This is a mandamus proceeding originally instituted in this  court by Benigno Madalang against the Court of First Instance  of  Romblon, Seventeenth Judicial  District,  and Andres Malbas, praying that a peremptory order be issued to the respondent  Court of First Instance of Romblon to permit the petitioner to present additional witnesses in his favor in the new trial which is being held in civil case No. 438 of the said court.

The pertinent  and essential  facts in  this case are as follows:

Civil case No. 438 for the recovery of possession, in which Andres Malbas,  one of  the herein respondents,  was  the plaintiff, and Benigno Madalang, the herein petitioner, defendant, was tried  by the Court of First  Instance of Romblon on appeal from the justice  of  the place  court of Badajoz, Province of Romblon.  After the proper proceedings and introduction of the evidence of both parties in that case, the respondent Court of First Instance of Romblon, on  September 6,  1922, rendered judgment against the said petitioner  Benigno  Madalang  and  in  favor of  the  said respondent Andres Malbas, ordering the  former to return the possession of the land in litigation to the latter.  The petitioner in the present appeal and defendant in the former action, made timely exception and filed a motion for a new trial upon the ground that  the decision  was  contrary to law and the  weight  of evidence.   One day  in December, 1922, while the resolution of the said motion for a new trial was pending, a fire took place in the provincial building of Romblon where the Court of First Instance of said province was located, and destroyed the  entire record in civil  case No. 438, including  the oral and documentary evidence introduced during the trial  of  the case, as well as the stenographic notes.

In accordance with the  provisions of Act No. 3110 of the Philippine Legislature, Andres Malbas, the plaintiff in said case and respondent in this, filed a petition praying for the reconstruction  of civil case No. 438.  The  court below granted the petition and  issued the proper order.   In compliance with said order the plaintiff and  the defendant in said civil case reproduced,  by means  of  authentic copies, some of them certified, their respective pleadings, the documentary evidence, which  were admitted without objection identified with the same marks as the originals which were destroyed, and the judgment rendered  in the same, minus the transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of the witnesses 'for both parties, the same having been destroyed by  fire, together with the original stenographic notes.  In view  of the impossibility of  reproducing said oral evidence,  the court ordered a new trial for the presentation and reception of the testimony of the witnesses.   After several continuances all granted at the instance  of  the herein petitioner the  new trial  was finally held,  during which said petitioner Benigno Madalang, defendant  in said case,  after having introduced the same witnesses who had testified  in the original trial,  attempted to present additional witnesses.  The  herein  respondent Andres Malbas, plaintiff in the former action, objected, the respondent court sustaining his objection and denying  the  petition  of  the petitioner.

The only question to be decided in the present proceeding is whether or not, under the provisions  of Act No. 3110, in the holding of a new trial for the reconstruction of the record of a civil case destroyed by fire, pending the resolution of a motion for a new trial based upon the ground that the decision is contrary to law and the  weight of evidence, the defeated party may be permitted to present additional oral evidence  which was not presented  during the original trial.,

The pertinent provisions of Act No.  3110 are contained in the following sections:

"SEC.  6. Testimony of witnesses taken in civil cases shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy thereof or a new transcript of the stenographic notes.   If no authentic copy  can be obtained and the stenographic notes have also been  destroyed, the cases shall be tried  de novo as if called for trial  for  the first time.

"SEC. 7. If a  civil case has already been decided,  the decision shall be  reconstituted by means of an authentic copy.  In case an authentic copy cannot be found, the court shall make a new decision, as if the case had never been decided."

It apears from section 7 above quoted that a new judgment can be rendered, as if the case had never been decided, only when the original decision cannot be reconstructed by means of an authentic copy.  So that if an authentic copy of the original  decision exists, the  latter must  be  reconstructed by means thereof.  If this is so, the reconstruction of the oral evidence introduced at the original trial of civil cases, when no  authentic copy thereof exists, or when the stenographic notes have been destroyed and it is impossible to secure another transcript of the same, the testimony  of the  witnesses who testified at the  original trial shall  be taken again;  because,  as the original  decision is  reconstructed by means of an authentic copy of the same, it is not necessary to render a new one, and the reconstruction of the oral evidence is only for the purpose of permitting the court of appeal to review it and determine whether the appealed decision is in accordance therewith.

Consequently, Act  No. 3110 in providing in  its section 7  that  if an authentic  copy exists the  decision shall  be reconstructed by means thereof, it was the intention that in the reconstruction of  the oral evidence, provided  in section 6, only the testimony  of the same witnesses who testified  at the original trial must be taken again and not the testimony of additional witnesses, because neither the literal meaning of the verb "reconstitute," used in said law, nor the spirit, nor the object  of the  same warrants a  different interpretation.

In this proceeding the decision entered in civil case No. 438  was reconstructed  by means  of an authentic  copy thereof.   At the time that the  record  was destroyed by fire  there was  a motion for a new trial pending.   Said motion was based upon  the ground that the decision was contrary to law and the weight  of the evidence.  In case the motion for  a new trial should have  been granted upon the ground alleged therein, the  court might have limited itself to taking into consideration only the evidence already introduced in order to determine whether or not its original decision was in conformity therewith and the law applicable thereto.  If, on the contrary, said motion for a new trial should be denied and an appeal taken, the appellant could not bring, on his  appeal to this court, more evidence than was originally introduced.

Having, then, reconstructed the original decision by means of an authentic copy thereof, and there being a motion for a new trial  upon the ground that the said decision was contrary to law and the  weight of evidence which, in  case it is granted, only authorizes the revision of the same  evidence originally introduced, the respondent court did not commit any violation of law in connection with its ministerial duties nor abuse its discretion in not permitting the petitioner to present additional witnesses in the new trial ordered, in accordance  with the provisions  of Act No. 3110  of  the Philippine Legislature.

By virtue of the  foregoing, the remedy  prayed  for is denied and  the petition  is dismissed, with the costs against the petitioner.  So ordered.

Avanceña,  C. J.,  Johnson,  Street,  Villamor,  Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.