Appellant was charged  with the crime of  murder in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and, after due trial, he was found guilty only of homicide and sentenced to not less than eight years and one day of prision mayor and not more than fifteen years of reclusion temporal, to  indemnify the heirs  of the deceased, Benigno de  Guzman, in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

The facts which, led to the  filing  of the  information against the appellant are stated  in the opinion of the court below, and, to avoid repetition, we shall refer to  them here only in so far  as they  are important to the determination of this appeal.

The question presented is somewhat  simplified  because the corpus delicti was  established by  undisputed evidence. There is  no  question  that Benigno de Guzman  was  feloniously slain.   It is likewise undisputed that the only persons  who could have  committed  the homicide  were the appellant  and  Raymundo Santiago and his wife  Maria Nicban.   These were the only persons who  were with the deceased at the time he met his death early in the morning of October 26,1934 in the municipality  of Santa Rosa, Province of Nueva Ecija.  But, while Raymundo Santiago and his wife testified that the unlawful deed was perpetrated by the appellant, the  latter by his own testimony  tried to fasten the guilt on the two spouses.   The lower court, after a careful consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the guilt of  the appellant was  proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of this appeal, counsel for the appellant vigorously contends that the lower court erred in convicting the appellant, because the weight of the evidence points to the guilt of Raymundo Santiago and his wife, rather than that of the appellant.  As the issue involved rests essentially on the credibility of the opposing witnesses, we may well rest our decision on the settled doctrine of this court that as the trial judge had opportunity to see the witnesses and to ob- serve the manner in which they gave their testimony, he was in a better position to pass upon their credibility, and his findings of fact ought not to be disturbed in the absence of strong reasons that would warrant such a course.

Counsel for the defense maintains that there is no sufficient evidence to establish the motive of the accused to commit the crime charged against him.  He lays great stress on  that  part of  the  evidence  which  seems  to  indicate that prior to the commission of the  crime friendly relations existed  between  the appellant  and the  deceased.  While this circumstance should not  be overlooked, it is not decisive in determining the weight of evidence.  Evil designs are sometimes  concealed under  the cloak of affection and friendship.  The betrayal of the Great Master by one of his trusted disciples was stamped with a kiss, and so runs the old adage: "Faithful are the wounds of a friend, but the kisses of an enemy are hateful."

Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence, we find that the version  given by  Raymundo Santiago and Maria  Nicban as to the manner in which Benigno de Guzman was slain, is more consistent with the  established facts, than that of the appellant.   Santiago and his wife testified, for instance, that the appellant hit the deceased on the occipital region with a stick; that the deceased fell as a result of the blow; that as he raised his left arm appellant struck it; and that the latter again hit the deceased on the face, and around the neck.  This coincides with the testimony of Dr. Roman Rustia as to the marks of violence found on the body of the deceased.

This case has an aspect which is significant.  The record shows that  in  the original  complaint filed by Lieutenant R. Alejandro, of the Constabulary, Raymundo Santiago and Maria Nicban were, together with the appellant, charged with having murdered Benigno de Guzman.  At the preliminary investigation, however, Maria  Nicban testified substantially to the same facts to which she testified at the trial of this case  as to the manner in which Benigno de Guzman  was slain; and  the appellant "having expressed in open  court his unwillingness to testify against these two accused  (Maria Nicban and Raymundo Santiago)," the justice of the peace of Santa Rosa, Province of Nueva Ecija, dismissed the case as to Nicban and Santiago, but remanded it to the Court of First Instance as  to the herein appellant. While no presumption can be indulged against the appellant by reason of his failure to testify at the preliminary investigation,  yet, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, his attitude in that respect may be taken into consideration in determining the weight of his subsequent testimony.

The Solicitor-General, in his brief, has shown a commendable effort to view the evidence presented in this  case with absolute  impartiality, free from any bias or  prejudice against the  appellant.  And while  he expresses  doubt as to the appellant's guilt, he admits that "the records do not reveal such  glaring errors on the part of the trial court as would justify us in recommending the reversal of its findings of fact."

The  judgment  appealed from  is affirmed with  costs against the appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Hull, Vickers, and Recto. JJ.,  concur.