Two questions are before the court for  decision.   The first is preliminary in nature and relates to the motions to dismiss presented by the intervenors.   The second question goes to the merits, and relates to the legal  right of the Public Utility Commission to impose conditions  upon public utilities operating auto trucks obliging them to  follow fixed routes and schedules and to respect the operation of other public utilities.

The petitioner is  Alejandra Mejica who  was  likewise the petitioner before the Public Utility Commission.   The respondent to the petition is made the Public Utility Commission.  The intervenors are Francis J. Cooper, the Negros Transportation  Co.,  and Ramon  Mirasol, who were the opponents before the  Public Utility  Commission.   The writing filed here is  entitled "Petition for Review" and is predicated on the grounds "(a)  that no  evidence was  produced  before the respondent commission upon the matter of fact which will justify  the restriction of the time of departure of the increase of seven trucks belonging to the herein petitioner," and "(b) that said order is unjust and prejudicial to the public interest."  The  brief for the petitioner is labeled "Certiorari" and the  same  reasons advanced in  the petition  for review  are relied  upon  as "Grounds for Certiorari."

It will be noted that the petitioner has made the Public Utility Commission  the respondent, as in certiorari cases, without advancing any allegation that the commission has exceeded its jurisdiction.   As,  however, the petition  follows  the  statutory  language providing  for  petitions  for review, and as the  intervenors have  presented their contentions to  the court, we prefer to treat this as a petition for review, and for the better satisfaction of the parties, will proceed to decide the case on its merits.   (See Manila Railroad Company vs.  A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., [1925], 48  Phil., 266.)

In  connection with the main point at issue, it is well to recall that the petitioner and the intervenors  are all public utilities engaged in the operation of auto truck  services for the transportation of passengers and freight over practically the same territory.  The certificates of public convenience first issued authorized operation  without stated hours or routes.  Subsequently, however, Francis J. Cooper and the Negros  Transportation Co. changed their methods of operation with  the  approval of  the Public Utility Commission from ones without fixed hours  or routes to services with fixed hours and routes.  It is also our understanding that Ramon  Mirasol has pending an application for a similar certificate.  The petitioner  Alexandra Mejica has preferred to operate her vehicles upon irregular schedules.   By means of two cases presented to the Public Utility Commission by Francis J.  Cooper and  the  Negros Transportation  Co., Alejandra  Mejica was  forbidden, when operating on the same line with Francis J. Cooper and the Negros Transportation Co. or either of them, to do so from any point within less than two  hours before or one hour  after  the scheduled  hours of departure  of their  trucks.

Thus remained  the  situation,  until  Alexandra  Mejica asked  the  Public  Utility Commission for  authority to increase her equipment  by seven  auto trucks with a capacity of twenty-eight passengers each, and to operate them on the same route and under the same conditions prescribed in her previous certificate  of conveyance.  To this application, Francis J.  Cooper and the Negros Transportation Co. filed opposition.  After hearing; the Assistant Public Utility Commissioner, Honorable M. V. del Rosario,  rendered  his  decision.  The  Commissioner  found  that  the evidence presented clearly showed that there existed sufficient traffic for the granting of the increase of equipment applied for in the proceeding.   The Commissioner  then treated of the more important  question  of whether  the trucks should be permitted to operate pursuant to a fixed itinerary route.  On  this point, it was said:

" *  *  * The Commission has said on various occasions, in solving similar questions to that now under consideration, that it will protect and render every reasonable and necessary support for the  defense of their interests which  concern the public, to those operators who  operate with  a fixed route or itinerary of trips with their specified hours of departure,  inasmuch as it means  a good service to the public  that makes  use of this  means of transportation.

"And while this  does not mean that the interests of the other operators affected will be  disregarded, yet it is indisputable  that those who  operate with  fixed route  and itinerary and  with fixed hours  of trips, deserve all the attention and reasonable protection of the  Commission, in order that the public may always have proper and  adequate service on  fixed hours,  which necessarily  redounds to the benefit of the public itself.

"That  is not the case with other operators who, not desiring to submit to a fixed route or itinerary of trips and much less to fixed hours of departure, depart  and operate at their convenience, without in the least considering the interests of the public that  makes use  of said means of transportation."

In the same connection, there can be noted Public Utility Case  No.  4345, Manuel R. Lopez, applicant,  and Public Utility Case No. 1525, Vivencio  Oefemia, applicant.   The following taken from Huddy on Automobiles, 6th ed.,  193, although relating more directly to the  legislative power, is nevertheless indicative of the general  trend:

"The fixing  of routes and schedules for jitneys is an appropriate exercise of the regulatory power of States and municipalities.   A jitney regulation may properly require the proprietor  to maintain a regular schedule  of his trips for certain  hours.  And a jitney owner  may  be required to operate over a designated  route and no other, and on a fixed schedule without repetition in whole or in part of the scheduled trips, and that the machines shall be operated a certain number  of hours  during  each  day.  *  *   *." (Citing Hutson vs. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa, 455; 156 N. W., 883; Ex parte Lee, 28 Cal. App., 719; 153; Pac, 992; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va.,  576; 85 S. E., 781; Booth vs. Dallas [Tex. Civ. App.],  179 S. W., 301; Commonwealth vs. Slocum, 230 Mass., 180; 119  N. E., 687; West vs. Asbury Park  [N. J.], 99 Atl., 190; Allen vs.  City of Bellingham, 95 Wash., 12;  163  Pac, 18.)

As suggested by counsel for the intervenors, a resolution of two questions will decide the larger  question at issue before this  court.  They are;  (1) Did the Public Utility Commission have the power to establish the rule announced in its decisions that regular  operators of auto trucks  will be protected from the competition of irregular operators? (2) Was there  any evidence before the Public Utility Commission when it made the decision appealed from which supported reasonably the order applying  the  rule to the petitioner?

The  general rule  established by the Public Utility Commission speaks for itself.  It is its own best advocate.  It appeals to one's sense of justice.  The general public, in the opinion of the Commission, is better served by regular service than it is by irregular service.  The public utility operators in the opinion of the Commission are better protected from ruinous competition by the enforcement of a method fair to all.

In the exercise of the power conferred  on the Commission, the court should not interfere.  The Commission should  not  be hampered by technical obstruction.  The court should not attempt to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Public Utility Commission  if  there be evidence before it supporting its order.  In this instance, that there was ample  evidence before the  Commissioner, is plain.

Going on the assumption that this is a petition for review and  that all the  parties thereto are properly before the court, it yet results that the decision of the Public Utility Commissioner is reasonably supported by the evidence and is within  the jurisdiction of the Commission.  Wherefore the decision  is affirmed,  with costs against  the petitioner.

Avanceña,  C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ.,  concur.