This is an appeal by Leopoldo Hormillosa and  "Viuda de Tan Toco" from an order  of the Court of First Instance of Occidental  Negros,  granting  a motion of the Director of Forestry for  the reopening of the above-entitled case with respect to lot  No.  1156.

The proceedings were initiated by the Director of Lands under Act  No.  2259, known  as the Cadastral Act.

On  November  28, 1920, the Court of First Instance of Occidental  Negros  set  the case  to be heard on  February 21, 1921,  in the municipality  of Cadiz, of  that  province. December 8, 1920, the provincial fiscal on behalf of the Bureau of  Forestry filed an  opposition to the registration alleging that lot  No. 1156 and others therein named  were within the proposed "Northern  Negros Forest Reservation," and, for that reason, that such lands were the property of the Government  of  the United  States and  under the administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
About March 7,  1921, Leopoldo Hormillosa filed an answer in which he claimed to be the owner of lot No. 1156 with its improvements.  In   February, 1921,  Uvilfredo  Duyuñgan,  on behalf of the heirs of Custodio  Duyungan, filed  an  answer  also claiming  the  ownership  of  that lot and the improvements.  The  respective answers were duly noted  by the cadastral attorney, with the words "contested by the Bureau of  Forestry" and "contested by the heirs  of Custodio Duyungan and the Insular Government." April 22, 1921,  Hormillosa, the Duyungan heirs  and Lao Sangco filed a motion for the subdivision of  lot No. 1156, which was  granted on June 15, 1921, and the  surveyor was ordered to  designate the  subdivisions as lots  Nos. 1156-A, 1156-B, and 1156-C.  October 10,1921, the provincial fiscal filed another opposition  alleging  that lot No. 1156 and others were "public forest lands."  December 8, 1921, the court adjudicated  lot No. 1156-A with its improvements to Leopoldo Hormillosa.   Lot No.  1156-B with its  improvements to Uvilfredo Duyungan and his coheirs, subject  to a right of way in favor of "The Negros Philippine Lumber Co."  and lot No. 1156-C  with its improvements to Lao Sangco.  May 27,  1924, the provincial fiscal, on behalf  of the Bureau of Forestry,  filed a motion to reopen  the case as to those particular lots, alleging in substance  that the decision of  the court had been obtained through fraud and in bad faith.   Objections were filed to the granting of the motion, and after a hearing  thereon,  it was ordered that the case  be reopened, to which Leopoldo Hormillosa and "Viuda de  Tan Toco" duly excepted and moved for a rehearing,  which was denied, from which they appeal and assign the following errors:

"I.  The trial court erred in not holding that on December 8, 1921, the decree of registration of the land in  question was entered within the meaning of section 38 of Act No. 496; and that, no  fraud having been proven, and no petition for a review having been filed within one year from the entry of said decree, the same became irrevocable.

"II. The trial court erred in entering its order  of August 15, 1925 (B. E., pp. 36-38),  and in not holding that the Director of Forestry, not having  formulated his claim pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the law and within the period last granted by the  court,  had lost  all right to lay such claim and. all right to be notified of the hearing."

JOHNS, J.:

The first assignment of error is squarely decided adverse to the appellants by this  court in De los Reyes vs. De Villa (48 Phil., 227), in which the decision was promulgated on November 12, 1925.

The second assignment is largely based upon the contention that the protest of the Bureau of Forestry was not verified, and that for such reason it has no legal force or effect.

It must be noted  that  the original proceedings were initiated upon the petition of the Director of Lands  in and by  which all parties  having any interest in the lands in question were cited  and required to appear,  claim, and assert their interests.  In response to that notice, the Bureau of Forestry, through the provincial fiscal,  appeared and filed an  opposition claiming that lot No. 1156 and others therein named were within the proposed "Northern  Negros Forest Reservation," and as such were the property of the Government of the United States and under the administration of the  Government  of the Philippine Islands.  Based upon that opposition, the cadastral attorney made a notation on the records that the lands were "contested by the Bureau of Forestry" and "contested by the heirs of Custodio Duyuñgan and the  Insular Government."

That became a matter of official record  in the proceedings,  and within itself was notice of the fact that the Government was claiming  the  lands and  contesting  the  rights  of any other claimant, upon the ground that it was within the proposed "Northen Negros Forest Reservation."

It is true, as the appellants claim, that  the protest was not verified.  Whatever  may be the rule  as to  a  protest filed by a private party,  it does not apply  to a case where the proceedings were initiated  by one branch of the Government and  an  opposition  was filed by  another  branch against private  parties,  who had  appeared and asserted their respective rights against the alleged right of the Government itself.  It is also maintained that no fraud was alleged  or  proven.  Be that  as  it may, the original order of the court was made without giving the Bureau of Forestry an opportunity to be heard, and the court set aside that order,  the doing of  which  was a  matter largely in its discretion.

If appellants have a valid claim to the lands in question, that fact can  be ascertained and determined by a  hearing on the merits.  If they do not have a valid claim, it would be a fraud upon the Government to have  the titles to the lands in question adjudged  to them.

Again, although the point is not made  in the brief of the Attorney-General,  under numerous decisions of this court, an  order of the lower court, setting aside and vacating a judgment and granting  a new  trial, is  not a final order from which an appeal will lie.

It follows that there  is no merit in the appeal; that it was prematurely taken; and that it is dismissed, with costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.