The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands  on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document.   He  objected to the jurisdiction of the court  on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of  the  Philippines the  court below had no jurisdiction to try him.  His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of  First  Instance of  Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal  action filed against him.

In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed  against the petitioner for the reason that under Article  III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2)  that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original  jurisdiction  over cases affecting  ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is  conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

This case involves no question of diplomatic  immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not  entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited.  (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U.  S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.)   A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2  DalL, 297; 1 Law.  ed.,  388; Wheaton's International Law  [2d  ed.],  423.)  The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.

1. We find no merit in  the  contention  that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case.   We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether  the constitutional provision relied  upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the Philippines.   Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a  fundamental  change  in  the  political  and  legal status of the Philippines.   On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full  force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.   Not only the members of this court but all  other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government  of the Common- wealth,  are  bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article  XIII, section 2.)   This court owes its own  existence to that great instrument, and derives  all its powers therefrom.  In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court  "shall  include all cases affecting  ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."  In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond  this  constitutional provision.

2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public  ministers, and consuls, is exclusive.   The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption  of  this  Constitution."   It then goes on  to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public  ministers, and consuls."

In  the light of the constitutional  provisions  above adverted to, the question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the  Constitution was exclusive.

The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from  section  17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of  Civil Procedure,  and to hear  and determine the  controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs  of  quo  warranto,  certiorari, mandamus,  prohibition, and habeas corpus was also con- ferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of  Civil Procedure.   (Act No. 190, sees.  197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.)  It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the  Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch  as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public  ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.

The conclusion we  have reached upon  this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.  In  construing  this constitutional provision the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction" thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls  on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bdrs vs. Preston, 111 U. S.,  252; 28 Law.  ed., 419.)

3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which; a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.)  Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or  ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside.   By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution,  all laws  of the Philippine Islands in  force  at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration  of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were  to  remain  operative, unless inconsistent  with the Constitution,  until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by  the  National  Assembly.   The  original  jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusive by any law in force prior to the inauguration  of  the Commonwealth,  and having reached the conclusion that the  jurisdiction conferred  upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the  laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such  cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be  deemed to remain operative and in force,  subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend, alter,  modify, or repeal  the same.   (Asiatic P. Co. v8. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12,  pp. 620, 623.)

We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of  Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner,  and that the petition for a  writ  of  prohibition must be  denied.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J.,  Vlla-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

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CONCURRING
LAUREL, J. :

In my humble opinion, there  are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court over the petitioner in the instant case is concurrent and  not exclusive.   The strictly legal reason is set  forth in the preceding illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a)  historical and based on what  I consider  is the (b) theory upon which the  grant of legislative  authority under our Constitution is predicated.

(a)  As the  provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,  and consuls, has been taken from the Constitution of the United States, considerable light would be gained by an examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the United States.

The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787) gave the Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the plan, authority to hear and determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier  resort  *   *  *  all cases touching the rights of ambassadors  *  *  *."  This clause,  however, was not approved.  On July 18, the  Convention of  1787 voted an extraordinarily broad  jurisdiction to the Supreme Court extending "to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions  as  involve the national  peace and harmony."  This general proposition was considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May  29 which, however, did not mention  anything about ambassadors, other public ministers  and consuls.  But the Committee of Detail, through Butledge, reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section 3.  The  jurisdiction of the  Supreme Court shall extend  *   *  *  to all  cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; *   *  * In  *  *  *   cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,   *  *  *  this jurisdiction shall  be original   *  *  *."  On September 12, the Committee on Style reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2.  The judicial power shall extend  *   *  * to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls  *  *  *   In  (all)  cases affecting ambassadors,  other public ministers and consuls  *  *   *  the Supreme  Court shall  have original  jurisdiction."   This provision was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate and is now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States, (The Constitution and  the  Courts, Article  on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M.  Meigs,  New York, 1924, vol. I,  pp.  228, 229.   See  also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of  1787, Yale University Press, 1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.)

The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive.   Two years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act (Act of September 24,  1789, 1 Stat., c. 20, 687)  was approved by the first Congress, creating the United States  District and Circuit Courts which were nisi prius courts, or  courts of first instance which dealt with different items of litigation. The district courts are now the only federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having  been abolished by the Act of March 3,1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of 1787 invested the district courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all  suits in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party.  By the passage of the Act of  February 18,1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction was repealed and, since  then, state courts have  had  concurrent  jurisdiction  with the federal courts over civil or criminal  proceedings  against a consul or vice-consul.  At the present  time, the federal courts exercise exclusive  jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as a  court of law can have consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is a party."   (Act of March 3,1911, 36 Stat, 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24,  1789; 28 U.  S. C. A., sec. 341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial  Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934,  sec. 233.)  The district  courts now  have original jurisdiction "of all suits against consuls  and vice-consuls."   (Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934,  sec. 24, par. 18.)

The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by  the Congress  of the United States.  It has remained essentially unchanged  for  more than 145 years.  It was prepared chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in the Constitutional  Convention,  who was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1796-1800).  It is interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates who actually attended the Convention that adopted the federal Constitution (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court [Boston, 1935], p. 99).  When, therefore, the first Congress  approved the Judiciary Act of 1789 vesting in the Supreme  Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the word "original" as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has never been repudiated. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ames vs. Kansas (£1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4  S.  Ct,  437; 28 Law. ed., 482):

"In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by Congress,  at the very moment of the organization of the government,  and of the significant fact that, from 1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases  where the  Supreme Court has been  vested by the  Constitution with original jurisdiction.  It rests with the legislative department of the  government to  say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high privileges  of those for whose protection the constitutional provision was intended, At any rate, we are unwilling to say that the power to make the grant does not exist."

Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original"  means  "exclusive" and as  observed by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana  ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69), the question has given rise to some differences of opinion  among the earlier members of the Supreme  Court  of the United States.  (See,  for instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U. S. vs. Ravara [1793],  2  Dall.,  297;  1 Law. ed., 388.)  Reliance was had on more or less general  expressions made by  Chief Justice Marshall  in  the case  of Marbury  vs.  Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:

"If congress  remains at liberty to give this  court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall  be  original; and original  jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance."  But Chief  Justice Marshall who penned the decision in  this case in 1803 had occasion later, in 1821, to explain  the  meaning and  extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury case.   He said:

"In the case  of  Marbury vs.  Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed., 60), the single question before the court,  so far as that case can be  applied to this, was, whether the legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in which the  Constitution had clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the  construction of the article could possibly be raised.  The court decided, and we think very properly, that the  legislature could  not give original jurisdiction in such a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in  support of  this decision, some expressions are used which go far beyond it.   The counsel for Marbury had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial power; and it is against this argument  that the reasoning of the  court is directed. They say that,  if such had been the intention of the article, it would certainly have been useless to proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested.'  The court says, that such a construction would render the clause, dividing the jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that 'affirmative  words  are often, in their operation, negative  of other objects than those which are affirmed; and, in this case (in the case  of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or exclusive sense must be given  to  them,  or they have no operation at all.'  'It cannot be presumed,  adds the court, 'that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore,  such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it, The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon the idea that the affirmative words of the clause giving one  sort of jurisdiction, must imply a negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, because otherwise the words would be  totally  inoperative, and this  reasoning is advanced in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in  that case original jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause under consideration would have been entirely useless.   Having such  cases only  in its  view,  the court lays down a principle which is generally correct, in terms much broader than the decision, and not only much broader than the  reasoning with  which that decision is supported, but  in some instances contradictory to its principle.   The reasoning sustains the negative operation of the words in that case, because otherwise the clause would have no  meaning whatever, and because  such  operation was necessary to give effect to the intention of the article.  The effort now made is,  to apply the conclusion  to which the court was conducted by that reasoning in the particular case, to one in which  the words have their full  operation when understood affirmatively, and in which the negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat some of the great objects of the article.  To this construction the court cannot give its  assent.  The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison must be understood with the limitations which are given to them in this opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the decision in that case, or the tenor of its reasoning."   (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821],  6 Wheat., 264, 400; 5 Law.  ed., 257.)

What the Supreme Court in  the  case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that Congress could  not extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly mentioned in  the  Constitution,  the  rule  of construction  being  that affirmative words of the Constitution declaring in what cases the Supreme Court shall  have originai  jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases.   (See Ex parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall., 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1 Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.)  That was all.

It should be observed that Chief Justice  Marshall  concurred  in the opinion rendered  in the  case of Davis vs. Packard ([1833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684).  In this case the jurisdiction of the state  court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on the ground that jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district courts of the United  States  exclusively of the state  courts.  Such a ground,  says Justice Harlan in Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111 U. S., 252;  4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probable not have been given had it been believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court  deprived Congress of  the power to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in such  cases upon subordinate courts of the Union, concluding that the decision in the case "may be regarded as an affirmance of the constitutionality of the Act of 1789, giving original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United States." Of the seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five  participated in the decision  of Osborn vs.  Bank of the United States ([1824],  9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed., 204), also penned by Chief Justice  Marshall and relied upon as authority together with Marbury vs. Madison, supra.

The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United States.  The question involved  in that case was whether the Circuit Court then existing had jurisdiction under the Constitution  and laws of the United States to  hear  and determine any suit whatever against the consul of a  foreign government.  Justice Harlan said:

"The Constitution declares that 'The judicial power of the United States shall extend *  * * to all cases affecting ambassadors  or other public ministers  and consuls;' to controversies between citizens of a state  and foreign citizens  or subjects; that  'In all cases affecting  ambassadors, other public ministers  and consuls, * * * the  Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction; and that in all other cases previously mentioned in the same clause 'The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to  law and fact, with  such exceptions and under such  regulations as the Congress shall make.  The Judiciary Act of  1789 invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for  offenses of a certain character; this court, with 'Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction  of all  suits  *  * * in  which a  consul or vice-consul shall be a party;'  and (he circuit courts with jurisdiction of civil suits in which an alien is a party.   (1 Stat. at L., 76-80.)  In this act we have an affirmance, by the first Congress many of whose members participated in the Convention  which adopted the Constitution and were, therefore, conversant with the purposes of  its framers of the principle that  the original jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily  exclusive, and that the subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases affecting such representatives of foreign governments.  On a question of constitutional construction,  this fact  is entitled to great weight."

In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained  by Chief Justice Taney in the earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec,  1, 10).  In that case of Gittings, it was held  that neither public policy nor convenience  would justify the Supreme Court in implying that Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the inferior judicial tribunals of the United States.  Chief  Justice Taney said:

"If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate and original,  as  respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude  that tribunal from appellate power in  the cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to imply words of exclusion  as respects  other courts whose jurisdiction is not there limited or prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress?  The true rule in this  case is, I think, the rule which is constantly applied  to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court,  does  not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive.  In the clause in question, there is nothing but mere affirmative words of grant, and none that import a  design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on the same subject-matter."  (See also U. S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297;  1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31  Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890], 135 U. S., 403; 10 S.  Ct, 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi  vs. Van de Carr [1897], 166 U.  S., 391; 17 S. Ct., 595; 41  Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken  [C. C. N. Y., 1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada  [D.  C.  Mass.,  1866]; Fed.  Cas., No.  8517; St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf., 259;  Sfate of Texas vs. Lewis  [C. C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of Alabama vs. Wolffe [C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836, 837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)

It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital  vs.  Barclay,  supra,  the  jurisdiction of  circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens,  no exception being made as to whose who were consuls, was maintained. (See 1 U. S. Stat. at  L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.)

From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2,  section  2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word "original" in reference to  the jurisdiction of Supreme  Court of the United States over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers  and consuls^ was never intended to  be exclusive as to prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.

It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787  placed  cases  affecting  the official  representatives of foreign powers under  the jurisdiction  of the  Federal Supreme  Court  to prevent the public peace  from  being jeopardized.   Since improper treatment of  foreign ambassadors, other  public ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that the federal  government, which is responsible  for  their  treatment under international  law, should itself be  provided with the means to  meet the demands imposed by international duty.  (Tucker, The. Constitution of the United States  [1899],  vol. II, 760,  772; vide, The Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.)   Bearing in mind the distinction which international law establishes between ambassadors  and other public  ministers,  on the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives,  on the other, Congress saw  it fit to provide in one case a rule different from  the other, although as far as consuls and vice-consuls are  concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme  Court, as already observed, though original is not exclusive.  But in the United States, there are two judicial systems, independent one from the other,  while in  the Philippines there is but one  judicial system.  So that the reason in the United States for excluding certain courts the state courts from taking  cognizance of cases against foreign representatives stationed in the United States does not obtain in the Philippines where the court of the lowest grade is as much a part of an integrated system as the highest court.

Let us now turn our attention to our own laws as they affect the case of  the  petitioner.  Undoubtedly Philippine courts are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of the United States.  We have a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of the American federal system and possessing, powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of bur own Constitution and laws.

The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our Constitution and  laws which  include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the law of nations. There are no treaties between  the United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either country from the operation of local criminal laws.  Under the generally accepted principles of international  law, declared  by our Constitution as  part of the  law of the nation (Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls, vice-consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status and can not claim the privileges and immunities accorded to ambassadors and  ministers.   (Wheaton,  International Law, sec. 249; 1 Kent, Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec.  1660; Mathews,  The American Constitutional System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings  vs.  Crawford, C.  C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1; Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac, 676; 2  C. J., 1305; 9 R. C. L., 161.)    The only provisions touching the subject to which we may refer are those found in the  Constitution of the Philippines.  Let us trace the history of these provisions.

The report of the Committee on the Judicial Power, submitted  on September 29,1934, did not contain any provision regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.   The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the Sponsorship  Committee, submitted on  October 20, 1934, however, contains the following provision:

"Article X, Section 2.   The  Supreme  Court shall have such original jurisdiction as  may  be  possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of to  Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all  cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consul*  *  *  *."   The Special Committee on the Judiciary, compost principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco and Norberto Romualdez, included in its report the provisions  which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of  Article  VIII of  the Constitution. Section 2 provides:

"The National Assembly  shall have the power to define, prescribe,  and apportion the jurisdiction of  the  various courts, but may not  deprive the Supreme  Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,  other public ministers and consuls * * *."  And the second sentence of section 3 provides:

"The original jurisdiction  of the Supreme  Court shall include  all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls."

The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court "original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" is literally the same as that contained  in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution.

In the course of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was expressed regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme Court.  An examination of the records of the  proceedings of the Constitutional Convention show that the framers of our Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the judicial construction placed on, the same provision of  the United  States Constitution.  In order to end  what would have been a protracted discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee on the Judiciary gave the following information to the members of the Convention:

"* * *  gr presidente, a fin de poder terminar  con el Artfculo 2, el Comite esta dispuesto a hacer constar que la interpretation que se debe dar a la Ultima parte  de dicho artlculo es la misma interpretaci6n que siempre se ha dado a semejante disposition en la Constituci6n de los Estados Unidos."   (January 16, 1935.)  Without further discussion, the provision was then and there approved.

It  thus  appears that the provision in  question has been given a well-settled meaning  in  the  United  States the country of its  origin.   It has  there received definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and  judicial interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it when incorporated in our  own  Constitution.  To paraphrase Justice  Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are justified in interpreting the provision of the Constitution  in the light of the principles and history with which its framers were familiar.   (United States vs. Wong Kin Ark  [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct, 456; 42 Law. ed., 890, cited  with approval  in  Kepner vs. United States, a  case of Philippine origin [1904];  195 U. S., 100;  49 Law. ed., 114.)

(b) What has  been  said  hereinabove is not  unnecessary attachment to history or idolatrous adherence to precedents.  In  referring to the history of this  provision  of our Constitution  it  is realized that historical discussion while valuable is not  necessarily decisive.  Rationally, however, the philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far to seek  if certain  principles of  constitutional government  are borne  in mind.  The constitution is both a grant of,  and a limitation upon, governmental  powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal restraint of legislative authority, the power is retained by the people and is exercisable by their representatives in the legislature.  The general rule is that the legislature possesses plenary power 'for all purposes of civil government.  A prohibition  to exercise legislative  power is the exception.   (Denio,  C,.J., in People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 543.)   These  prohibitions or restrictions are found either in the language used, or in the purposes held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the adoption of the particular  provision as part of  the  fundamental law.  (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73 S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.)

Subject to  certain  limitations,  the  Filipino  people, through their delegates, have committed  legislative power in a most general way to the National Assembly of the nation.  In other  words,  the National  Assembly has plenary legislative power in all  matters of legislation except as limited by  the  Constitution.  When, therefore, the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other pubic ministers and consuls,  without specifying the exclusive  character  of the grant, the National Assembly is not deprived of its authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent  It has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it.  It is unquestionable that the mass of  powers of  government is vested in the  representatives of the people, and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system  than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have that  effect.   (Angara  vs. Electoral Commission,  p. 139, ante.)  What the  Constitution  prohibits is  merely the deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over  cases affecting ambassadors, other  public ministers and  consuls, and while it must be admitted, that original jurisdiction if made concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction does not cease to be original merely because it is concurrent.

It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class  of  cases would  mean  the sharing of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls such that the Supreme Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the  lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice of the peace courts, in a petty case involving for instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just mentioned..  However, no serious objection to this result can be seen other than the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this  jurisdiction with a  court pertaining to the lowest category in our  judicial organization.  Upon the other hand, the fundamental reasoning would  apply with equal force if the highest court of the land  is made to take cognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal ordinance simply because of the character of the parties affected.  After alluding to the fact that the position of  consul  of a foreign  government is sometimes filled by a citizen  of the  United States  (and this  is  also true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed:

"It could hardly have been the  intention of the statesmen who framed our constitution to require that one  of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less than five dollars against another  citizen, who had been  clothed  by some foreign government with the consular office, should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury summoned in order to enable  him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that the time of that court,  with all its high duties  to perform, should be taken up with  the trial of every petty offense that might be committed by a consul in any  part of the United States; that consul, too, being often one of our own citizens."

Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that considering the actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in our jurisdiction, there may be cases where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise either original whether exclusive or concurrent or  appellate  jurisdiction,  notwithstanding  the grant of original jurisdiction in  this class of cases to the Supreme Court.   If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a justice of the peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a foreign  consul and no question of law is involved, it is evident that in case of conviction, the proceedings will terminate  in the Court of Appeals and will not reach the Supreme Court.  In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the Constitution of original jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls.   This is a situation, however, created not by the Constitution but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National Assembly.  The Constitution cannot deal  with every casus omissus, and in the nature of things, must only deal with fundamental principles,  leaving the details of administration and execution  to the other branches of the government.  It rests with the National Assembly to determine the inferior courts which shall exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors,  other public ministers and consuls,  considering the nature  of the offense and irrespective of the amount of the controversy.  The National  Assembly may, as in the United  States (Cooley,  Constitutional Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting foreign diplomatic and consular representatives.

Before the"approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction  over consuls was exercisable by our courts.  This is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution framed and adopted pursuant  thereto are in force.  The  fact that the National Assembly has not enacted any law determining what courts of the  Philippines shall  exercise  concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment.   This can not mean and should not be interpreted to mean  that the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution is not concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.

The  respondent  judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having jurisdiction to take  cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner, the  writ of prohibition should be denied.