On March 26, 1924, the Municipal  Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 1181 providing for the collection of a fee of 5 centavos on each kilogram of meat from animals  slaughtered in the matadero of the city.   The plaintiffs, whose  business was adversely  affected by the ordinance, brought this action to have it declared null and void on the ground that it had not been published in two daily newspapers of general circulation  as provided by section 2443 of the Administrative Code.  At the time of the filing of the complaint, May 3, 1924, a  preliminary injunction was issued restraining the city from enforcing the ordinance.  On September 29, 1924, the  court below rendered a decision in  which it found  that the ordinance had been duly  published in the Official Gazette  and in conformity with the  decision of this court in the case of Rodriguez vs. City of Manila (46 Phil.,  171), held that such publication was  sufficient and ordered that the  preliminary injunction be dissolved and the complaint dismissed without costs.

On December 31, 1924, over three months after the rendition of  the judgment, the defendants filed a motion setting forth that under the facts stated in the decision of the court, the City of Manila had suffered losses at the rate of P253.78 per day for the period  from May 3, 1924, the date of the issuance of the preliminary injunction, until September 30th, the  date on  which  the city  was notified of the decision of the court,  the total amount thus being P38,067, for which the movants prayed that a writ of execution issue against  the plaintiffs jointly and  severally. This motion was  denied on January 6, 1925, on the ground that the decision in  question contained no judgment for damages susceptible of execution.

On January 16, 1925,  the  defendants excepted  to this order and asked that a date  be set for the defendants to present their  evidence to establish the  actual amount of damages caused the city by the issuance of the preliminary injunction in order that the corresponding judgment might be rendered in its favor.  On  the 26th of the same month, the court  granted the motion and  set the  case down for the reception of evidence  in regard to damages.

Upon motion of the plaintiffs dated February 11, 1925, the court, on the 28th of  the same month,  issued an order revoking the order of January 26th on the ground that there being no judgment for damages and the motion for the determination of such damages having been filed after the original decision had become final, the defendants had lost their right to a judgment for such damages.   Motions for  reconsideration and a  new  trial were  subsequently denied  and the  defendants  appealed to this court.  The questions presented for our  determination are raised by the appellants' first two assignments of error which read as follows:

"The lower court erred:

"I. In denying the motion of the defendant City of Manila dated December 26, 1924, for the issuance of a writ of execution against the plaintiffs and  their sureties for the sum of P38,067, the amount  of  the damages suffered by said city by reason of the issuance of the preliminary injunction in this case.

"II. In  setting aside the order setting this case for hearing on  February 4, 1925, at 10 a. m. for the  purpose of giving the city an  opportunity to prove the damages suffered by it, in accordance with the order of said court dated January 26, 1925."

As to the first assignment  of error it would seem sufficient to quote the final or dispositive clauses of the decision rendered  in the case by the court below on September 29, 1924, and which  set forth the judgment to be entered:

"The parties  having stipulated that the publication of Ordinance No. 1181, the validity of which is in question in this case,  was made in the manner prescribed by Act No. 2930, said publication is, as  hereby declared, legal and valid, and therefore it must be, as is hereby ordered, that the preliminary injunction issued in this case be dissolved, and the defendants absolved from the complaint with the. costs de oficio.

"The  bond in the sum of  P1,000 given by the plaintiffs for the  issuance  of the aforesaid  writ of preliminary injunction shall answer  for the damages caused to the City of Manila by reason of the issuance thereof."

It  will be  readily  seen that  there  is  nothing in this judgment upon which an execution for damages might issue. It is true that in its decision the court quotes certain stipulations of fact in which it  appears that the city, through the issuance of the  preliminary injunction, was prevented from  collecting revenues to the amount  of P253.78 per day during the period the injunction  remained in  force, but that is merely a statement  of a fact and is not in itself a judgment (see 15 R. C. L., 570).

But the defendants  argue that the last  clause  in the judgment providing that the bond given by the plaintiffs for the issuance of the preliminary injunction should be held to respond for the damages caused the City of Manila, clearly indicates an intention on the part of the court to award damages and its decision containing all the data necessary for the determination of the amount of such damages, the intention of the court should be given effect and its findings as to the losses regarded as a part of the judgment.

This contention is untenable.  The  daily losses  in revenue collections was, of course, an element to be taken into consideration  in awarding  damages, but  there is nothing to show that the court intended to rely upon that element exclusively and to make the award without  further hearing. The cases cited by the appellants relate only to defects in the drafting or preparation of judgments and are not in point; this is not a question of  correction of clerical errors. The appellants' second assignment  of  error is  equally unmeritorious and is fully  disposed of by the decision in the case of Santos vs. Moir (36 Phil., 350), in which this court said: " *  *  *  While it is true  that, even though a judgment in the principal cause has been duly entered, the court still has power to open that judgment for the purpose of including in it the damages caused by the execution of the injunction order, nevertheless, the court can do so only while the judgment remains within its  control.  *   * * "

In the present case the motion to set the case down for hearing for the determination of the damages was filed on January 16,  1925, over two months after  the judgment in the principal cause had become final and had passed beyond the  control of the court.  Under section  170  of the Code of Civil Procedure, damages  for the  issuance of a preliminary injunction must  be determined  in the principal action and judgment therefor must be included in the final judgment of the  case; this remedy has  been held  to  be exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the determination of the damages in time, the defendants have lost their right to such damages  (Santos vs. Moir, supra;  see also Somes vs. Crossfield, 9 Phil., 13, and Macatangay vs. Municipality of San Juan  de Bocboc,  9 Phil., 19).

The orders appealed from are affirmed  without  costs in this  instance.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., did not take part.