This is an action  for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property for the sum of P15,000.  The complaint was filed on April 22, 1925, and the sheriff's return shows that summons was served on the defendants on the 24th of the same month.  They failed to appear, and on May 26, 1925, were declared in default.   Two weeks later said defendants through their attorney filed the following unverified motion:

"Now come, Salvador V. del Rosario and Benita Quiogue de V.  del Rosario,  the  defendants of the  action above named, thru the undersigned attorney, and to  this Honorable Court respectfully begs, that its order  on the 26th day of May, 1925, declaring the aforesaid  defendants, in default, be put aside, and the said case be again, reinstated.

"This petition is based  upon the fact that said attorney did not receive the complaint of the case above mentioned from  the messenger of the defendants, as the latter entrusted the said complaint to the said messenger for delivery to the undersigned attorney; nor have the said attorney any notice of the  said complaint until after order of this Honorable Court, declaring said defendants  in  default was received.  However, upon posterior investigation, the defendants above named found out that said  complaint was carried by the said messenger with him in his escapade."

The motion was denied and on June 20, 1925, the defendants without leave of court  filed another motion in exactly the same terms as the foregoing, but this time verified by  oath.  This motion was  also  denied.   No affidavit of merit accompanied either of the motions and no exceptions appear to have been taken from the orders denying them.

On October 20,  1925, judgment was rendered by default ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage.   Upon appeal to this court the defendants make only one assignment of error, namely,  that "The court erred in  not putting aside its order of May 26,  1925, declaring herein defendants-appellants  in  default, after having  shown that their failure to file an answer was due to an accident, thus unjustly depriving them of their  day in court, in violation of section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure."

Without going  into  other  features  of  the case,  it is sufficient to say that the defendants' failure to  show by affidavit of merit that they had a just and valid  defense, is fatal to their contention.  This point was fully discussed in the case of Coombs vs. Santos (24 Phil.,  446), in which the court said: "There is, however, a serious drawback to granting  the relief asked.   The motion  asking that the default judgment  be set  aside is accompanied by no affidavit of merits.  Although the Code does  not specifically require such an affidavit of merits, the reasonableness and necessity  for  it is apparent.  If the  defendant has no real  defense to the action or intends to enter only a technical plea, there would be no  justice in permitting the case to be reopened and subject plaintiff to further delay and expense for the mere purpose of rendering a judgment in the regular manner,  It is but right, therefore, to require the defendant to show that if he be allowed to answer he will  be able to produce evidence which  may  affect the claims of the plaintiff.

"The universality of the rule is attested  by the remarks in 23 Cyc, 951, 955,  and 962, supported by a host of authorities.  Black on  Judgments,  sec.  347,  thus  states the general rule:

" 'Where an application is made  to open a  judgment, under the statutes for that purpose, it must be accompanied by an  affidavit setting forth a good defense on the merits, and showing that, the default occurred through mistake, surprise, or other statutory ground, and stating the facts constituting such mistake, surprise, etc., and also showing due diligence.  And-independently of such statutes, it has always been the practice of  our courts, from the very earliest times,  on an application to open or set aside a judgment, to require some sort of showing, by affidavit or otherwise, that the judgment is unjust as  it stands and prejudicial to the party  complaining and that he has a meritorious defense. It may therefore be regarded as  a universal requirement.'

"A mere statement that defendant has a valid defense is a conclusion of law (Roberts vs. Corby, 86 111., 182) ; or is not  sufficient (Palmer vs.Rogers, 70 Iowa, 381; 30 N. W., 645; Jackson vs.Stiles, 3 Caines [N. Y.], 93; Mayer vs. Mayer, 27 Ore., 133; 39 Pac, 1002; Foster vs.Martin, 20 Tex.,  119).  The  only  exceptions  to  the  rule are  cases where the granting of the motion is not discretionary but is demandable as of right, as where there was no jurisdiction over the defendant or of the subject-matter of the action, where a judgment was taken by default before defendant's time to answer had expired, where it was entered by mistake, or was obtained  by fraud,  and other  similar  eases. (23 Cyc,  956.)   It does not appear that any  such exceptions favor the present case.

"The opinion of  this court in the case of Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co.  (2 Phil., 301), sets forth the rule with some  particularity.  But in  view  of  the fact  that  the opinion in its entirety  was not approved  by a majority of the court, we have taken this  opportunity to state the  rule at  length, and compliance with  it in the future will be required."   (See also Daipan  vs. Sigabu, 25 Phil., 184 and Mapua vs. Mendoza, 45 Phil., 424.)

The appeal is  entirely without merit and has evidently been taken for the sole purpose of securing delay.

The judgment  appealed from is therefore affirmed with double costs  against the appellants.   So  ordered.

Avanceña, C. J.,  Street, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.