You're currently signed in as:
User
Add TAGS to your cases to easily locate them or to build your SYLLABUS.
Please SIGN IN to use this feature.
https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1ac9?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[IN RE WILL OF DECEASED LEONCIA TOLENTINO. VICTORIO PAYAD v. AQUILINA TOLENTINO](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1ac9?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
{case:c1ac9}
Highlight text as FACTS, ISSUES, RULING, PRINCIPLES to generate case DIGESTS and REVIEWERS.
Please LOGIN use this feature.
Show printable version with highlights
62 Phil. 848

[ G. R. No. 42258, January 15, 1936 ]

IN RE WILL OF THE DECEASED LEONCIA TOLENTINO. VICTORIO PAYAD, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. AQUILINA TOLENTINO, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

GODDARD, J.:

Both parties  in this case appeal from an order of the trial court denying the probate of the alleged will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased.  That court found that the will in question was executed by the deceased on the date appearing thereon, September 7,1933, one day before the death of the testatrix, contrary to the contention of the oppositor that it was executed after her death.  The court, however, denied probate on the ground  that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused  Attorney Amario to write her name at her express direction.

The appeal of the oppositor-appellant is based upon the alleged failure of the trial court in not finding  that the will in question was executed  after the death of Leoncia  Tolentino, or that she was mentally and physically incapable of executing said with one day before her death.   After a careful examination of the evidence on these points we find no reason for setting aside the conclusion of the trial  court as set forth above.  The assignments of the  oppositor-appellant are therefore overruled.

As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the trial court denied probate of the will on the sole ground that the attestation clause does not state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to write her name. The  last paragraph of the  questioned will reads in  part as follows:
"En prueba de todo lo cual, firmo el presente testamento con mi marca digital, porque no puedo estampar mi  firma a causa  de mi debilidad, rogando al abogado M. Almario que ponga  mi nombre en el sitio donde he de  estampar mi marca  digital  * *  *."
The evidence of record establishes the fact  that Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each  and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely  wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed  said thumb mark.  In other words Attorney Almario  did not sign for the testatrix.  She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every  page thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark."  (Quoted by this court from 28  R.  C. L., p. 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.)  It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.

The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned  will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased,  is  hereby admitted to probate with the costs of .this appeal against the oppositor-appellant.

Malcolm, Vitta-Real, Imperial, and Butte, JJ.,  concur.

tags