The petition alleges that on July 7, 1913, while the above-named  incompetent was not subject  to guardianship, he entered  into  an agreement with  your  petitioners to lease his one-third interest, together with the third interest of his children,  if possible, in a parcel of land in the City of Manila,  a copy of which, in the form of a letter from Zacarias Lichauco to petitioner, Tan Pho, in reply to a letter from the latter of date July 5, 1913, is hereunto attached, marked Exhibit A, and made a part of this petition; that on October 14,1913, and after the said incompetent was returned to guardianship, and for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Exhibit A, the then guardian of the incompetent, as such, entered into a contract of lease with your petitioners for the period of twenty years, a copy of which is attached to the petition, marked Exhibit B; that on December 1,  1913, the said guardian, as such, executed a contract with your petitioners for the purpose of clarifying the description of the property and of making the same binding upon  the heirs and legal representatives of the lessor, a copy of which is attached to the petition, marked Exhibit C; that subsequent to the execution of Exhibits B and C, the Honorable A. S.  Crossfield, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in charge of probate and guardianship matters, with the full knowledge and approval  of all the parties in interest,  approved the same by placing on each of said documents,  under the seal of the court, the following endorsement:

"Aprobado:

"A. S. CROSSFIELD
 "Juez"

That  under the provisions  of paragraph II of the lease, the lessees  undertook  to construct the building on the land in question at a cost to them of not less than P52,000; that under the provisions  of paragraph IX, it was agreed that upon the expiration of the lease, the  buildings and other improvements placed  thereon by the lessees should become the sole property  of the owners of  the land; that relying thereon, the lessees erected the building on the leased land, in compliance with the terms of the lease; that in the accounts of the guardianship  for the years 1913 to 1919, inclusive, which were approved  by the respective orders of the court, the  receipt  of  the stipulated rentals in the contract of lease, Exhibit B is shown  and the approval of said accounts "necessarily involved an approval of the lease under  which  the  payment of said rentals was  made;" "that through  some error or oversight, no order of this court approving said lease, Exhibits B  and C, was ever entered of record in the above entitled cause;" that taking advantage of that fact, Faustino Lichauco, a subsequently appointed guardian  of the above-named prodigal brought an action to set aside the lease as being voidable, for the reason that the lease was never judicially approved; that in the Court of First Instance of Manila that action was dismissed, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the lease was  there declared to  be voidable "by reason of the fact that no order of approval of the execution of said lease by Geronimo Jose, at that time guardian of the said prodigal, was  made of record."  It is then alleged:

"That the letter of July 7,  1913,  to which  reference is made in the preceding citation from the said 'decision of the  Supreme Court  is the  same letter  of  which a copy is hereunto annexed, marked Exhibit A, and made a part hereof;  and  the  contract mentioned   in  the said  decision  is the  contract  executed on behalf of Zacarias Lichauco by his then guardian, Geronimo Jose, evidenced by the copies  of said contract hereunto  attached,  marked Exhibits B and C,  and made a part hereof.

"That the Supreme Court in said decision expressly held that all that was  necessary to make the said contract of lease valid as  regards the  estate of the  said prodigal Zacarias Lichauco, was the approval of this honorable  court.

"That inasmuch as the said prodigal, Zacarias Lichauco, as the Supreme Court  has  expressly decided in the above- mentioned case, was under a valid and binding obligation, at the time he was subjected to guardianship, to enter into the contract subsequently entered into on his behalf by his guardian, Geronimo Jose, its disaffirmance by the  subsequent guardian, Faustino Lichauco, amounts to a breach of a valid and subsisting contract, which, if permitted to continue, will subject  the estate of the said prodigal, Zacarias Lichauco, to the payment of heavy damages.

"That the said contract of lease, Exhibits  B and C, made by the said Geronimo  Jose in execution of the preliminary contract entered into by the said Zacarias Lichauco while competent to contract  and obligate himself, is valid and binding, save only for  the lacking requisite of the approval of this honorable court.

"Therefore, your petitioners pray that the pending motion  of the former guardian, Geronimo Jose, of  date October 15,  1913, for  the approval of the said lease, Exhibits B and C be granted, and that the said lease be approved by this  honorable court."

To this petition, Amparo Nable Jose, as guardian of the prodigal, Zacarias Lichauco, answered  and asked the court to deny and dismiss the petition, for the reason that on October 15, 1913, the motion of Geroninio Jose was practically withdrawn and repudiated by Faustino  Lichauco, then guardian ad litem of the prodigal, Zacarias Lichauco, and  that on September 17,  1920, the said Faustino Lichauco filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila in which,  among other things, he asked for an annulment of the contract, and upon which judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for the plaintiff and against the defendants, the herein petitioners, and in which case, the defendants' application for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States; for all of the questions raised by the petitioners have already been adversely decided by the Supreme  Court of the  Philippine Islands, and that all of such questions are now res judicata.

Upon such issues, the lower court granted the motion as prayed for in the  petition,  and rendered a  judgment purporting to affirm and ratify the  original lease, which this  court declared void for want of execution.

From that decision the respondent appeals and assigns the following errors:

"1. The trial court  erred  in  holding that the filing of the complaint  on September 17,  1920, in  civil case  No. 18884 of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, and G. R. No. 19512 of this Honorable Supreme Court, entitled Faustino Lichauco, etc. vs. Tan Pho et al., by Faustino Lichauco, as guardian ad  litem  for the incompetent Zacarias Lichauco et al., for the annulment of the contract of lease dated October 14, 1913, executed in favor of Tan Pho by Geronimo  Jose,  as guardian for the incompetent Zacarias Lichauco, and marked as Exhibit B in this case, was not a withdrawal or repudiation of the alleged motion filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, on October 15, 1913, by the said Geronimo  Jose, as guardian for said Zacarias Lichauco, asking for the judicial approval of the said contract of  lease marked as  Exhibit B  and the  amplification thereof  marked as Exhibit C.

"2. The trial court further erred in granting judicial approval to said documents marked  Exhibits B and C, by virtue of the petition filed by the herein petitioners and appellees dated April 22, 1925, invoking said  motion of Geronimo Jose, dated October 15, 1913, notwithstanding the fact that the said lease contract marked as Exhibit B had been declared null  and void by  the Supreme  Court of these Islands, on November 22, 1923, with  reference to the excess over the period of six (6) years, in said civil case No.  18884 of the  Court  of First Instance of Manila, and G. R. No.  19512 of this Honorable Supreme Court, entitled Faustino  Lichauco, etc. vs. Tan Pho et al."

JOHNS, J.:

The real question on this  appeal is the legal force and effect of the decision of this court rendered on the former appeal of Faustino Lichauco,  as guardian ad litem of the prodigal, Zacarias Lichauco, in which the petitioners here were the defendants there.  The sole purpose and intent of that proceeding was to have the court declare the  lease then in question null and void as to  the prodigal, Zacarias Lichauco.

Upon the former appeal  of that case, this court held:^[1]

"It is, therefore, our conclusion that while the lease in question could have been approved by the  trial court, yet such an approval was not obtained either in the opportune time or afterwards, inasmuch as  the nunc  pro  tunc order of approval,  which is implied in  the decision rendered, is not valid, there being  no sufficient legal basis therefor."

And:

"In  the first place the contract in question remains intact and valid, so far as  Galo Lichauco is  concerned, who did not  join as  party plaintiff,  but  as party defendant, with Tan Pho,  and to whom the cause of the nullity of the contract, as regards  his  colessors, the  plaintiffs, does not apply.   The contract is void  only in so far as the incapacitated  Zacarias  Lichauco  and the  minors Luis and Julita  Lichauco are concerned.

"That the contract of lease  here  in question, executed on October 14, 1913 by and between Galo Lichauco and the respective guardians  of Zacarias  Lichauco  and the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco, on the one hand, and Tan Pho on the other, is null, as against the plaintiffs and this declaration of partial  nullity shall have retroactive effects from  September  17, 1920, the date  of the filing  of the complaint for nullity."

The question presented is whether the lease  in question, which was  declared  null and void for want of execution by a final judgment  of this court, can now be made legal and valid in a proceeding for that purpose between the same parties brought in the Court of First  Instance.   That original suit was brought by the  guardian of the prodigal for the specific  purpose of having  the lease in question declared null and void for want  of execution,  and in that proceeding, this court held that the  contract of lease now in question "is null,  as against the plaintiffs and this declaration  of partial nullity  shall have retroactive  effects from September 17, 1920, the date of  the filing  of the complaint for nullity"

The petitioners in the instant case pray "that the pending motion of the former guardian, Geronimo Jose, of date October 15, 1913,  for the  approval  of the said lease, Exhibits B and C be  granted,"  and that the lease be now approved by the court.  That is to say, that the petitioners in this proceeding now  seek to have granted and approved the  alleged petition of the former guardian, Geronimo Jose, made on October 15, 1913, and that is what the lower court did.

The appellant contends that the original petition  of Geronimo Jose of October 15, 1913, for the approval  of the lease ceased to be of any  legal force or  effect September 17, 1920, when the then guardian of the  prodigal brought an original  suit to have the lease now in  question declared null and void for  want  of execution, and that it is especially true,  and, in particular, after the rendition  of the final decree by this court in the former proceeding.

The real  question involved in  that proceeding was the validity of  the  lease.  The then guardian claimed and asserted that it  was void.  The petitioners in the instant case, who were the defendants in that case, contended that the lease was valid.  At no time during  that litigation or at any previous time was  any effort or attempt made  by the petitioners to have  the lease  validated by an order of the court.  The  legal force and effect of the filing  of the original suit by  Faustino Lichauco, as  guardian of the prodigal, on September 17, 1920, was to  nullify, set aside and rescind the alleged  motion of Geronimo Jose made on October 15, 1913, for the  approval  of  the lease.

In  the  final analysis, the fact remains, as  this court held in its former decision, that the lease now in question was never approved  by  any court until  after the rendition of the final  judgment of this court, to  the effect that the lease was null and void for want of execution  as of September 17, 1920, the  date  upon which the original complaint was filed.  If, as this court then held, the lease was null and void as of September 17, 1920, upon  what legal principle can it now be made a  valid lease as  of  October 15, 1913, upon the alleged petition of the former guardian asking for its approval as  of that date?  It may be that at  any time  prior  to the  filing of  the original  suit by Faustino Lichauco,  as guardian, or  even before the final decision  in  that suit, that  upon a  proper showing, the court would have had the legal right  to have approved the lease on the strength of the petition of the former guardian as of October 15, 1913.   Be that as  it may, after a final decree was rendered in that suit, which involved the same subject-matter as this  suit, and which was between the same parties now before  this court, the power to approve the lease based upon the petition of  the former guardian then ceased to exist, and  was no longer of  any  legal force or effect.   The question involved in  the former suit was the validity of the same lease which is now in  dispute in this suit, and it was held by this court that the lease was null and void.

Petitioners say:

"It is incontestable that a guardian ad litem of an incompetent person may not withdraw or repudiate a motion filed by the general guardian of such incompetent in the guardianship proceedings."   That would be especially true if the motion had been acted  upon and approved by the court, which is a condition precedent for the execution of a valid lease of real  property for twenty years by a person who is under guardianship.  Any other construction would nullify the  statute, which requires such approval by the court.

In an able and adroit brief, attorneys for petitioners vigorously contend that the  final judgment of this court in the former suit is not  res judicata  upon the real question now involved in this suit.

Section 307 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

"That only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which  was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."

It is admitted that the parties are the same in each proceeding, and that they are litigating in the same capacity, and that the land now sought to be leased is the identical land involved  in the former suit.

In their brief, petitioners' counsel say:

"A former judgment between the same parties is conclusive  as to all matters actually adjudicated and as  to  all other matters which might have been adjudicated; but it is obvious that in the former  action the question of the validity of the lease after formal judicial approval could not have been litigated, because  that element was  then lacking."  And that:

"In  the first case it was the non-existence of the fact of judicial sanction in the  form required which led to the decision unfavorable to the lessees; as matters now stand, this judicial sanction has been granted in the form required, and therefore a new legal situation has  arisen  based, not upon a fact merely evidentiary of the facts in issue in the former litigation, but upon a subsequently occurring, ultimate, provable fact constituting  one of  the  essential elements  of the contract as now relied upon."

Upon those points, they cite and rely upon the note in 39 L, R,  A,  [N.  S.], 974; Peck vs. Easton  (74 Conn., 456; 51  Atl.,  134); Naftzger  vs.  Gregg  (71  Pac.  [Cal.], 757) ; Utter vs. Franklin (172 U. S., 416; 43 Law. ed., 498); Erskine vs. Steele County  (87 Fed., 630) ; Gaynor vs. Village of Port Chester  (230 N.  Y.,  210; 179  N. E.,  657); Schneck  vs. City of Jeffersonville (152 Ind., 204; 52 N.  E., 212);  Worley vs. Idleman (285 111., 214; 120 N. E., 472; 203  U. S., 106; 51 Law. ed., 109).

All of the authorites cited are good law, and if the decisions of the  Supreme Court of the United  States above cited involved the same legal principles and were founded upon the same state of facts, they would be binding upon, followed, approved and applied to this case.  But in the final analysis, the facts are very  different.

Counsel have not cited any case, and we apprehend that no decision will ever be found upon the admitted facts in this case, holding that where a final  judgment has been rendered by the Supreme Court that a lease of land by a person under guardianship was void for want of execution, that the lower court can then, on motion of the lessee, validate the lease over the protest and objection of the guardian of  the  lessor after  the rendition of such final judgment by the Supreme Court.

The alleged motion made by the guardian on October 15, 1913, was never acted upon or approved by any court until after the rendition of the  final decree in this court, and the legal effect of the decree  in  the original suit was to revoke and rescind  the motion made on October 15, 1913, by the then guardian to have the  court approve and ratify the lease.  In other words, at the time the lower court made its order approving the lease as of  October  15, 1913, that motion was  then legally  revoked and rescinded, and there was  nothing then before the court upon which it could approve the lease.

For such reasons, the judgment  of the lower court is reversed, with costs in favor of the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña,  C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Lichauco vs.  Tan Pho, G. R.  No. 19512, promulgated November 22,  1923, not reported.

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ROMUALDEZ, J.,

I think that there is sufficient  ground for affirming  the judgment appealed from.