In the cadastral  expediente  No. 10, G.  L.  R. 0. Record No.  270,  of the Court of  First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Bartolome Salamanca claims lots  Nos. 3001,  3002,  3003, 3009,  3017, 3056,  3057,  3058,  3086,  3089,  3090,  3092, 3093, 3094, 3095, 3097, 3102, 3108, 3110, 3112, and 3114, alleging that he inherited the same from his deceased father Anastacio Salamanca.  Clemente Lazaro and Rosauro Agonoy  together claim the undivided  ownership  of  lots Nos. 1122, 3016, 3018, 3059, 3062, 3063, 3064, 3084, 3085, 3088, 3098, 3121,  and 3009, the first alleging that he acquired his interest by purchase from Restituto Romero in 1907 and the second that he had inherited his share from his father  Policarpo Agonoy, who in turn purchased from Restituto Romero in 1907.   Emilio Eserjose claims lots Nos. 2991, 2992, 2993, 2994, 2995, 3115, 3117, 3118, 3119, 3120, 3122, 3199, and  3456, asserting that he acquired the same by purchase from Restituto  Romero in  the  year 1907.

Upon hearing the cause on June 15, 1925, the trial court overruled the  claims of the  four individuals  above-mentioned and declared the parcels in controversy to be public land, i  e., lots Nos. 1122, 3016, 3018, 3059, 3062,  3063, 3064, 3084, 3085,  3088, 3098, 3121, 3001, 3002, 3003, 3008, 3009, 3017, 3056,  3057, 3058, 3086, 3089, 3090, 3092, 3093, 3094, 3095, 3097,  3102, 3110, 3108, 3112, 3114, 2989, 2990 to 2995,  inclusive, 3115, 3117, 3118, 3119, 3120, 3122, 3456, and 3463.   From this judgment Bartolome Salamanca, Clemente Lazaro, Rosauro Agonoy, and  Emilio Eserjose have appealed.

Before entering into the merits of the case it is necessary to dispose  of  a question relating to the  competency of  the trial judge to hear and determine the cause in the  court below.   In  this connection  it appears that the  judge who decided  the case,  namely, Judge Conrado Carballo, is  the same person who, as Acting Director of Lands, caused an administrative investigation to be conducted in the year 1921 into  the conflicting claims of Bartolome  Salamanca and numerous homesteaders who, with the approval of  the Director of Lands, had previously occupied much or all of the land  now in question under the provisions of the Public Land Act.   As a  result of said investigation Judge Carballo, as Acting Director of Lands, dismissed the claim of Salamanca as  unfounded and sustained the rights of  the homesteaders  to the  property as public land.  It  further appears  that the present cadastral was instituted in April, 1921; and  the petition initiating the proceeding appears to be signed by the same Carballo, in the capacity of Acting Director of Lands.

When  the controversy over these lots arrived at the stage for the submission of proof and the hearing of the cause, Judge  Carballo was then presiding in the  Court of First Instance  of Nueva Ecija; and as no objection whatever had been raised by any of the appellants with respect to his competency,  he proceeded to hear  and determine the cause.

After a decision had been made, adverse to the appellants, their attorneys filed a motion in the cause, asking the judge to inhibit himself as disqualified, on the ground that, prior to the  initiation of the cadastral proceeding, he had conducted an administrative investigation with respect to the controversy between Salamanca and the homesteaders.   At still later date another motion of inhibition was made, on the ground, alleged to have been then newly discovered, that the cadastral was initialed by the judge who had presided at the trial.   These motions were overruled, and the court having adhered to its  decision, and having overruled the motion for  reconsideration, the cause was brought to this court, upon appeal, as previously stated.

We  are of the  opinion that the exception taken  to the competency of Judge Carballo is not well  founded.  Even supposing that the situation was one where the trial judge, upon having his attention called to the matter, might properly have inhibited himself from acting in the matter, yet it is  obvious that he had  jurisdiction and power  to act; and the failure of the  appellants to interpose objection prior to the decision, is a fatal obstacle to raising any objection on this ground later.   The attorneys for the appellants should have been familiar with the pleadings in the cause,  as well as other documents in the record.  Reference to these would at once have revealed the fact that Judge Carballo had participated  administratively to the  extent above stated.   A litigant, having these facts before him, cannot be permitted to speculate upon  the action of a court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered.

The grounds of disqualification specified in section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure supply matter for preliminary exception,  and timely  objection should be submitted  in writing as  is required in  said section.  The inadvertent failure of the court to disqualify himself in the case there mentioned does not supply a ground for reversing the judgment;  but of course if  this court were of the opinion that the litigant had not had a fair trial, a  new trial could  be granted.  In  the  case  before  us  Judge Carballo had no personal interest in the controversy,  and it is obvious that substantial justice has not suffered.  In section 503 of the Code  of Civil Procedure this court is prohibited from reversing any cause on merely formal  or technical  grounds not prejudicial to the excepting party.

With respect to the merits of the contention over the title to the land, the following  facts are pertinent: In the year 1894 one Restituto  Romero  instituted proceedings to obtain a possessory information covering a tract of about 100 hectares of land located in what  is now  the barrio of San Agustin, municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, with the Digdig River  on the north,  the  Estero  Tapirong  on the east, the Estero Luyos on the west, and the Estero Tagaytay on the south.  These proceedings terminated in the extension of the  document, Exhibit B.  In  1907  Romero executed deeds conveying  to  various individuals  several parcels  of land purporting to be  of those included in said possessory information.   One portion, of an area of 63 hectares, 91 ares, and 62 centares, was thus sold to Cornelio Ramos; and a sketch of the precise  parcel sold to Ramos is printed in our decision in Ramos vs. Director  of  Lands (39 Phil, 175).  Said  parcel lies south  of the land involved in the present dispute.   Another parcel  consisting  of 81 hectares, 93 ares and 75 centares was  sold by Romero to one Crisanto Sanchez.   This  parcel lies  still further south than that purchased by Ramos; and both  Ramos  and  Sanchez have  in  former proceedings  procured the registration  in their  own names of the lands claimed by them under said deeds.  This makes a total of nearly  146 hectares already registered, of the land covered  by Romero's possessory Information.

The land in question in the case before us has  an area of more than 180  hectares and it is located to the  north and east of the tract acquired by Ramos.  All  of the appellants claim title directly or indirectly from  Restituto Romero  by virtue of conveyances made to them  or their predecessors in interest in the year 1907  (Exhibits  A,  F, and O).  The lands claimed by  the different appellants together form a single mass as shown in the sketch plan of the Bureau of Lands, Exhibit No. 6.  All of it seems to be  now occupied by some fifteen homesteaders who entered upon the parcels, now severally occupied by them, in the year 1913.

The document relied upon by the  appellants as their ultimate source of title is  the Exhibit B, which, as already stated, is a possessory information extended in favor of Restituto Romero upon proceedings instituted by him in the year , 1894.  This document is a possessory information only, as the proceedings necessary  to the procurance of a royal decree  do not appear to have been taken.  Besides, the recitals of the possessory information are not such as to show that  the conditions requisite to a royal decree were ever complied with.  In Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil., 175), we pronounced this same instrument to be a mere possessory  information.

There are  two circumstances which, taken singly or together, are serious obstacles to the conclusion that the lands now claimed  by the appellants are  covered  by  the Exhibit B.   The first consists in the fact that the possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares, while the lands claimed by the appellants together comprise some 182 hectares.  As we have already  seen, some 146 hectares of land have already been registered in favor of  other claimants as comprised within the limits of said possessory information.  The other consideration is found in the fact that the calls for  boundaries in the possessory information have little relation to the natural limits of the land now claimed by the appellants.  For instance, the Estero Tapirong now divides the land claimed by the appellants from east to west, instead of supplying the eastern boundary; while the Estero Luyos, called for as the western boundary in the possessory information,  appears to He to the  south, in proximity to the land registered by Crisanto  Sanchez.  Even after making  all due  allowances for changes  effected   by  natural agents in course of time  in the beds of the streams, it  is difficult to believe that the lands now in controversy were, at  the  time the possessory information  was extended, within the boundaries therein  expressed.

Apart from these considerations we are of the opinion that there is no satisfactory proof of continuous possession on the part of  the appellants and their predecessors in interest of the lands now claimed by  them.  It is certain that these lands were unoccupied when the homesteaders made their advent in 1913, and they appear to have been vacant for an indefinite period prior to that epoch.   The appellants' claim of ownership therefore fails not only for lack of certainty upon the point of the inclusion of the, land in the description of Exhibit  B, but for lack of continuity of possession on the part of the appellants and their predecessors in interest.

Error in the conclusions of the trial court has therefore not been demonstrated, and the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.  It is  so  ordered, with costs against the appellants.

Avanceña, C.  J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.