This is an action for the partition of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose of the municipality of Alaminos,  Pangasinan,  the plaintiffs  alleging that they are the owners of a four-fifths interest in the land, having inherited the same from their  father, Juan Razote  1.°. The original complaint was filed on September 30, 1920, Norberto Rapatalo and Juan Razote, a brother of the plaintiffs,  being  the  only parties  defendant.  Norberto  Rapatalo,  through his counsel,  filed  an  answer  denying  the allegations of the complaint and setting up  as a special defense "that he is in legal possession of the land in question,  it being alleged in the complaint itself that he purchased the land  from Juan  Razote in the year 1913."  On November  24, 1923,  counsel for  the  defendant Norberto Rapatalo filed an amended answer in which he denied generally the allegations of  the complaint and pleaded as a special  defense  that  he only had possession of the land during the years 1913 and 1914 and that he, in 1915, made a donation of the land propter nuptias to his son Gregorio Rapatalo by reason of the latter's marriage to Eugenia de Francia, and that he, the .said defendant, had no further interest  in the land.  The plaintiffs thereupon on December 13,  1923, filed an amended complaint to  the same effect as the original complaint, but including Gregorio Rapatalo and Eugenia de Francia as additional  defendants.

At  the beginning  of the trial in the Court of First Instance the parties entered into the following stipulation of facts:

"1.  That the identity of the land in question  is known to the witnesses for both parties  and that  they know the description of the land.

"2.  That on June 9, 1913, the defendant Juan Razote (alias Bandong)  sold the land to  his codefendant Norberto Rapatalo and that on that same  date  Norberto Rapatalo entered into  the  possession of the land and  enjoyed  the fruits thereof until the year 1915.

"3. That on March 26,  1915, the defendant Norberto Rapatalo granted said land by donation  propter nuptias to his son Gregorio Rapatalo and that from that date up to the present time  Gregorio  Rapatalo has been in possession of the land and has enjoyed the products thereof.

"4. That a deed of  sale was executed by the defendant Juan Razote (alias Bandong) in favor  of his codefendant Norberto Rapatalo, the deed  having been acknowledged before Mr. Jose Rivera, attorney and notary  public.

"5. That a deed was also executed by Norberto Rapatalo in favor of his son Gregorio Rapatalo, which is Exhibit 2, ratified before the same notary public, attorney Jose Rivera.

"6. That on September  30,  1920, the plaintiffs filed  a complaint  for partition  of property  against Juan Razote and  his codefendant Norberto Rapatalo.

"7. That in December,  1923, the  same plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, including the spouses Gregorio  Rapatalo and Eugenia de Francia as defendants,  as a  consequence  of the answer in  which it is alleged that  the defendant  Norberto Rapatalo has no longer any right or interest in the land in  question,  having  transferred  the same in 1915 to his son Gregorio Rapatalo."

Upon these stipulations counsel for the  defendant  Rapatalo moved that the, case be  dismissed on the ground that Gregorio Rapatalo had acquired title to the land by prescription, but no  ruling  was made  upon this motion.

After receiving  the  testimony of some  witnesses  in regard to points not covered by the stipulation of facts  the trial court rendered judgment in favor  of the defendants, denying the partition  of the property  and absolving  the defendants from the complaint.  From  this judgment  the plaintiffs appeal.

In our opinion the judgment appealed from  must be affirmed.   Leaving  aside the question of  credibility of witnesses  upon the disputed  facts, and in regard to which opinions  may differ, it clearly appears from  the stipulation of facts, which is not impugned and which is binding upon the parties, that the defendant  Gregorio Rapatalo, by himself and through his predecessor in interest,  Norberto Rapatalo, had held adverse possession of the property for over ten years when he  was  made  a defendant in the case  in December, 1923, and that he therefore has acquired title to the land by prescription.  But it has been suggested (1) that inasmuch as action was brought against Norberto Rapatalo within ten years from the time he obtained  possession of the  land, his possession  cannot be tacked to that of Gregorio; and  (2)  that it is not  clearly shown by the evidence that the possession held by Norberto and Gregorio was of the character required by section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Neither one of  these  contentions can  be  successfully maintained.  Section 41, supra, reads as follows:

"Ten years  actual  adverse possession by  any  person claiming to  be the owner for that time  of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced  or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full  and complete title, saving to  the  persons under  disabilities the  rights secured by the  next section.  In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive  of any other right  and adverse to  all other claimants.  *  *   *"

The rule is almost universal that if there is privity between  successive  occupants, the adverse possession  of the predecessor  may be tacked to the adverse possession  of the successor, whether the former had title  to the  land or not.   (See 2 C. J., 82 et seq.;  1 R.  C. L., 717 et seq.) The very  few exceptions to this rule are based on special statutory provisions which do not exist in this jurisdiction.

The provisions of the section quoted are taken from section 2734 of the Annotated Code of Mississippi of 1892,  under which Code, tacking of successive possessions has always been allowed.  (Crowder vs. Neal,  100 Miss., 730,)   The same  rule has also uniformly been  followed in this  jurisdiction.

As  already stated, it is stipulated that Norberto  Rapatalo bought the land on June 19, 1913, and held possession until March 26, 1915, when he ceded it to his son Gregorio, who continued the  possession  uninterruptedly  until December, 1923, when he was  made a party to the case.  It also appears from uncontradicted testimony that when the cession was made Gregorio moved from the barrio of  Pugo, where his father is living, to the barrio of San Jose, where the land in  question is situated, and that he alone enjoyed the fruits of the land  during that time.   There was therefore no cotenancy between him  and his father  and  there is no  indication of collusion between  them with  intent to defraud the plaintiffs.  As there was  privity of possession between the two, the predecessor's possession must,  under the rule stated, be tacked to  that of the successor.

At this point attention is called to the clear and positive language of the section above quoted.   It is there in  effect stated that the manner in  which the possession is commenced is immaterial; to confer title it is sufficient that the possession has been actual, open,  public,  continuous and adverse for the period of ten years saving only certain rights  of  persons under disability.  Nowhere in our statutes is any  exception made in a case  such as the present, and if there is no exception it stands to reason that section 41  applies with full force, and  if the possession  is of the character described  in said  section for the period of ten years,  it gives the possessor a "full  and complete title." That the possession in the present case was of that  character,  is fully shown  by the evidence.  That it was continuous,  is  not disputed; that it was adverse  and  under claim of ownership, is shown by the facts that both Nor- berto  and Gregorio held the land  under  conveyances  in fee simple; that it was actual, open, and  public, is sufficiently proven by the testimony to the effect that the land was cultivated to its full extent and by the  stipulation that Norberto enjoyed its fruits during the time of his possession and that Gregorio received the  products  during the succeeding period.

Now,  as to the suggestion that Gregorio's rights were affected  by the fact that an  action for partition  of the land was brought against his father some five years after the father had divested himself of all interest in  the land, it must be considered that after the land  had  been ceded to him, Gregorio held adverse possession not only against the plaintiffs but as against  the  whole world,  including his father,   Can an  action brought against a person, in regard  to whom the  possessor of  the  land  holds adversely, be regarded as an interruption of the possession of the actual possessor?  The question answers itself.  It is elementary that an action against  a stranger to the possession cannot interrupt the running of the statute of limitations as  to the  actual possessor if  the  latter's possession has been open and notorious, as is  admittedly the case here.

The blood relationship between  Norberto and  Gregorio has nothing to do with the question; an action against the father is not an action against the son, and it  is again to be noted that there is no indication in the record of  collusion between the father and son to mislead the  plaintiffs into bringing the action against the  wrong  party.  It is probable  that  Gregorio knew that an  action had been brought  against his father, but that  knowledge did  not interrupt his possession; he was under no obligation to inform the plaintiffs of their  mistake;  it  was their duty to be vigilant and  to see that  the action  was  brought against the proper party in interest.

Some stress has been laid on the admission  of possession contained in  the original answer filed by Norberto's counsel.  Aside  from  the  fact that  mistakes  are  frequently made by  lawyers in  preparing pleadings and  that when such pleadings are  subsequently amended but little weight can  be given to original errors in the allegations, it is here to be observed that the question of possession is  not in controversy; that is definitely settled  by the stipulation of facts.   It may  also be noted that the  wording  of  the allegation of possession in  the answer indicates that it was not based on information furnished  by the defendants but upon allegations contained in the complaint.

For the reasons stated the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.  So ordered,

Avanceña, C. J.,  Street, Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa- Real, JJ.,  concur,
Johns, J., dissents.