In the administration proceedings for the  settlement of the  estate of  Francisco Derayunan, deceased,  pending in the  court of First Instance of Iloilo,  the  judicial administrator submitted a scheme of partition of the estate of the said deceased.   The widow, by the second marriage,  Elisa Dominado, objected to said partition.  After a hearing of the parties the court ordered the partition to be made upon the following  basis:

"In the scheme  of partition there shall first be separated the  conjugal property belonging to the widow  and half of the conjugal property belonging to the deceased which, together with his private property,  will constitute the  inheritance  to be  partitioned.   This inheritance shall  be divided into three equal  parts: Two thirds thereof shall constitute the legitime of the two children of the deceased according to article 808 of the Civil Code, and the remaining one-third shall be the free portion from which shall be taken that which is to  go to the  widow Elisa Dominado in usufruct.  This portion, which  legally belongs to the widow in usufruct, shall  be equal to the  legitime of each of the children who has not received any betterment.   (See article 834 of the Civil Code.)   The betterment, according to article 808 of the Civil Code, is one-third of the estate one of  the two-thirds  which  constitutes  the legitime, or one-half of the legitime,

"According to the  law,  then, two-thirds of the inheritance must be  adjudicated to the children, one-half  to the son Narciso Derayunan and the other half to the daughter Margarita  Derayunan.  Under  the law  the widow Elisa Dominado is entitled to one-sixth of the inheritance in usufruct,  which one-sixth  part shall be  taken from  the free portion.

"Furthermore, there  shall be  adjudicated to each  of the children Narciso  Derayunan  and  Margarita Derayunan, one-half, in full ownership, of the free portion not adjudicated to the widow  Elisa Dominado and, in addition, the naked  ownership of the portion allotted in usufruct  to the widow Elisa Dominado.

"This is the basis to be followed in the scheme of partition of the estate of the deceased Francisco Derayunan."

Upon this basis  determined by the court, the administrator of the intestate  estate presented another  scheme of partition on April 24,  1925, which, after  a hearing, was approved by the court in  an order dated  December 2, of the same year.   The  widow appealed from this  order.

One of the questions raised in the appellant's brief refers to the manner of determining the portion of the inheritance which  pertains to  the widow in usufruct,  two children of different marriages of the deceased Francisco Derayunan inheriting with her.   According to the  appellant, the widow's usufruct in the  present case constitutes one-third of the inheritance,  citing in support of her  contention the opinions of the illustrious commentators on  the Civil Code, Messrs. Manresa and  Sanchez Roman.   On the other hand, the appellee maintains that said  usufruct consists of one sixth part of the inheritance as  found  by the trial  court.

Article 834 of the Civil Code provides that "any widower or widow who, on the death of  his or her  spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by the fault of the  deceased, shall be entitled to a  portion in usufruct equal  to that  corresponding by way of legitime to each of  the  legitimate children or descendants who have not received any betterment."

What is necessary, then, to determine is  the  legitime of the  children  who have  not  received  any betterment. First of all, it must be noted that the legitime which serves as a point of comparison is that of the children or descendants who have  not received any  betterment,  which implies  that the deceased has made use of the right to give a betterment.  But, in the present case,  there being no  betterment, what is the legitime of the two children?

Sanchez Roman, in  solving the legal problems that might arise in the interpretation of article 834 of the Civil Code, among other things, says:

"According to article 834, the legitime that pertains  to a legitimate child, or descendant not received any betterment or the legitime by which the amount of the widow's usufruct is regulated in order that said legitimes may be equal in amount, is the two-thirds of the inheritance as maximum when there is no  betterment; as a minimum, the one-third constituting the short legitime only when the  whole of the  second third  constituting the betterment is  given as such; and as a medium, said one-third constituting the short legitime, to which is to be added what  remains of the third constituting the betterment  when only  a part and not the whole thereof is given; and fixing within these limits, maximum, minimum and medium, the amount which must be allotted to the widow in each case as her share, which must be equal to that of the child or each of the children not receiving any betterment, according to their number." (6 Sanchez Roman, vol.  2, p. 878.)

Manresa fully solves the same question as follows:

"What is the legitime  pertaining to each of the children not having received any betterment?  It is necessary  to get the meaning of the words 'pertaining' and 'not receiving any betterment/  What pertains to each of the children by way  of legitime  is the portion to which he is  entitled according to the law whether there is a surviving spouse  or not, for the fact that  the latter  inherits with descendants cannot alter their legitimes.   The children not receiving any betterment are  those in whose favor the testator has not expressly disposed of any part of the one-third constituting the betterment, for the code, as shown by articles 825 and 828, does not admit of implied betterments.  The law excludes,  therefore,  the amount of the express betterments whether or not they absorb the one-third constituting the same.  The legitime, therefore, that must be taken into account  is the two-thirds, if  no betterment is  given, the one-third constituting the short, legitime if the other third was given entirely as a betterment,  or said one-third plus the residue of the other  not given as a betterment by the testator.  It is this  portion, or the two-thirds, one third and the one-third plus the residue, according to the case, that must be divided equally by the number of the children and will give the legitime belonging or pertaining, by force of law, to each of the children not receiving any betterments"   (6 Manresa, p. 541.)

Perhaps Mr. Arturo Casanueva may be cited in support of appellant's  contention, said author being of the opinion that, in order to determine the widow's usufruct, the short legitime of the children,  or, one-third  of  the inheritance constituting the same must be considered  as the basis of the computation.   In an article on  usufruct  of the spouse published  in the Revista  de Legislation  y  Jurisprudencia, vol. 134, p. 532, Mr. Casanueva, among other things, says:

"Does the phrase 'not receiving any betterment' refer to express betterment?  Ubi lex non  distinguit, nee nos distinguere  debemus.  It  is conclusive not receiving  any betterment.  And  those who appear to have received betterments impliedly are  as much bettered as  those who do so expressly.   In the three cases which are possible, namely, some having  received  a  betterment and  others not, all having received expressly or impliedly equal betterments, and  all having received betterments but unequal, only the latter two give rise to doubt.  But in both  cases   *   *  *. Art  we going to accept  a  different view ?  From  a reading of article 834 of the Civil  Code we draw the inference that the portion in usufruct is equal to  that  which pertains to each one as his legitime,  and as things  equal to  the  same things portion in usufruct are equal  to each  other,  it results that that part which pertains to each of them as legitime, is equal.   Does this occur  when all  have received unequal betterments?  The absurdity is  evident if it is admitted that those  unequal parts are real legitimes.  In a decision rendered  December 2, 1893, the  Supreme Court has  held that  'any interpretation  or construction which leads to an absurdity  must be rejected.'  Therefore, the view whereby  the legitime of a legitimate child or descendant  is considered  as a part of the two-thirds  must be rejected.

"Having established that the legitime to be taken into account in the computation of the  usufruct  of the widow is an aliquot part of the one-third, a divisor of the said one-third still  remains  to be found, which is also much debated. Some are of the  opinion that it must  be the number of the children, and others that it is the number of the children plus one, because they consider the surviving spouse as another  child.

"Let  us admit as the divisor the number  of children plus one, and as we can  give the number of children any value whatever, let us give it the value of one,  and we will find as divisor one plus one equals two.   What will be the result?   It  will be that  in  case a surviving  spouse inherits with  a  single child, one-half of the one-third constituting the  betterment  would belong to him in usufruct, which is against  the conclusive  provisions of the Civil Code, which precisely  determine  that in  the  case where there is  only  one  child he will receive the whole third in usufruct. It is therefore  an inadmissible divisor because it leads to a  manifest juridical absurdity,  manifestly contrary to the law.

"In short,  the  portion in  usufruct pertaining  to  the widow is obtained by dividing one-third  of the inheritance by the number of  children."'

But in this jurisdiction the legal doctrine laid down in the case of  Chico vs. Viola and  Reyes  (40 Phil., 316), is that under  articles 825 and 828,  there can be  no implied betterments that, under  article 808, the two-thirds of the inheritance  of the  father or of the mother  constitute the legitime  of  the legitimate children and  descendants without prejudice  to the right to give a betterment; and when this right has not been  made use of, the two-thirds pertain to them as legitime; but this does not mean  that they thereby  receive a  betterment.  Dividing, then, the  two thirds of the  inheritance  of the deceased Francisco Derayunan between the two  children  by  his two  marriages, one-third of the said inheritance pertains to each one as his legitime  and this  one-third is the measure of the portion that must go  to the widow-appellant in usufruct, or one- third also of the  same  inheritance, which must  be  the one-third of free  disposal in  accordance with  article 839 of the Civil Code.  Therefore, we find that the trial court committed an error of  law in holding that the portion which belongs to the widow-appellant in usufruct consists of one-sixth part of the inheritance.

Another error  assigned by the appellant as committed by the court is  that the ^court adjudicated to the widow Elisa Dominado half of the expenses  incurred in sowing the 798 cocoanut trees,  instead of half of the said trees. the planting of these  cocoanut trees took place during the marriage of Domiirgo  Derayunan and Elisa Dominado, the land being exclusive property of the former.  The appellant claims half of these cocoanut trees as her half of the conjugal property, invoking paragraph No. 1  of article 1407 of  the  Civil  Code in support of her contention.  This contention  is untenable.  A similar question was raised in the  case of Tabotabo vs. Molero (22 Phil., 418).  Diego Tabotabo was married the second time to Gregoria Molero.  He had a piece of land as his exclusive property which  had been  planted  with more  than 2,000 cocoanut  trees during his second  marriage  with Molero.   The  latter  claimed the  right to one- half of the said coconut trees,  but this court denied her claim  enunciating the following  doctrine:

"To the owner of realty also belongs, by right of accession, the  improvements  made  thereon.  Buildings,  crops and other  improvements  upon land belong to the owner of the realty.  To this rule there is an exception in the case of  married persons.   Paragraph 2 of article 1404 of the Civil Code provides that buildings constructed during the marriage,  on land belonging to one of the  spouses, are conjugal property, but the  owner of the realty  shall be entitled to credit for the value of the  land.  This exception, however, is limited to buildings and does not apply to crops and  other improvements, with  respect  to which the general rule applies.  Expenses incurred  in making such crops and improvements are conjugal  expenses, for which the conjugal partnership must be reimbursed.

The second error, therefore, must be overruled.

The determination of the part of the land described in tax assessment  No. 3308, the subject-matter of the third assignment of error, lies within the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the interests of the parties, regarding which it is not  incumbent upon us to make  any pronouncement.

For the foregoing,  the judgment  appealed from must be,  as it is hereby, modified in that the portion pertaining to the widow in usufruct consists  of  one-third of the estate of the  deceased  Francisco Derayunan,  without  any special findings  as to costs.   So ordered.

Avanceña, C.  J.,  Johnson, Street,  Ostrand, Johns,  and Romualdez, JJ.,  concur.