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https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1226?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[PEOPLE v. WONG PUN ET AL.](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1226?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 24661, Feb 15, 1926 ]

PEOPLE v. WONG PUN ET AL. +

DECISION

48 Phil. 713

[ G.R. No. 24661, February 15, 1926 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. WONG PUN ET AL., DEFENDANTS. FIDELITY AND SURETY CO. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, SURETY AND APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

JOHNS, J.:

STATEMENT

The appellant is surety  on two appeal bonds,  the  first of which reads as follows:

"Bond No. One
"Whereas on the 21st day of October,  1918, Wong Ping Tin, Yee Hong Tung, Yiong Liam, So  Chan, Yee Hing, Cheng Kee, Yin Yap, Wong Sam, and Yu Fong, were  duly convicted in the Municipal Court of the City of Manila of the offense of gambling, they having  been admitted to bail in the sum of five hundred forty pesos (P540), Philippine currency, pending appeal to the Court of First In- stance of Manila;

"Now  therefore, the Fidelity and Surety Co. of the Philippine Islands, hereby undertakes that the aforesaid Wong Ping Tin et al. will appear and answer the charge above- mentioned in whatever court they may be tried, and  will at all times hold themselves amenable to the order and process of the court; that they will pay such fines as the appellate court may  direct, or will surrender themselves in execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render, or that,  in case the cause  is remanded for a new trial, they will appear in the court to which they may be remanded and submit themselves to the orders and process thereof;  or if they fail to perform  any of these conditions that they will pay to the Government of the. Philippine Islands the sum of five hundred  forty pesos (P540), Philippine currency.

"But the surety does not  undertake that the accused  will later surrender themselves  in execution of a judgment if, at the time sentenced, the court should grant them an extension of time; nor does it consent to any such extension."
Bond No. 2, executed at the same time,  is for P640, and, in all other respects, is identical with bond No. 1.

On January 24, 1920, the defendants mentioned in bond No.  2 were tried and convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila.  Two days later, they personally appeared for  judgment,  and each of them was sentenced in open court to pay a fine of P100.

March 11,1920, the defendants mentioned in the first bond appeared for trial in the Court of First Instance, and withdrew their plea  of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty, and  each of them was sentenced to pay a fine of P100 and. costs.

In bond No. 1, the defendants asked for and obtained  an extension of ten days in which to pay their respective fines. The  record does not disclose any order granting an  extension of time to the defendants in bond No. 2 in which to pay  their fines, but it does show that after being sentenced, the  defendants were released, and that after such release, they were not again taken into custody by the sheriff.

May 15, 1923, an order of arrest of the defendants was issued, but the defendant Yu Fong only was arrested, the others could not be found.

June 29, 1925, the  appellant was directed to produce in court the bodies of Yin Yap, Ang Yee Tai, Wong Pun, Yee Long Tung, Hong Sam, Lee Pin, Yam Gan, and Ong Kan, and  was further notified that, if it neglected to appear in court on July 10, 1925, the bail bonds will be declared forfeited.  The  appellant appeared in court and  contended that it was no longer liable under its obligation to produce the bodies of the defendants,  and on July 1,  1925, filed a motion to have the bonds cancelled, and to be relieved from any  liability.

July 26, 1925, the court denied the appellant's motion  on the ground that the third and last clause contained in each bond of the appellant was a substantial alteration of the bail  bond prescribed by law, and for such reason that those provisions were null and void, and that the bonds remained in full force and effect, and rendered judgment on the bonds.

From this decision, the surety company appeals,  and assigns the following errors:
"I. The lower court erred in not giving  validity to the third and last clause contained in each bond of the appellant.

"II. The lower court erred  in not taking  into consideration the circumstances of the case, particularly the unreasonable length of time allowed to pass by the fiscal before taking any action against the bonds of the appellant.

''III. The lower court erred in ignoring the fact that the bonds of  the appellant had been accepted by the government and approved  by  the court  which had jurisdictions over the defendants, with the clause in question.

"IV. The lower  court erred in confiscating the bonds of the appellant."

JOHNS, J.:

It will be noted that the bonds in question were executed in October, 1918, and that they were given on appeal from a judgment of conviction in the municipal court of the City of Manila to the Court of First Instance of Manila.  It will be further noted that no appeal was taken to this court from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance, and that the body of the bond itself follows the exact wording of the form  prescribed in section 67 of General  Orders No. 58.

The real question  involved  is the legal force and effect of the language used in  the  last paragraph of the bonds. It is very apparent that the purpose and intent of this provision was to avoid delay in  the administration of  justice, and to insure a speedy execution of the sentence.  The court had the legal right to refuse,  accept or approve the bonds in question, and, as a condition of the release of the defendants, could have required them to give a bond in substantial compliance with the provisions of section 67, and without the paragraph in question.  That was not done.  The bonds now in question  were taken, accepted and approved in their existing form, and on the strength of them, the defendants were released from custody.  There is nothing in the bonds which  is against any  law or that is immoral or against public  policy.  As a matter of fact, the provision in  question conforms to, and is in harmony with, the spirit and intent  of the code.  That  is to say, after a man  is convicted  of a crime and is sentenced in open court, and does not appeal, the law contemplates a speedy  execution of the sentence, and in the orderly administration of justice, the defendant should be forthwith  remanded to the sheriff for the execution of the sentence.

After the court granted the stay of execution of ten days to the defendants in which to pay  their  respective  fines, nothing more was ever done until the issuance of the  order for their arrest on May 15, 1923, at which time only one of the defendants could be found.  This  was more  than three years after the  defendants were sentenced in  open court.   Strange as it may seem, nothing further was done until about July 1,  1925, at which time the appellant was notified to produce the bodies  of the defendants in court, which  was nearly seven years after the bonds were executed.

Stating it  mildly,  some person has been guilty of  gross negligence and inexcusable carelessness  in the discharge of official duty, and the  record is a very sad reflection upon the administration of  justice.   The court officials having accepted  the bonds in their present form, and released the defendants,  and such provisions being  valid, the Government is now estopped to deny the terms, and the provisions of the bonds having been  grossly violated, they are null and void, and the surety company is released from all liability.

What is said in this opinion  should be confined and limited to cases in which no appeal is  taken  from the lower court to this court, and  to bonds which contain the paragraph  in question.   Where the defendants are sentenced in the Court of First Instance, and no appeal is taken to this court, there is no excuse for any delay  in the execution of the sentence.   In such cases, the law contemplates that the sentences should be executed, and it is the duty of officials and of the courts to see that they are enforced.

The judgment of the lower court is  reversed, and the defendant is released from all liability, with costs de oficio. So  ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street,  Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm,  J., dissents.

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