This is a petition for a writ of certiorari.  The  record shows that in cadastral case No. 9  of  the Province of Tarlac, the Court of First Instance in  a decision dated September 16, 1922,  ordered  lots  Nos. 1199,  1208, 1209, 1210, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225 and 1230 registered in the names of Estanislao Garcia and Rafael Llorente.  Both the provincial fiscal of Tarlac and the Attorney-General, representing the Director of Lands, filed motions for  a  new trial which were  denied.  A  bill of exceptions was  also presented, but was disapproved by the court on the ground that it had not been filed in time.

Subsequently, Rafael Llorente transferred his interest in the lots  to Estanislao  Garcia  who, on  March 7, 1923, mortgaged the land to the petitioners herein for the sum of P10,691.  The  mortgage was  inscribed in the unregistered land register on April 10, 1923.

In the meantime, on February 15, 1923, the Attorney- General  presented a  petition for review  under section 38 of the Land  Registration Act, alleging that the adjudication of the land to Garcia and Llorente had been obtained by fraud consisting in fraudulent alterations of the  stenographic notes taken in the cadastral case.

On April 25, 1923, the Court of First  Instance granted the petition for review, set aside the decision of September 16,  1922, and ordered that the case be  reopened and reset for a new trial.  The case was assigned for trial on June 15,  1923, but on  motion of the respondents  Garcia  and Llorente, without objection to the jurisdiction of the court, the trial was postponed until further notice.

On July 21,  1925, the herein petitioners, Sisenando Rivera, Ruperta Gonzalez, Julian Panlilio and Maria Rivera, filed a motion  in the cadastral case alleging among other things that they had accepted the mortgage herein-before mentioned on the strength of the decision of September 16, 1922; that they were the holders of the mortgage as innocent third parties and in good faith; that by reason thereof, the  court  had no  jurisdiction  to grant the petition for review under section 38; and they therefore asked that the court declare  itself without jurisdiction and desist from proceeding with the retrial of the case.  This motion was denied.

On August 1, 1925, the mortgagees filed  the present petition in this  court alleging that the  Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction  to reopen the cadastral case for the following reasons:

(a) That no sufficient notice was given  of the hearing of the petition for  review  filed on February 15, 1923, and heard on  the 21st of the  same month.

(b) That the respondent,  the  Director of Lands, in his motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered in the cadastral case,  alleged fraud  on the part of Estanislao Garcia  and Rafael Llorente and, therefore,  after having failed to appeal from the order  denying said  motion,  the  matter is res judicata and he is  thereby precluded from availing himself of the remedy of a petition for review under article 38 of the Land Registration Act.

(c) That no final decree in the case having been  issued, the petition for review was  presented  prematurely.

(d) That if  the decision of September 16, 1922, is to be regarded as a decree, the petitioners herein having acquired their interest  in the land  subsequent to said decision are innocent parties and that therefore the remedy provided by section 38 is not available.

1. As to the first ground stated, the facts are in dispute, but we think it has been shown by a clear preponderance of evidence  that the  motion and  notice  of hearing  was served upon Mr. Vicente Francisco, the attorney for Garcia and Llorente in the cadastral case; that said attorney refused to  accept service on the ground that he had nothing further to do with the case; and that thereupon  copies of the motion and notice of the hearing were forwarded by registered mail  to Garcia and Llorente, personally,  five days before the hearing.  As Mr. Francisco was  still the attorney of record for Garcia  and Llorente in the  cadastral case, an  offer of service upon him might well in itself be considered a  sufficient compliance with the rules of the Court of  First Instance.  But in addition thereto, it  also appears that Garcia and Llorente, the only respondents in the petition  for review,  appeared  generally before  the court through their counsel  on  several occasions without questioning the  jurisdiction  of the court  and thereby impliedly waived their objections  to such defects  as there might have been in the service of notice.  The herein petitioners not being parties in the cadastral case and not having acquired any interest in the land at the time the petition for review was filed, were not legally  entitled to notice.
   
   
2. The  second ground upon which the petition is based is also of no  substantial merit.   The petition for  a review under section 38 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for a new trial  under  section 145 of the  Code of Civil Procedure, and in our opinion the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial  of such  a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it  may have been presented.
   
   
3. The third ground for the present petition is, perhaps, the most important point in the case.  It is conceded that no decree of registration has been  entered and  section 38 of the Land  Registration Act  provides that a  petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree."  Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the  petition for review cannot  be presented until the final decree has been  entered.  But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and  that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented  before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree.   Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final  decree is entered before urging his claim of  fraud.   We  therefore  hold that  a petition  for review  under  section  38, supra, may be  filed at any time after the  rendition of the court's decision and before the  expiration of one year from the entry  of the final decree of registration.
   
   
4. The contention that the petitioners must be regarded as innocent purchasers  for value within the meaning of section  38 cannot be sustained.   They  acquired their  interest in the land before any final decree had been entered; the litigation  was therefore in effect still  pending and it appears  that they were  aware of that fact.  In these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith.   It is further to be observed that if we were  to consider the land as already registered at that time, the petitioners could have acquired no interest valid as against third parties until  their title thereto had been  duly entered in the Torrens register in  the office of the register of deeds; section 50 of the Land Registration Act provides that "the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey  and affect  the land."   The inscription in the unregistered land register did  not materially improve the petitioners'  situation; such  inscriptions are  without prejudice to third parties with a better right  (section 194 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 2837).
   

From what  has been said, it follows that the court below did not exceed its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for review and in reopening the case.

The petition  for a writ of certiorari  is therefore denied with the costs against the petitioners.  So  ordered.

Avancena,  C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.