At about 5.30  o'clock in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, was found lying on the ground, with several wounds in the head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato, and situated  within the property of  another Chinese named Yu Enching Sero.  Tan Why  received  a  wound on the upper part of his forehead, which necessarily proved fatal because it fractured his skull.  He died as  a result of this wound shortly afterward  in the Cotabato  Hospital where  he had been brought by an agent of authority with the aid of some laborers who had gone to the scene of the crime.

The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.  He was convicted of said crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to return the sum of P150  to  the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Tan Why in the sum of P1,000, with costs.  The accused appealed  therefrom and assigns five errors as committed by the lower court, which may be briefly summarized as follows:

"(1) In not having granted him a period of twenty-four hours to  prepare his defense;
"(2) In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken from him during the search of his person, without the corresponding judicial warrant;
"(3) In having admitted Exhibits A, B, C, D, F, L and L-1, as evidence in the  case;
" (4) In having denied his petition to dismiss  for lack of evidence,  filed immediately after  the  fiscal  had finished presenting his evidence; and
"(5) In having found him guilty of robbery with homicide, instead of acquitting him."

When Tan Why was found on the morning in question, he was still alive and able to answer laconically "Kagui" when Moro Alamada, was among the first to approach him, asked who had attacked him.  The appellant was known by this name in Cotabato, whereupon Lieutenant A. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered his immediate arrest.  The accused was arrested shortly after eight o'clock in  the morning  of the same day, and after he had been brought forthwith to Lieutenant Jacaria, who had already been informed that he had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops of Cotabato  and that he carried money,  said lieutenant asked him for the bracelets and he then voluntarily and without  protest produced what now appear in the record as Exhibit A.  He was later searched, without opposition  or  protest  on his part,  and it was  discovered that he also had the pocketbook (Exhibit B), containing P92 in bills (Exhibit C), Tan Why's  identification card and a memorandum of amounts with some Chinese characters (Exhibit D).  In one of the pockets of his pants was found  some change, making the total  amount of money found in his possession P92.68.

Tan Why, the deceased, carried the pocketbook, Exhibit B, as he did on former occasions, a few hours before his body was found  in  the  condition and under  the circumstances above  stated.  Before  he left his home between 4.30 and  5 o'clock that morning, he had it full of  bills because he was, as usual, on his way to purchase palay in Carcar as part  of his work.  The memorandum of amounts, Exhibit D,  found in the pocketbook, Exhibit B, is in Tan Why's handwriting; and in the afternoon before his death he was given by Raw Tin of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company the sum of P150 to be invested in the purchase of palay, in addition to the P80 that remained of the amount previously delivered to him.

The appellant had to be searched after he had voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A and placed them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because, upon being asked if he had any thing else, he tremblingly answered in the negative.

The foregoing facts are inferred from the testimony of the government witnesses Alamada, Chua Sian, Kaw Tin, Yap Sea, Lieutenant Jacaria, and Police Sergeant Urangut

Alamada testified that the deceased, shortly before he died, named Kagui as his aggressor, and the appellant was known by this name in Cotabato.  He also testified  that on the morning in question, he saw the appellant, with a club in his hand, pass by  the house where he and the deceased lived. The club, Exhibit M, then with bloodstains) was found near the place where Tan Why was wounded.

Chua Sian, an employee of the deceased, identified  the pocketbook  Exhibit B saying that it was the same that the deceased used  to carry whenever he went to make purchases ; that it was usually kept in a box at Tan Why's store; that the deceased in truth carried it when he left his store on the morning of March 5,  1935, to purchase palay, and that it was then full of bills.

Kaw Tin, cashier of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, in turn, testified that on the night before the crime, he gave the  deceased, at the latter, request the  sum  of P150  to purchase palay, inasmuch as he was a buyer  of said commodity for the company in Cotabato.

About four meters from the place where Tan Why's body was found, there was a coconut tree with two dangling leaves, as if they were so arranged intentionally to hide anybody who might post himself near the trunk.  At the very place where the tips of the leaves touched the ground, there were  footprints presumably of somebody who hact posted himself there in ambush, without being seen: the fresh footprints were exactly the same size as the appellant's foot; and the said bloodstained club was found  very near the place.  Such  was the  testimony of Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Eusebio de los Santos who inspected the scene of the crime, particularly the latter who did so early in the morning and took said measurements With the aid of Exhibit E which is part of a reed-grass leaf.

The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation taken from him the bracelets (Exhibit  A), the pocketbook (Exhibit B)  and all the money which he carried (Exhibit C); and that, but for the printing thereon, the identification card found in the pocketbook then was blank and there was no memorandum of the kind of Exhibit  D, in Tan Why's handwriting, inside the pocketbook,  thereby insinuating that  it  was Lieutenant Jacaria who typed  or caused to be  typewritten on the card Tan Why's name and personal data and who placed Exhibit D in the pocketbook. There is nothing of record to corroborate the appellant's imputation to said two officers; and it is unbelievable that they so acted because they were induced  by no other motive than  to comply with their duties as agents of authority.

The appellant permitted them to search his person and to take from him the articles in question to be used as evidence against him in due time; at least, he neither made any objection nor even muttered a bit  of protest.  Consequently, his contention that he was subjected to the rigor of an un-reasonable search to dispossess him of his effects without judicial warrant, and that the court should have ordered their return to him when he so formally requested before the trial,  is unfounded. When one voluntarily submits to a search  or  consents to have it  made of his person or premises,  he is precluded  from  later complaining thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,  vol. I,  page 631.)"  The right to be secure  from unreasonable search may, like every  right, be waived and such waiver may be made either  expressly or impliedly.  On  the  other hand, the appellant was then charged with the  crime, imputed to him  by Tan  Why before the latter's death, of  having assaulted  the deceased; that he was then also known to be carrying much money; and that a few moments before he was brought to  Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault  on Tan Why, he was able to redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom he had pledged them several months before.  These are circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a previous judicial warrant, only upon a verbal order from said officer to Sergeant Urangut, or of the latter's own will, inasmuch as he had direct knowledge of the aggression committed on the person of Tan Why, his violent death, the revelation made by Tan Why before his death  naming the appellant as the author of the aggression, and the other circumstances already stated.  This is so because under the law, members of the Insular Police or Constabulary as well as  those of the municipal  police and of chartered cities  like Manila  and Baguio, and even of townships (sees. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383  of the Revised Administrative Code) may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about to be  committed in their presence, but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them.  (U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Samonte,  16 Phil., 516; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Santos,  36 Phil., 853.) An arrest made under said circumstances is not  unlawful but perfectly justified; and the agent of authority  who makes the arrest does not violate  the provisions of article 269 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and punishes unlawful arrest, nor infringe the constitutional precept relative to the inviolability of one's right to be secure in his person, house,  papers, and effects  against unreasonable search and  seizures; as either  provision  of law permits, like the above cited sections of the Revised Administrative Code, the making of arrests without judicial warrant, when there exist reasonable motives therefor so that the person arrested may be brought to the corresponding authority. In  fact such was  the  appellant's  state and  circumstances when he was searched and his alleged effects (Exhibits A, B, C and D with Tan Why's identification card)  were taken from him and, such being the case, it was proper,  perfectly lawful, prudent and even necessary, in order to avoid any possible'  surprise or aggression  from the tappellant, in the search to be made and the effects in question seized by the persons concerned, to  be presented, as they  were in truth presented to the competent authority.   Section 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads:

"A person charged  with a crime  may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime."

Article III, section 1, paragraph (3), of our Constitution is identical in all respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of  the United States; and said  constitutional precept has been  interpreted as not prohibiting  arrests, searches and seizures  without  judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.

In United States vs. Snyder (278 Fed., 650), it was said:

"The Fourth Amendment, providing that 'the  right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon  probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized  contains no prohibition of arrest, search, or seizure without a warrant, but only against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures."

When the search of the person detained or  arrested and the seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in  conformity  with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable, much  less unlawful. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 652, 655,  citing favorably 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc, sec. 211; Wharton, Crim. PI. & Pr.,  8th ed., sec. 60; Dillon vs. O'Brien, 16 Cox,  C. C, 245, Ir. L. R. 20 C.  L.,  300; Moreno vs.  Ago Chi, 12  Phil., 439; United States vs. Welsh, 247 Fed., 239; United States vs. Kraus, 270 Fed., 578, 582, par. 7; Garske vs. United States, 1 Fed. [2d], 620; King vs. United States, 1 Fed. [2d], 931.) In this last case it was said:

"In these circumstances of search and seizure  of defendant engaged in the commission of a felony, and of which the officers had reliable information and cause to believe, there is nothing unreasonable within the  import of that term in the Fourth Amendment.  After the amendment, as before it, the law necessarily sanctions arrest, search, and seizure of persons engaged in commission of  a crime, or reasonably believed to have committed a felony,  without any paper warrant.  This case is so plain that it suffices to  say so."

Anent an identical  question, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in United States vs. Snyder,  supra, said:

"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be  to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."

The appellant contends that the lower court did not grant him even twenty-four hours to prepare his defense, thereby denying him the right afforded to every accused by section 30 of General Orders, No. 58." We have carefully examined the record and found nothing to convince  us that said court had in truth refused to grant him time for  said purpose.  To be entitled to said time as a matter of right, the interested party  must  expressly ask for it,  inasmuch as  the  law  so prescribes.  The truth, however, is that  the  appellant not only did not ask for it but, after his petition for the return of his effects to him had been denied, he forthwith asked, through his counsel, to be arraigned and to  proceed with the trial.

The appellant likewise contends that there  was error  in the admission of the evidence Exhibits A,  B, C and D, alleging that they had  been taken from him through force and intimidation.  The record  shows that before  proceeding with the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked for the return of said  effects (Exhibits A, 6,  C, and D)  to him on the ground that they were unlawfully  taken  away from him.   Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria  asked him what other things  he carried,  after having voluntarily placed  the two pairs of bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his  body,  he did not show the least  opposition.   It follows, therefore, that the lower  court committed no error in accepting as evidence Exhibits A,  B, C and D, not only because  the  appellant did not object to the taking thereof from him when searched, but also because the effects found in the  possession of a person detained or  arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if they constitute the corpus delicti  or are pertinent or relevant  thereto.   (Adams vs. New York, 192 U. S., 585; 24 Sup. Ct., 372; 48 Law. ed., 575; Weeks vs. United States, supra; People vs. Mayen, 205 Pac, 435.)   It is certainly repugnant to maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing the return to the accused of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstanding their being eloquent proofs of his crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.

The appellant attempted to prove  that the money found in his possession had been given to him, on different occasions, by the witnesses who  testified in his favor, as Kagui Guialal, Kagui Patak, Kakim, Akun or Amay Indo.   Kagui Guialal, in truth, testified that he had given the accused P90, two days before the latter's arrest; Kagui Patak, P45, on two  occasions, one month, and two weeks, respectively, also prior to his arrest;  and  Kakim and  Akun  or Amay Indo, P22.50 and P20,  seven  and five days, respectively, before the day of the crime. These  four witnesses are all relatives of the  appellant;  and if it  were true that the latter had enough money several days  prior to the aggression and death of Tan  Why, the natural thing to  assume is that he would not have redeemed  the two  bracelets Exhibit A, precisely on the very morning in question.  Furthermore, their testimony did  not destroy the unexplained finding  in the appellant's possession, of the deceased Tan Why's pocketbook, containing much money, and the latter's personal papers.  In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of said person and of the robbery committed on him (U. S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil., 88; U. S.  vs. Divino, 18 Phil., 425).

The facts which we consider as having been fully established in  view of the foregoing considerations, constitute the crime of robbery with homicide defined and punished with reclusion perpetua to death in article 294, subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code.  Inasmuch as no aggravating circumstance  had been proven and the penalty imposed by the lower court is in accordance with law, taking into consideration the rules prescribed in article 63 of said Code, the appealed judgment is hereby  affirmed,  except that  part thereof containing a pronouncement in  favor of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, a strang party to the case, which should  be entirely eliminated; and it is  ordered that Exhibits B  (pocketbook), C (money), D (memorandum of amounts) and Tan Why's identification card  be delivered to  the latter's heirs, with costs against  the  appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.