The petition  before us  is for a writ of mandamus with preliminary injunction, filed by Jose D.  Zenarosa against the respondent judge, to require the latter to pass upon a certain motion  alleged  to  have been filed  by the petitioner, praying that he be granted the benefits  of the Probation Law (Act No. 4221), which took effect on August 7, 1935.

It appears that in criminal case G.  R. No. 42937,1  the People of the Philippine Islands vs.  Jose D. Zenarosa, et al. (criminal case  No. 901 of the Court of  First Instance of Camarines Norte), a final judgment was entered sentencing said accused, the  herein  petitioner, for  the crime  of  abduction, to an indeterminate penalty of from eight to seventeen years, four months, and one day; that before the petitioner began service of his sentence, he tiled a motion with the respondent judge on January 15, 1936 (Exhibit A-1), asking that the benefits  of the Probation Law be extended to  him, alleging that he  is eighteen years of age  and that the crime for which he was sentenced is not one of the exceptions or bar  to the  application of the  provisions of said law; that the resolution of the  respondent  denying petitioner's motion is based not only upon respondent's belief that he has no jurisdiction to grant the motion because the provincial board of Camarines  Norte,  within whose jurisdiction the crime for  which petitioner was sentenced  was committed, has not provided for the salary of a probation officer in said province, but also upon the fact that, in his judgment,  even  assuming that he  has jurisdiction,  the grounds stated in  the motion are not  sufficient to justify the granting thereof, and that there is no probation officer appointed for the  Province of  Camarines Norte,  and in fact the petitioner  is  under arrest because his incidental petition  for a writ of  preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondent from  issuing an order for his arrest, was denied in a separate resolution.

While it is true  that the crime of abduction is not one of the exceptions provided in the Probation Law to the application of its provisions, it is no  less true that it is discretionary with courts to suspend the execution of a final judgment and to  extend or deny the benefits of said law to applicants therefor, inasmuch as sections  1 and 2 thereof use the verb "may" which  undoubtedly  implies the exercise of discretion.

Act No. 4221 does not require that the  provincial fiscal should be heard before denying a petition  for the application of the benefits thereof, but on the contrary, the said law provides  that no such petition should be granted without first  hearing the fiscal, as is evident *from the last part of section 1 thereof reading, "*  *  * No  person, however, shall be placed on probation until an investigation and report by the probation officer shall have been made to the court  of the circumstances of  his offense, his  criminal record, if any, and his social history and until the provincial fiscal shall have been given an opportunity to be heard. The court shall enter in  the minutes  the  reasons for its action/' which  means that the purpose of the law is  to restrict or  avoid the  commission  of abuses by indiscriminately granting  probation to  guilty persons whether they apply for it or not.

The respondent in  fact resolved the petitioner's motion on the merits in denying the same as he did, exercising thereby a power  granted  to him by law, according to his sound judgment,  for  the  reason stated in his resolution, namely, that  said motion  does not  state sufficient grounds justifying the granting to the petitioner  of  the benefits applied for by him. For all the foregoing reasons, we rule that the petition is without merit.

It is our judgment that we should deny, as we do hereby, the said petition, with costs to the petitioner.   So ordered.

Avancena,  C.  J.,   Villa-Real,  Abad  Santos,  Imperial, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.