This is a  petition  for  a writ of prohibition filed by Marciano  Romasanta et al.,  against the Hon. Serviliano Platon, acting Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Twelfth  Judicial  District.

It appears that in case No. 752  (G. L. R.  O. Record  No. 40170) of  the Court of First Instance  of  Batangas,  entitled, "Colegio de San Jose, Inc., applicant, vs. Director of Lands, Francisco Lejano et al., oppositors," for the registration  of land, judgment was entered by  said court  on March 2, 1932, couched in the following language:

"Wherefore, the court finds that the parcels  of land, in contention in this application, belong to the  Colegio  de San Jose,  Inc.,  and hereby confirms its  title thereto and orders the registration and inscription thereof in the name of the applicant, a corporation sole duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Philippine Islands, with residence in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands.

"In accordance  with the  stipulation  between the applicant, Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and the oppositor, Ayala & Co., the applicant is hereby ordered, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy of this decision, to  present .an amended  plan segregating  from the parcels  applied  for the portion included in the  plan decreed  in  case No. 4163 of the Hacienda de Calatagan, under the terms of the stipulation between the said parties, and let the corresponding decree issue after the  amended plan is approved by this court and the decision has become final."

It is  also a matter of record that after the aforesaid judgment had become final, the corresponding decree was issued on April 17, 1934, and thereafter the certificate of title in  the name of the applicant corporation "Colegio de San Jose, Inc.," covering the lands adjudicated in its favor; that on November 26,  1934, the herein petitioners filed a petition with the court for the revision of the decree issued in said case, which, after proper proceedings, was denied in the court's order  of August 27, 1935; that the herein petitioners appealed from this order and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions, which has not  yet been acted upon by the court which tried  the registration  case; and that on October 10,1935, while petitioners' bill of exceptions was pending approval, the respondent judge entered  an order in the registration case  announcing that he would issue the corresponding writ  of  possession  covering  the lands the inscription, registration, and title of which had been decreed in favor of the applicant corporation "Colegio de  San  Jose,  Inc.,"  unless  each  of  the petitioners puts up a bond in the sum of P100 within thirty days; and that the order of the respondent judge announcing that he would issue the writ of possession was issued, not by virtue of  the order which denied the petition for review, but by virtue of the judgment and decree entered  and issued  in the registration  case.   It  appears further that the allegations  of paragraphs  9 to 14 of the petition, assuming that they  are true, would imply at most errors of judgment in the findings of fact  or in the  application of the  law, and  by no means lack of  jurisdiction or excess in its  exercise.   In the petition at  hand it is alleged that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in announcing that he would issue  the writ of possession notwithstanding the presentation of  petitioners' bill of  exceptions for the purpose  of appealing from the order of August 27,1935, which denied their petition to  review  the decree.   The respondent judge  has  appeared  and  answered  the petition, denying that he acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof when  he issued  the order of October  10, 1935.

The judgment entered in the registration case in question became final and  executory, and  the petition  for review filed by the herein petitioners did not have  the effect of setting  aside either the aforesaid  judgment or the decree issued thereunder, especially in view  of the denial of  the petition for  review by the court which heard the said case. While section 17 of Act No.  496, in its original form, has been repealed by the Administrative Code, section 5 of Act No. 1108 amending the former by including in the power of the Court of Land  Registration to compel obedience to its judgments and decrees the issuance of writs of possession, and section  3 of  Act No. 1680, which has re-amended by substitution said section  17 of Act No. 496, have  not been repealed and are, therefore, in force, on the principle of statutory construction that ''An amendment to a section or statute is  not  necessarily repealed  by a repeal of the section or statute amended."   (State vs. Young, 30  S. C, 399; 9 S. E., 355, 358; Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction,  vol.  I, p.  574.)

Section 10 of Act No.  2347 has conferred upon Courts of First Instance all the jurisdiction and powers possessed by the defunct Court of  Land Registration, and has provided, further, that the  provisions of the  Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to land registration cases  in all matters not provided in Act No. 496.   Among the powers of the Courts of First Instance is  "to compel obedience to its judgments,  *   *   *" (section 11, paragraph 3, Code of Civil  Procedure),  and that "Independent of any statutory provision, every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary  for  the administration  of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction."   (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)  "The party in whose favor judgment is given, may,  *  *  *   have a writ of execution issued for its  enforcement,   ?  *   *"  (Code  of  Civil  Procedure, section 443), and that "If it (the judgment is)  be for the delivery of the possession of real or personal property, it must require the governor (now the sheriff), or his deputy, to deliver the possession of the same,  *   *  *   to the party entitled thereto" (Code of Civil Procedure, section 444, paragraph 5), which, otherwise stated, means  the issuance of a writ of possession.  In cases for the registration of land,  the judgment adjudicating ownership thereof and decreeing its inscription and  title in the name of a person, impliedly carries with it the delivery of possession, if he is deprived thereof, because the right of possession, is inherent  in that of ownership.  The  writ  of  possession, therefore, the issuance  of which was announced in the respondent  judge's order of October  10, 1935, finds sanction both in the existing statutory provisions in this jurisdiction and in the  generally  accepted principles  upon which the administration of justice rests.

While the provisions of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring, among other things, that "the filing of a bill  of exceptions shall of itself stay  execution until the final determination of the action," are applicable to land registration "cases, it is to be noted, however, that the writ of possession oft-referred to will not be issued by the respondent judge for the purpose of executing the order from which the petitioners have appealed  by bill of exceptions, but  by virtue  of  the judgment entered  and the  decree issued  in  the  aforesaid  land  registration  case.  The respondent judge,  on issuing the writ  of possession, will accordingly  act neither without  jurisdiction nor in excess thereof.

Wherefore, we must hold, as we do hereby, that the petition be dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by  this court be  dissolved, with costs to the petitioners.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull,  Vickers, and Diaz, JJ.,  concur.