August  28, 1922, the lower court  rendered  judgment against Manuel Ernesto Gonzalez in favor of the Philippine National Bank on the first cause  of action for P17,313.59, and on the second for P17,555.20, and for the foreclosure of a real mortgage upon lands specifically described in Exhibits A, B and C.   An execution  was issued and the lands described in Exhibits B and C were sold to Saturnino Lopez for P15,000, and on  March 9,  1923, the sale was confirmed by the lower court,  and later on the motion of Gonzalez, the sale was set aside.  From that order,  Lopez appealed to this court where  the judgment of the lower court was reversed, and it was ordered by this  court that the sale should stand "affirmed as of the  date of the original confirmation by the trial court  *   *  *  without prejudice to the right of Gonzalez, if any, to redeem."   This judgment was  promulgated February 14, 1924.^[1]

March 1,  1924, Gonzalez filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in  which the decree of the lower court was rendered, and where the  real property is situate, declaring his intention to redeem under the provisions of section 41 of Act No. 2612, and for that purpose deposited with the clerk of the court, for the use and benefit of Lopez, the sum of P18,000,  which was the estimated amount  of the mortgage credit in favor  of the bank,  in addition to the interest, judicial costs and the costs of the keeping and care of the property, in which  Gonzalez made a judicial offer of the P18,000 to Lopez,  or of such other sum as the court may determine in  conformity with the provisions of Act No. 2612 is sufficient to cover the items mentioned in section 41 of the Act.

Upon March 3, the notice in question was  served upon the sheriff, who  sold the property, and the attorneys for Lopez and the attorney for the Philippine National Bank, in and by which they were notified that on March 8, 1924, at 8.30 a. m., or as soon as it could be heard, Gonzalez would ask the court to grant the  motion and permit him to redeem the property.  After  service of the notice and motion, the attorneys for Lopez appeared and vigorously contested the right of Gonzalez to redeem.

After a hearing, the lower court granted the motion, and held that Gonzalez had a  right to redeem, and in its conclusion, says:

"The court is, therefore, of the opinion  that the P18,000 deposited in the clerk's office is sufficient  for the payment of all the items required by the law for the  redemption of the lands in dispute in the present case, so much so that, even assuming the contrary, there is evidence in the record to show that Manuel Ernesto Gonzalez has also  offered in open court to pay any difference which may result against him upon making the due computation of the expenses, and of all the items covered by section 41 of Act No. 2612."

From this judgment, Lopez appeals and assigns the following errors:

"I.  The lower court erred in holding that  the  plaintiff in this case has the right to redeem, and  the defendant is under the obligation to permit the redemption  of the property involved, under  and by virtue  of the provisions  of section  41 of Act No. 2612; and in holding that the said section and Act are applicable to the  case at bar.

"II. Assuming for the sake of argument the applicability of section 41 of Act No.  2612  to the facts of the case  at bar, the lower court also erred in holding that the one year's period of redemption  provided in said section and Act is to be counted from the date of the confirmation of the sale by the court and not from the date the sale was actually made or the property struck off by the sheriff in favor of the buyer; and in  not holding that  the reports made by the plaintiff to redeem the property involved by his motion of March 3,  1924, in the previous case, were made after the expiration of the one year period provided by the aforesaid section and Act.

"III.  Conceding the applicability of section  41  of Act No. 2612 and the exercise in due time of the right to redeem, the lower court still  erred in  holding that  the amount of P=18,0Q0 deposited by plaintiff  with the clerk of the lower court was  sufficient to cover the amount required by law for the redemption of the property involved, to wit: The price paid by the  defendant at the sale at  public auction, the interest thereof at the rate provided in the contract which gave rise to the foreclosure proceeding (12%), the costs and the judicial and  other expenses which have been incurred by the defendant for the custody and conservation of said property; and in not holding that the said amount of P18,000 was far  below the amount actually required and hence  the efforts to redeem made by the plaintiff did not constitute a legal offer  to redeem and were nugatory.

"IV. The lower court also erred  in  permitting, and in including  in  its decision findings concerning, the  supplemental  complaint  filed by the plaintiff on February 28, 1925; instead of disregarding and  rejecting entirely the said supplemental complaint filed not in accordance with law.

"V. The lower court,  finally,  erred in granting the ex parte motion for the appointment of a receiver filed by the plaintiff on April 30, 1925, and in making the appointment of the receiver  in  accordance  with  the said motion, notwithstanding the fact that the said motion was not even supported by an oath or an  affidavit and did not contain sufficient allegations to  warrant the appointment of a receiver under the law."

JOHNS, J.:

In this case the  facts and dates are very important. It will be noted that  the proceeding now in question is based upon the foreclosure of a real mortgage executed by Gonzalez to and in favor of the Philippine National Bank upon  agricultural  lands lying  and being situate  in  the Province of Pangasinan.  That is to say, it had its origin in what is known as an agricultural loan made by the Philippine National Bank,  which was  secured by a mortgage on real property.

Section 32 of Act No. 2938, known as the Charter of the Philippine National Bank, as amended, provides:

"The  mortgagor shall have the right, within one year after the sale  of real estate as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court  in the order of  execution, with  interest thereon at the rate specified  in the mortgage, and all  the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by the bank by reason of the execution and sale and for the custody of said property."

In the instant case, it was the appellant Lopez,  and  not the Philippine  National Bank, who was  the purchaser of the property at the sheriff's sale of the lands, and for such reason, the appellant contends that Gonzalez had no legal right to redeem.  It will be noted that the section provides that "the mortgagor shall have the right, within one year after the sale  of real estate"  upon a foreclosure to redeem the property, etc.  The  meaning of the word "mortgagor" is not in any way qualified, limited or confined as to who may be the purchaser of the  property.  If it had been the purpose and intent of the Legislature to  limit the right of the mortgagor to redemption in a case in which the bank only was the purchaser, the law would have said so.  Appellant's contention would give  to  the word "mortgagor" a limited and strained construction that is not justified by the language of the Act.   It should be construed to mean that where a person gives a mortgage to  the Philippine National Bank on agricultural land, and the mortgage is foreclosed by the bank and the property sold under execution, that the mortgagor has a legal right to redeem from the purchaser, whoever he may be, at any time within one year after the sale of the land.

Under the second assignment of error, the appellant contends that the one year's period of redemption should commence to run from the day  that the  property was sold and struck  off by the sheriff to Lopez, and not from the date of the  confirmation of the sale.  It will be noted that the sheriff sold the property to Lopez on February 14, 1923, and that the sale was confirmed on March  9, 1923.  That the former decision of this court on appeal was promulgated on February 14, 1924.  In that opinion, this court used the following language:

"For such reasons, the  judgment of the trial court,  setting aside the confirmation of the sale, is reversed, and the sale will stand affirmed as of  the date of the original confirmation by the trial court, with costs in favor of. the appellant.  Such judgment  to  be without prejudice to  the right of Gonzalez, if any, to redeem."

That decision was rendered on  an appeal from the decision of the lower court  which set aside and  revoked its former order  confirming the  sale.  Hence,  it must follow that until the decision of this court w.as promulgated, Gonzalez  was not in a position to redeem from the sale made by the sheriff to  Lopez, for the simple reason that the lower court set aside and vacated the sale, and ordered a resale of the property.  There was no sale  from which Gonzalez could redeem until this court promulgated  its  decision of February 14, 1924.

It also appears that the mandate of this court was issued to the lower court on March 1, 1924.   Until it was received, that court did not have any jurisdiction over the proceeding.   It also appears that on the very day the mandate was issued, Gonzalez appeared in the lower, court, filed his motion, gave notice of his  intention to  redeem, and  deposited the P18,000 with the clerk for that purpose.  If, as the appellant contends, the one year for redemption commenced to run from the date of  the sale by the sheriff on  February 14, 1923, that time expired on  February 14,  1924, which was the very day on which this court promulgated its decision.   In other words, pending  the  appeal of Lopez  from the decision of the  lower court, setting aside the sale and ordering a resale of the property, the one year  period of redemption expired, and for that reason Gonzalez had lost his right to redeem.

No one would contend that pending the appeal, Gonzalez could redeem from the sale of his property where  the lower court had set aside the sale and ordered a resale of the property, and from that decision, Lopez had appealed to this  court.  So  long as the decision  of the lower  court, setting aside the sale and ordering a  resale of the  property, remained in force and effect, there was no sale from which Gonzalez could redeem.  It would be a legal absurdity to require him to apply to the lower court to redeem his property from a sale which that court had set aside, declared null and void, and, for  such  reasons, had ordered a resale of the property.  In the very nature of things, Gonzalez could not redeem  from the sale to  Lopez until  after the decision of the lower court was reversed by this court.

As stated, on March 1, which was the very  day  upon which the  record on appeal was remanded by this  court to the lower court, Gonzalez appeared in that court and filed his notice and motion of intention to redeem, which is the first day upon which it could have been filed, and as further evidence of his good  faith,  deposited the P18,000 with the clerk for redemption purposes.  What more  could he have done?

Appellant  relies  on that portion  of the opinion  of this court in which it is stated: "And the  sale will stand affirmed as of the  date  of  the original  confirmation  by the trial court."   That was on  March 9, 1923.  Citing numerous decisions from the different courts of the United States to the effect that the one year period for redemption commences  to  run from the date that the property was sold and struck off by the sheriff, and that when confirmed by the court, the date of the sale then relates back to the day on which it was sold by the sheriff.  That is to say, in the instant  case, the period for redemption expired on March 14, 1924, which is  one year after the date  of the sale by the sheriff.

Suffice it to say that many of  those decisions are based upon other  and different statutes, some of  which at least provide that from the date of the sale by the sheriff, the purchaser is entitled to the use, enjoyment,  and possession of the property.

Under the law here in this kind of a case, a purchaser at a sheriff's  sale of real property,  made like the one in question, does not take or  acquire the right to possession or any  interest whatever in the property until after the sale is confirmed.

In legal  effect, that is the rule laid down by this court in Raymundo  vs. Sunico (25 Phil., 365), where it is held:

"1.  MORTGAGES;  FORECLOSURE  SALE;  TITLE  VESTS ON CONFIRMATION. The acceptance of a bid at the foreclosure sale confers no title on the  purchaser.  Until the sale has been validly confirmed by the court, he is nothing more than a  preferred bidder.   Title vests only  when the sale has been validly confirmed by the court."

And on pages 368 and 369, the opinion says:

"As the title to mortgaged real property does not vest in the purchaser until  after the  confirmation of the sale, he has,  prior  to that  time, no right to the possession of such property, and no legal  cause of complaint against the defendants, who remain in possession, exercising the rights of ownership.  On the other hand,  the mortgagors  have no means,  until after  the confirmation, of compelling the purchaser to comply with the terms of the sale.  Should the mortgators attempt to compel a purchaser to pay in his money an answer on the part of the purchaser to the effect that the sale had not been confirmed would be sufficient.  The confirmation operates to divest the title out of the former owner and the vest it in the purchaser.  It is at this time when the rights of title passes, and not before.  Sales of mortgaged real estate should be more strictly scrutinized than ordinary sales under execution.  In the former the tile, as we have said, passes to the purchaser upon confirmation by the court, and the defendant or debtor has no right to redeem within the statutory period granted in cases of ordinary execution sales.  In some of the States of the American Union  there are statutes permitting the mortgator to redeem after the foreclosure sale has been confirmed.  There is no such privilege extended to him by statute in the Philippine Islands.  The right of the mortgator and those claiming under him to redeem from the mortgage is extinguished by the foreclosure when the same has been properly made.  But, up to the time of confirmation the title remains in the mortgator."

Section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure, among other things, provides that:

"This sale, when confirmed by decree of the court, shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser."

This carries with it and clearly implies that until such time as a sale is "confirmed by decree." the purchaser at a sale, like the one in question, does not acquire any right whatever in and to the property sold until after the sale is confirmed.  That is to say, that it was nothing more than an executory contract to become valid and binding on condition that the sale is affirmed by the court, and that, otherwise, it would be null and void.  At such a sale, the purchaser, in legal effects, says that I am able, ready, and willing to pay so much for the property, and here is the money, on condition that the sale is affirmed; otherwise, my bid must not be accepted, and I want the money refunded.

The sales of real property by the Philippine National Bank under foreclosure proceedings are more or less sui generis.  Strange as it may see, the question of redemtion in such cases is separate and distinct from, and unlike, that of any other foreclosure proceeding.

The law in question was enacted for a special reason, and should not be construed to defeat its purpose and intent.  Giving it a liberal construction, it is apparent that in this class of cases, the words "within one year after the sale of real estate, etc." should be construed to mean within one year after the confirmation of the sale.  It is the confirmation only which consummates the sale. Prior to that, the purchaser's bid is nothing more than an executory contract, which may or may not be executed depending upon the confirmation of the sale. That is the spirit and intent of the law in question.

Be that as it may, Gonzalez could not redeem pending the appeal to this court, because the decision of the lower court was in his favor, and it happens that the decision reversing the lower court was promulgated on February 14, 1924, just one year after the original confirmation of the sale of the lower court which it later set aside.  Hence, if the appellant's contention is sustained, without any fault or neglect of his own, Gonzalez would be cut off any redemption right whatever.  Under appellant's contention, through the action of the lower court, and without his own fault, Gonzalez would be deprived of his statutory right of redemption.  That is not the policy of the law, and it was never the intention of this court, and would be a gross injustice.

The record shows that in the matter of redemption, Gonzalez was both prompt and diligent, and that his effort to redeem  was made in good faith.  In the very nature  of things, he could not take action  any sooner than he did take it.

Upon such a state of facts, we are clearly of the opinion that Gonzalez had a right to redeem at the time he made his  application  to  the lower  court, and deposited the P18,000 for that purpose.

In this kind of a case, the law permits the mortgagor  to redeem:

"By paying the amount fixed by the court  in the order of execution, with interest  thereon  at  the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and  other judicial expenses  incurred  by the bank by  reason of the execution and sale and for  the custody of said property."

Lopez's bid was P15,000, and he was entitled to interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage from the time that he  paid his money to the clerk  of the  court to the time when Gonzalez made his offer to redeem.

Appellee  points out that one of  the  original loans of P15,000 each, drew interest at the rate of 12  per cent per annum, and the other at the rate of 8 per cent,  which would make an average rate of 10 per cent on P15,000, or a total of P1,500 due and owing on March 3, 1924.  That would seem to be just and equitable.  The amounts of both loans, with their respective rates of interest, were merged in the judgment in favor  of the bank, and the  execution was issued and the property was sold on  the merged  judgment.

The law further provides that  the redemptioner must pay  all the  costs and other judicial expenses  incurred by the bank by reason of the execution and sale and for the custody of the property.

The lower court  allowed Lopez  P500 as attorney's fees in the pending  litigation, P65 as costs on the appeal, and P346 for the caretaker of the property, or a total of P911 for those items, and the further sum of P1,488 as taxes which was paid by Lopez.  It appears that a receiver was appointed, and that Lopez paid him P421.40, and that  the amount of this item was apparently overlooked by the lower court, making a total of all such items for and on account of expenses of P1,332.40.   Apparently, the lower court did not allow P1,500 interest, but it did allow P1,488 for taxes which were paid by Lopez.  The grand total of all of such items  amounts to  P19,320.40.   It  also  appears  that the taxes were  not paid by Lopez  at the time the tender was made.  Thus at that time, Gonzalez was entitled to redeem from Lopez upon the payment of P17,832.40, and the actual amount of  the tender which he made  was P18,000.  It further appears from his tender and the statement of his counsel in open court, that Gonzalez was able, ready and willing to pay the true amount, whatever it might be, that Lopez was entitled to have  and receive at the time of his notice to  redeem was given, and in addition, to pay the item  of P1,488 for taxes paid by Lopez, after  Gonzalez filed his motion to  redeem.

We  are clearly  of the  opinion that the amount of the tender was  sufficient to entitle  Gonzalez  to redeem.   This court finds  as a fact that on the day Gonzalez made his tender, Lopez should have and receive the sum of P17,832.40, as the amount due him on that date for the redemption of the property.  That upon the  payment  of that amount, the property shall  stand  redeemed as of the date of the tender.  That Gonzalez should pay  Lopez the further sum of P1,488, the amount of taxes on the property, together with  interest  on  that amount  from the  date Lopez  paid them, at the rate of  6  per cent per annum, and that he should make this  payment within  thirty days  after the promulgation  of this opinion.  In  all other  respects, the judgment  of the lower court is affirmed, with  costs against the appellant and in favor of Gonzalez.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C, J., Street,  Malcolm,  Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villa-Real, J., concurs in the result.
Johnson, J., dissents.

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^[1] National Bank vs. Gonzalez (45 Phil., 693).