The petitioner instituted these  proceedings to restrain the respondent judge from continuing to try civil case  No. 1951 of  the Court of First Instance of  La Union, entitled Andres Rimando,  plaintiff and appellant, vs. Regino Llarenas, defendant and appellee,  and to definitively  dismiss the appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the justice of the  peace of Bauang, of  said  province, in  said case, which was docketed  as civil case No. 318, with the costs to said plaintiff-appellant now one  of  the respondents.

There is no  question as  to the  facts.  The  respondent Rimando instituted civil case  No.  318 in the justice of  the peace court of Bauang, La Union, to recover the sum of P8  from the petitioner.   Judgment was rendered in favor of the latter and Rimando appealed  to  the  Court of First Instance.  In addition to the notice of appeal and the appeal bond, the appellant deposited the sum  of P8 as docket fee in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance, which amount together with the record was forwarded to the clerk of court who accepted and docketed the appeal.  Before depositing the P8, the appellant asked the justice of the peace how much he had to deposit and said official informed him that he should deposit said amount.  Sometime after the appeal had been docketed, the herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Court of First  Instance had not acquired jurisdiction to try it on appeal, alleging that the then appellant had not perfected his appeal  for not having deposited  the sum  of P16 required by section.  76 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure, as finally amended by Act No. 3615.   The respondent judge, declaring himself competent, denied  the  motion,  whereupon the petitioner instituted these proceedings.

Section 76 of  the  Code of Civil Procedure, as finally amended by Act No. 3615,  provides that the party appealing from a judgment of a justice of the peace court should, upon giving a bond, deposit the sum of P16  as docket fee of the appeal in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the appeal is taken.  Paragraph 2 of  section 788 of said Code of Civil Procedure,  as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3395,  provides that the docket fee of clerks of Courts of First Instance to be paid in cases wherein the sum claimed, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of the property in litigation is less than  P200, should be only P8.  Therefore, the question to be decided is whether the respondent Rimando was obliged to pay the sum of P16 or only P8 for  his appeal,  which question calls for an interpretation of the above cited legal provisions.

Section 76 of Act  No.  190 (Code of Civil Procedure) reads as follows:

"SEC.  76. Appeals,  how  perfected. Within  five  days after the rendition of a judgment by a justice of the peace, the party desiring to appeal may file with the justice  a written statement that he  appeals to the  Court of First Instance, and shall, within said period of five days, give  a bond  with sufficient surely to be approved  by said justice, payable to the opposite party, in the penal sum of one hundred dollars, conditioned for the payment of all such costs in the action as finally may be awarded against him.  The filing of such statement and giving of such bond shall perfect the appeal."

It was later amended by  section 16 of Act No. 1627, as follows:

"SEC. 76.  An appeal in civil causes shall be perfected by filing with the justice of the peace, within fifteen days after the entry of the judgment complained of, a notice that the party intends to appeal, and by depositing with such justice the appellate court docket fee of sixteen pesos, and by filing with him a bond in the sum of fifty pesos, executed to the adverse  party by the appellant and by at least' one sufficient surety, conditioned that the appellant will pay all costs which the Court of First Instance may award against him. In lieu of such a bond, the appellant may file with the justice a  certificate of the proper  official that  the appellant  has deposited twenty-five pesos with  the municipal treasurer (in Manila  with the Collector  of Internal Revenue) and that said sum is available for the satisfaction of any judgment  for costs that may be rendered against appellant by the appellate court  in said cause.   In  case  judgment is rendered in appellant's favor the sum deposited in lieu of appeal bond shall be returned to  him by the official with whom it was deposited.  Judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance  on appeal shall be final  and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or municipal ordinance."

It was finally modified by section 1 of Act No. 3615 in the following manner:

"SEC. 76.  Appeals, how perfected. An appeal in civil causes shall  be filed within fifteen days after notification of the party of the judgment complained of, and shall be perfected (a)  by filing with the justice of the peace a notice that the party intends to appeal; (b) by delivering a certificate of the municipal treasurer showing that the appellant has deposited  the  sum of sixteen pesos as appellate court docket fee, or, in Manila, by the delivery of said sum to the clerk of the court; and (c) by giving bond.  It shall be the duty of  the  clerk of the Court of  First Instance, upon receipt of the record, to deliver the deposit certificate within five days to the provincial treasurer, who shall immediately pay said sum  of sixteen pesos, and the clerk, as soon as said sum shall be in his possession, shall enter the appeal upon the docket  of the clerk's office.  The bond to be given by the appellant shall be filed with the justice of the peace and  snail be in the sum of fifty pesos,  executed to the adverse party, with  at least  one sufficient surety, conditioned that the appellant will pay all costs which the Court of First Instance may award against him.   In lieu of such a bond, the appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the appellant has deposited twenty-five pesos with the municipal treasurer (in Manila with the Collector of Internal Revenue) and  that said  sum is available for the satisfaction of any judgment for costs that may be rendered against appellant by the  Court of First Instance in said cause.   In case judgment is  rendered in appellant's favor the sum deposited in lieu of appeal bond shall  be returned to him by the official with whom it was deposited. The expense of notification of the judgment appealed from shall  be assessed as part of the  costs."

The pertinent part of the original section 788  of said Code relative to fees that the clerk of the Court of First Instance should charge for causes docketed in his  office reads as follows:

"SEC.  788.  Clerks  of Courts  of  First  Instance. -For filing all complaints, answers, motions, amendments and pleadings, for making all entries upon proper dockets,  for entering all appearances, for entering all judgments, orders, and decrees, for issuing all processes, preliminary and final, approving all bonds to be by him approved, filing same, for administering all oaths or affirmations, certifying the same, taxing costs, making necessary entries on indexes, and for all other services performed by him, his deputies, or assist- ants, in any one action,  eight dollars.  *  *  *"

Section 788 was later amended by section 1 of Act No. 3099, the pertinent part of which reads:

"SEC. 788.  Fees shall be charged  according to  the following schedule:

1.   When the subject of  litigation is not capable  of pecuniary estimation,  sixteen pesos.
   
2. When the amount of the demand, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of the subject-matter of the litigation is less than two hundred pesos, eight pesos.
   
3. When the amount  of the  demand, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of the  subject-matter  of the litigation  is two hundred pesos or more, but less than six hundred pesos, twelve pesos.
   
4. When the amount  of the  demand, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of the  subject-matter  of the litigation  is six hundred pesos or more, but less than one thousand  pesos, sixteen pesos."

On December 5,  1927, the Legislature again amended section 788 by  section 1 of Act  No. 3395, the  pertinent part of which is:

"SEC. 788. Fees of clerks of Courts of  First Instance. Fees  shall be assessed in accordance with the  following schedule:

1. If the case  does not directly or indirectly concern property and  it is  so  stated under oath in the complaint, sixteen pesos.
   
2. If the sum claimed, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of the property in litigation is less  than two hundred pesos, eight pesos.
   
3. If the sum claimed, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of  the property in litigation is two hundred pesos or more, but less than six hundred pesos, twelve pesos.
   
4. If the sum claimed, exclusive of interest and damages, or the value of the property in  litigation is six hundred pesos or more, but less than one thousand pesos, sixteen pesos."

It will be seen that the original section 76 did not require the deposit by the appellant of the docket fee of the Court of First Instance to which the appeal was taken. Docket fees were then governed and charged  in accordance with the provisions of section 788 which fixed them at $8 or P16.  The deposit of P16, as another requisite for an appeal,  was first demanded upon the promulgation of Act No. 1627, section 16 of which entirely  amended section 76. Act No. 3615 again amended certain details  of  section 76 and maintained the deposit of P16 for the same purpose. It would seem inferable  from these  last two amendments that the intention of the  Legislature was  to  require  a docket  fee of P16  for appeals  from the justice  of the peace courts; but we should not, on the  other  hand, lose sight of the  fact that the Legislature, by means  of Acts Nos. 3099  and 3395, amended section  788 which from the beginning fixed the docket fees of cases filed  in the Courts of First Instance,  establishing in both  amendatory  laws gradual and uniform rates varying according to the amount claimed in  the complaint or the  value of the property in litigation.  Taking into consideration  these two laws, we are of the  opinion that the clear intention of the  Legislature was that the docket fee of the Court of First Instance, which an appellant should deposit for his appeal,  is that fixed  by Act No. 3395 which, in this  case, should be P8. If the provision of section 76, as amended by  Act No.  3615, were  applied to the case at bar,  the respondent Rimando, as a result, would have had to deposit P16 notwithstanding the fact that the amount  claimed by him in  his complaint is only  f*81 and, therefore, less than P200.   Furthermore, if this  respondent  had filed a complaint "in  the Court of First Instance to recover P199, the docket fee to have been paid by him would be only P8 under  Act No. 3395.  We do  not believe  that the Legislature has  so intended to burden the litigants only because they  appeal from a decision of the justice  of  the  peace court, which they deem unjust.  To harmonize the above quoted contradictory legal provisions and to enforce the evident intention of the Legislature to standardize the docket fees of .the Courts of First Instance to be charged, It  should be declared, and we so declare,  that  the bases thereof  are those established in the gradual rates provided in section  788 of the Code of Civil  Procedure, as finally amended by Act No. 3395.

The petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in Lazaro vs.  Endencia and  Andres  (57  Phil., 552),  contending that in said case this court held  that under section 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 3615, the appellant  should deposit P16 as docket fee, not only P8.   However, by reading the opinion  it will be seen that the parties did not then raise the question now under consideration and the court neither discussed nor passed  upon it as a controversy raised therein.  In  said case it was taken  for granted that the appellant  was obliged to deposit  P16, it not having been  disputed by the parties.  It is clear, therefore, that  the ruling laid down therein cannot be correctly invoked as doctrine or precedent.

For the foregoing considerations, it  is held that the respondent Rimando deposited the docket fee required by law and the petition should be,  as it  is hereby denied, with the costs  to the petitioner.   So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.