This action was instituted by Jose Ledesma in the Court of First Instance  of the  City of Manila for the purpose of foreclosing a  mortgage executed by the  defendants, Salvador V. del Rosario and Benita Quiogue de Del Rosario, on certain property located in the City of Manila and covered by Torrens titles, as indicated in the complaint.  The property was originally mortgaged to Bernardino Jalandoni and  Cesar Jalandoni for the purpose of securing a loan of P130,000 which appears to have been advanced by them to Benita Quiogue de Del Rosario but the Jalandonis  transferred their  credit and rights under the mortgage  for a valuable consideration  to  Jose Ledesma, agreeing at  the same time that they would answer to Ledesma for any unpaid  balance due  upon the mortgage debt after the foreclosure and failure of the mortgagors to pay said balance. Accordingly,  in addition  to the  original mortgagors,  the Jalandonis were named as  codefendants in the complaint, with whom also are joined two defendants, Froilan  Lopez and  Chua Lua, who had levied attachments upon the  mortgaged property; but these latter are nominal  defendants and  have not figured in the litigation.

Upon hearing the cause the trial judge found  that the principal of the mortgage debt, in the amount of P130,000, was due and enforceable at the time of the institution of the action and  that interest had accrued thereon at the rate of  12 per centum per annum from August, 1924, and would so  continue to accrue until the indebtedness should be  paid.  He  also declared that under  a  special stipulation in  the mortgage P12,000 was due to  the plaintiff as attorney's fees and costs; and he accordingly entered an order requiring the defendant Del Rosarios to pay all of said sums within ninety days, upon default in  the payment of which the property should be sold for purposes of foreclosesure according to the provisions of the Mortgage Law.  He further required the defendant Del Rosarios to pay jointly and severally any balance of the indebtedness remaining unsatisfied from the foreclosure sale and adjudged that the two Jalandonis jointly and severally, but subsidiarily, should pay any balance that might still remain unpaid after the proceeds of the  sale  should have been applied and the Del Rosarios should  have failed to satisfy said  balance.   From this judgment both  the Del  Rosarios and the Jalandonis appealed  from the features  of the  decison severally unfavorable  to them.  The two appeals have  been brought to this  court in separate records, somewhat to the confusion of  the issues involved in the respective contentions of the appellants; but the causes have been  here  heard together and will be disposed of in a single opinion.

The date fixed in the original contract of mortgage for the maturity of the mortgage debt was December 11, 1924, but the contract contained a  provision to the effect that the interest should be paid in monthly installments, as due for each month, and that for  failure on the part of the mortgagors to comply  with any of their obligations  under the contract  of mortgage  the creditors might treat the mortgage  debt as due.  It further appears  that no interest was paid after August, 1923, for which reason the plaintiff elected to treat  the whole debt as due and instituted this foreclosure proceeding on November 8, 1924, a few weeks before the stipulated date  of maturity.  The  only defense' urged in behalf of the principal debtors, going to the whole right of action, is planted upon the claim that Benita Quiogue  de  Del Rosario had tendered the monthly interest as and  when due but that the creditor had refused to accept it save  upon the unreasonable condition  that the debtors should pay the interest for  an additional month, which was not then due.  The  trial court found that this contention was  without sufficient basis in fact, and we see no reason to question the correctness of his finding.  It results  that there was no error on the  part of the trial court in refusing  to dismiss the  case as premature or for any other reason; and judgment of foreclosure was properly entered in favor of the plaintiff.

The original mortgage  contained a provision  for the payment of 10 per  centum of the  principal  and  accrued interest  to cover attorney's fees  and court costs in  case of default on  the  part of the  mortgagors.   Under  this clause the trial court made an allowance of P12,000, and the mortgagors have assigned error on this  point, claiming that the allowance is  excessive.   This court is of the opinion that the assignment is well taken; and in accordance with the ideas expressed  in  E. C. McCullough & Co. vs. Veloso and Serna (46 Phil., 1), the  amount must be reduced.  In view of the simplicity of the issues as well as other factors involved in  the case,  we are of the opinion that the sum of P6,500 will be adequate compensation for attorney's fees and  costs.

The appeal of the Jalandonis,  in  so far as it is planted upon the grounds relied upon  by the mortgagors, is  likewise necessarily  without merit; but the Jalandonis raise one  point distinct from the defense interposed by the principal debtors, and this defense has relation to the action of the trial court in giving judgment against them jointly and severally, but subsidiarily, for  any balance due after the application of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale and exhaustion of remedies against the principal debtors.  In this connection it is insisted that the Jalandonis are mere guarantors and were not suable jointly with the-mortgage debtors.   The clause of the contract (Exhibit A) by which the Jalandonis created the  liability here involved reads as follows:

  "That,  in  the  remote event  of  the  foreclosure of the mortgage for noncompliance on the part of the mortgage debtors with any of the conditions  stipulated in the mortgage, and in the event that  the mortgaged property shall have proven  insufficient to cover the principal of one hundred and thirty thousand pesos  (P130,000),  Philippine currency, with accrued interest, and to satisfy the penal provision for ten per centum as attorney's fees, expenses and  judicial costs, we bind ourselves jointly and severally, but subsidiarily, to answer to Sr. Jose Ledesma, his heirs and  successors in interest, for the  unpaid balance of any of these amounts, to the complete liquidation of the same."

We are of the  opinion  that  this clause had the effect of impressing  on the obligation of the Jalandonis every feature of a  joint and several obligation except that it should be subsidiary.   In  other words by this provision they claim the benefit of  the exhaustion of the property of the principal debtors.  Under the judgment of the trial court this benefit was secured to them, and we  think that this is all to which they are  fairly entitled.  That the Jalandonis were proper parties to this lawsuit is undeniable, and  it is a well-known  doctrine that courts of equity  will not tolerate the bringing of a suit to settle only part of a controversy.  To hold that  the  personal  liability  of the Jalandonis cannot be enforced in the same action in which the foreclosure is effected would make  the ends of justice subordinate  to a  mere legal  technicality, something that should be avoided.

It results  that the judgment appealed from will be modified by allowing  P6,500 instead of P12,000 for attorney's fees and costs, and as thus modified the judgment is in all respects affirmed, without special pronouncement as  to costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.