This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, denying  the appellant's petition for the writ of permanent  injunction to restrain and prohibit the Collector of Customs from interfering with the exportation of rice from Manila to Hongkong.

The only questions presented  by this appeal are:  (1) Whether or not Act No. 2869 of  the Philippine Legislature was in full force and effect on the  6th day of August, 1919; and (2) whether or not said Act is constitutional. Said Act No. 2869 was approved on July 30,  1919, and reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. The  Governor-General is hereby authorized to prohibit, with the consent of the Council of State, by proclamation  and subject to such rules as he may publish, the exportation of rice  or palay, except to the United States, whenever in his judgment  the public interest may require it.

"SEC. 2. Upon  the express or implicit approval of this Act by the President of the United States, as provided in the Act of Congress approved on August twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, entitled 'An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political  status of  the people of  the  Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for  those Islands,' the Governor-General shall so announce forthwith, by means of a proclamation, and this  Act shall take  effect on the date of such proclamation."

The appellant contends that said Act was not in full force and effect at the time of the trial of this cause (August 6, 1919) because (1) the President of the United States had not approved it, and (2) the Governor-General had not, by proclamation, announced that the President had approved it. It appears  that  on the 6th day of August, 1919, the Governor-General, by a proclamation, declared that said Act was in full force and effect and,  with the  consent of the Council of State, prohibited "the exportation  of  any rice from the Philippine Islands to  any  country except the United States."  (See proclamation No.  14, 17 Off.  Gaz., 1174.)

When that proclamation was made, however, the President of the United States had not  yet approved  said Act (No. 2869)  either expressly  or implicitly.   In  view of the provisions of section 2 of said Act the  question arises as to whether that  proclamation could be legally made before such approval;  in  other  words,  could said Act be made effective before its express or implicit approval by the President of the United States?  The Attorney-General, on behalf of the appellee, maintains the affirmative, and argues as follows:

"From  a reading of the  section of law above quoted (sec. 2),  it is evident that, in passing the Act under consideration, the Philippine Legislature was  under the impression that its approval by the  President of the United States was required by the provisions of the  Jones Law.  It transpired, however, that the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the official representative of the President of the United States in matters relating  to the Government of the Philippine Islands, held that such approval  was not necessary.  Such being the case, it is submitted that, as a matter of law, there has been a substantial compliance with the conditions prescribed by section 2 of the Act."

The alleged action or ruling of the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs with reference to the approval of the Act in question by the President of the United States does not appear of record in this  case.  But an  examination of the provisions of the Act of Congress  of August 29, 1916 (the Jones Law) really shows that the approval by the President of Act No. 2869 is perhaps not necessary, under the said Act of Congress (the Jones Law).  The only acts of the Philippine Legislature which, under the Jones Law, appear to require the approval of the  President  of the  United States are:  (1)  Those having reference to "land of the public domain, timber, and mining; (2) tariff acts  or acts amendatory to the tariff of the  Philippine Islands;  (3) acts affecting immigration; and (4) acts affecting the currency or coinage laws of the Philippine Islands"  (sees. 9 and 10, Jones Law).  The Act here in question (No. 2869) does not belong to any  of these  classes.

It being evident that the main purpose and intent of the Philippine Legislature in enacting Act No. 2869 was to authorize the Governor-General, by proclamation, to prohibit the exportation  of rice or  palay, and the approval by the President being unnecessary, under the Jones Law, to carry that purpose into effect, we are of the opinion and so decide that said Act became effective when it was so proclaimed by the Governor-General on the 6th day of August, 1919. The appellant further contends that the Act in question is unconstitutional because  it attempts to  regulate commerce with foreign nations.   Counsel  alleges, but does not argue, that the trial court "erred in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands has  authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations," and in "holding that Congress may delegate to the Philippine Government power to regulate commerce with foreign nations."  In answer  to this contention of the appellant it is sufficient to cite our decision in the case of the United States vs. Bull (15 Phil.,  7, 30), wherein we expressly held that the Philippine Government has, by delegation from  Congress, the power  "to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory." 

"The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to  govern  the territory belonging to the  United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with  such  territory. It  may do this directly,  or indirectly through a  legislative  body created by it, to which its power in this respect is delegated."

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs.  So  ordered.

Mapa, C. J., Araullo, Malcolm, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.