This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna,  declaring the plaintiffs owners of a parcel of land situated in  the municipality of Magdalena of  said province, and  ordering the  defendant- appellant to deliver possession  thereof to said plaintiffs.

The appellant maintains that he acquired title to  the land through purchase from one Isabela Macaraya and  her son-in-law Lorenzo  Abordo, who in turn had  purchased the land from the plaintiff's ancestor Juana Acejo.  In his answer he also pleaded the statute of limitations  and alleged that he had been in the actual, open, public and continuous possession of  the land under claim  of  ownership for over twenty-four years.

There may  possibly  be  some merit in the  appellant's assertion that  he purchased the land from Macaraya and Abordo,  but the evidence upon that  point is not very clear and need not here be discussed in view of the fact that he in our opinion has fully established his claim  to title  by prescription or adverse possession.

The complaint in the present action was filed on January 5, 1920, and it is conceded that the appellant had then been  in  uninterrupted possession of the land in question since the year 1896.  In addition  thereto,  the following facts are shown by the  plaintiffs' own evidence: Ceferina de  la  Torre inherited  the  land from  her mother Juana Acejo.   Upon the death of Ceferina  her surviving husband, Antonio Francia, on March 2, 1896,  executed a deed of sale of the property to the appellant.  Ceferina left two minor children, Vicente Francia born on April 2,1884, and Josefa Francia born on April 28, 1892.  Vicente Francia died on November 19, 1906, leaving a  son, the  plaintiff  Amado Francia, born in the year  1904.  As under  the  laws in force at that time the age of  majority was 23 years, Vicente Francia was still a minor at the time of his death.  Josefa Francia attained her majority in 1913, seven years before this action was brought.

The court below held that  as Vicente Francia died before attaining  his  majority and as his son,  the plaintiff  Amado Francia, was less than 16 years old  when this action  was instituted, the statute of limitations had not begun to  run against either of them and that therefore the appellant could not have acquired title as against them  by prescription.   As we  shall presently see, this view is erroneous.

In his brief counsel for plaintiffs argues that the cause of  action in  this case  accrued before the enactment of the Code  of  Civil Procedure, and that therefore the rules relating to prescription established by the Civil  Code govern in the present case; that the defendant must  have known that Antonio  Francia  was not the owner of the land  and can therefore not be said to have possessed the land in good faith; that not having held  possession  in good faith, he is not entitled  to the  benefit  of  the ten years'  prescription provided  for  in  article 1957 of  the  Civil Code and  can only invoke the extraordinary prescription of  thirty years provided for  in, article 1959 of the  Civil Code; and that this action, having been brought before the expiration of the thirty years, is not barred.

This  argument leaves  out of consideration section  38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which  reads as follows:

"SEC. 38. To What  this Chapter does not Apply. This chapter shall  not apply  to actions already commenced, or to cases wherein the right of action  has already accrued; but the statutes in force when the action or right of action accrued shall  be applicable to such cases according to  the subject of the action and without regard to the form; nor shall this chapter apply in the case of a  continuing and subsisting trust, nor to an action by the  vendee of real property in  possession thereof to obtain the conveyance of it: Provided, nevertheless, That all rights of action which have already accrued,  except  those named in the  last preceding paragraph, must be vindicated by the commencement of an action or  proceeding to enforce the same within  ten years after  this Act comes into effect"

The Code  of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901, and under the  section just quoted the  time  for vindicating  rights of action accruing while the limitations provided for in  the Civil Code were in effect, consequently expired on  October 1, 1911, subject only to the saving clause contained in section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:

  "SEC. 42.  Exceptions in Favor of Persons under Disability. If a person entitled to bring the action mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter is, at  the  time  the cause of action accrues,  within  the  age of  minority,  of unsound mind or in prison, such person may,  after the expiration of  ten  years  from the time  the cause of action accrues, bring such action  within three  years after such disability is removed."

It will be noted  that the saving clause  only applies  to persons who are under disability at the time the  cause of action accrues, and that therefore in the present case only Vicente Francia and the plaintiff Josef a Francia could have taken advantage of the clause.  The death of Vicente  on November 19* 1906, terminated his disability, and under the saving clause his heirs or legal representatives had three years from  that date within which to bring action for the recovery of the land.   (37 C. J.,  1037, and  authorities there cited.)  His  right of  action was therefore extinguished on November  19, 1909, nearly eleven years before this  action was  brought.  If we regard the case as one of extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code as modified by section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the time for bringing the action  expired on October 1, 1911.  Josefa became of age on April 2, 1913, and  her  right  of  action consequently prescribed on April 2, 1916, nearly four years before the present action was  instituted.

But it is argued and the court below in  effect so held that the disability of Vicente must be tacked to that of his infant son and heir, the plaintiff Amado Francia, and that as the  latter  did not attain his majority until  the year 1925, his action was brought in time.   Upon this point the authorities are uniformly to the effect that in the absence of statutory provisions to  the contrary different disabilities cannot be tacked to each  other.  From the numerous authorities on the subject  we quote the following:

"Except where the statute  otherwise so provides,  one disability cannot be tacked to another, nor the disabilities of an ancestor to those of the heir, to protect a party from the operation of the  statute; nor can a party avail himself of several disabilities, unless they all existed at the time when the right of action accrued  *   *  *    This is in obedience to the universal rule, before stated, that when the  statute once  begins to  run  no  subsequent  disability  can stop its operation,  unless  specially so provided in the statute." (Wood on Limitations, 3d edition, pp. 554, 557.)

"Disability cannot be added  to disability.  If that were, permitted a right might travel through minorities  for an indefinite time for two centuries, Lord Eldon said.  Demarest  vs. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch., 129,  139; 8 Am. Dec, 467."   (Messinger  vs.  Foster,  101 N.  Y. Supp., 387.)

"The construction referred to is, that some or one of the disabilities mentioned in the proviso, must exist at the time the action accrues,  in  order to prevent the statute from running; and that after it has once commenced to run, no subsequent disability will interrupt it.   This was the rule adopted iii the exposition of the statute of 21 Jac, 1. ch. 16, the English Statute of Limitations in force at the time of the first settlement of most of the American Colonies. It is  provided  by the 7th section of that Statute,  'That if any person entitled to  bring any  of the personal actions therein mentioned, shall be "at the time of any such, cause of action given or accrued," within the  age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis,  imprisoned or  beyond the seas,  such person  shall be at liberty  to bring the same actions within the times limited by the statute, after his disability has terminated. Arig. Lim.,  ch. XIX.   It is true that the express words of this statute refer to disabilities existing at the time the cause of action accrues, and do not literally  include disabilities arising afterwards.  The courts,  however, held that such was not only the literal but the true and sensible meaning of the Act; and that to allow successive  disabilities to protract the right to  sue would, in many cases, defeat its salutary object and keep actions alive perhaps for a hundred years or more; that the object of the statute was to put an end to litigation, and to secure peace and repose; which would be greatly interfered with and  often wholly  subverted, if its operation were  to be suspended by every subsequently accruing disability."   (McDonald vs.  Hovey, 110 U. S.,  619.)

"The tacking of disabilities in different persons has been rejected by us since our earliest history; was even rejected in England before our day, is rejected by all our sister states, so far as I know, and  must of course be rejected in this instance."   (Guion's vs. Bradley  Academy, 4 Yerg. [Tenn.], 231, 255.)

"In Ashbrook vs. Quarles' Heirs (54 Ky., 20), the court said:  'It  has been repeatedly  decided  under  the  general statute, that one disability  cannot be added to another in any  case,  so as  to  prevent the  statute  from  running. (Floyd's  Heirs vs. Johnson,  2 Litt.,  114.)   There can be no accumulation of disabilities by adding one to another. Whenever  the ancestor would  have to rely upon his  own disability to preserve his right of entry, his heirs cannot avail themselves of their  disability for the same purpose, upon his death. "   (Clay's Heirs vs. Miller, 3  Mon.,  148.)

See also Thorp vs. Raymond  (16 How., 247);  Smith vs. Burtis (9 Johns, 174); Jackson vs. Johnson (5 Cow., 74); Walden vs.  Heirs of Gratz  (1  W^heat, 292);  Hogan vs. Kurtz  (94 U. S., 773); Mercer's Lessee vs. Selden (1 How., 37) ;  McDonald vs. Hovey  (110 U.  S.,  619) ;  Chicago, Rock  Islands, & Pacific R. Co.  vs. David  Campbell (174 U.  S., 1149; 43  Law. ed., 722); Gordon  vs. Lewis  (88 Mo., 378) ; Mitchell vs. Berry  (58 Ky., 602); Dowell vs.Tucker (46 Ark., 438) ; Griswold vs. Butler  (3 Conn., 227); South's Heirs vs.  Thomas Heirs (23 Ky.,  59) ; Best vs. Nix & Storey (6 Tex. Civ. App., 349).

The rule stated is in complete harmony with the Civil Law on the  subject; the heir or successor acquires  the rights of the predecessor  and no more.  "The heir represents  the person of the deceased, and both are  even considered as  one same person: Haeees censetur cum  de- functo UNA eademque persona; 'according to  law,' says law 13, tit. 9, Part. 7, 'the.person  of the heir and that of him from whom he inherits is  considered  as one," (Escriche's Dictionary, title  "Heredero.")

" *   *  *  the following are general rules as to successors :  He who succeeds to  the rjght or property of another must use the same right as he: Qui in jus dominumve alterius SUCCEDIT, JURE EJUS UTI DEBET.  The successor cannot be  in a  better condition than his predecessor: Non DEBEO MELIORIS ESSE CONDITIONS  QUAM AUCTOR MEUS, A QUO JUS ad ME  transit"  (Ibid., title "Successor")

Counsel for the plaintiffs suggests that the sale by Antonio Francia to the defendant was fraudulent; that the  fraud was not discovered  by the plaintiffs until after Antonio Francia's death in 1916; and that  the limitation of  the action did not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud. There is no merit in this suggestion.   Assuming that  fraud existed, is was the fraud of the vendor and not of the vendee, and did not prevent the running of the statute in favor of the latter.   (17 R.  C. L., 867.)

So far we have treated the matter  as a question of limitation or prescription  of actions, but the result will be the same if we regard it as one of acquisitive prescription under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:

"SEC. 41. Title to Land  by Prescription. Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten  years by occupancy, descent, grants, or  otherwise, in  whatever  way such occupancy may have commenced or  continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured by  the  next section.   In order to constitute  such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been  actual,  open, public,  continuous, under  a claim of title exclusive  of  any other right and adverse to all other claimants.  But failure to occupy or cultivate land solely by reason of war shall not be deemed to constitute an interruption of possession of the claimant, and his title by prescription shall be complete,  if in other respects perfect, notwithstanding such failure to occupy or cultivate the land during the  continuance of war."

The evidence  shows that the defendant's possession was of the character required by the section quoted.  The fact that the plaintiffs may not have been familiar with  the circumstances of the possession does not deprive it of its character as public; the defendant enjoyed the fruits of the land, declared it for taxation in his  own name as early as 1902 and has paid taxes on it ever since.  The prescription under  section 41 began to run October 1, 1901, when the Code  of Civil Procedure went into effect and the rules as to disability are exactly the same with respect to this  prescription as they are in regard to limitations of actions.

For the reasons stated, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant is absolved from the complaint, without costs.   So ordered.

Avanceña,  C. J., Street, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.