935, that is 39 days  after the  expiration of the  period prescribed by law.  It is, therefore, evident that the allegation of the petitioner that his bill of  exceptions  was filed on  time is not supported by the facts, and  is wholly without merit." (Pages  2-4, decision of the Court of Appeals.)

The Court of Appeals,  acting on said applications for the issuance of writs  of mandamus,  so did in the exercise of the original jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 145-G of the Administrative Code which provides that the  Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of  mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its  appellate jurisdiction.

Our appellate jurisdiction in this case is limited to reviewing and examining the errors of law incurred by the Court  of Appeals, in accordance  with the provisions  of section 138, No. 6, of the Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3.

Inasmuch as the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals,  quoted in one of the statements of  this resolution, are conclusive, no question of law is raised before us by virtue of this petition because the question of whether or not the ruling laid down in Levett vs. Sy  Quia  (61 Phil., 847),  is applicable  to  this case  depends  upon the findings on the scope  and character of  the  motions for a new trial and reconsideration filed by the petitioner in the Court  of First Instance of Rizal  for the purposes of his appeal, and such findings, which implied the determination of a question of fact, were made by the  Court of Appeals in the sense that both motions were identical, thus making the application of  the rule in  question imperative.

Rule 47 (a)  of the  Rules  of the Supreme Court provides,  in respect to cases brought to it in connection with its  appellate jurisdiction, that only questions  of law may be raised therein and that the court has the power to order motu proprio the dismissal thereof if in its opinion they are without merit.

In view  of the foregoing, we are of the  opinion and so hold that we are without jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the  Court of Appeals, and the  petition must be dismissed,  without special  pronouncement as to costs.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real,  Abad Santos,  Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.