On the  11th day of June, 1910, the plaintiff and appellee presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Laguna, praying that she be appointed administratrix of the property described in paragraph 4 of her petition.

After  hearing the respective parties, the lower court appointed the plaintiff as administratrix of said property. From that decision the defendants appealed to this court and made several assignments of error.

The undisputed facts, as presented by the record brought to this court, seem to be as follows:

That on the 23d day of April, 1897, Juan Banatin died, leaving a  widow (Damasa Alcala), the plaintiff herein, and seventeen nieces and nephews, whose names  are set out in the petition; that on  the 13th day of  June, 1897, the said widow and all of the seventeen nieces  and nephews, except Tranquilina Banatin, entered into a voluntary agreement among themselves for the division "entre ellos," of all of the property left by the said Juan Banatin, deceased, except the house described in paragraph 4 of  the petition; that by the terms of said agreement, the said house was to remain undivided; that the widow  (the plaintiff herein)  should receive the one-half of the usufruct of said house during her lifetime; that the other one-half of the usufruct  should be distributed equally  among the other seventeen heirs; that Francisco Salgado,  one of the nephews,  should administer the said house, collecting the rents of the same and deliver one-half to the widow (Damasa  Alcala) and the other one-half to the nieces and nephews; that Francisco Salgado, having failed to pay to Damasa Alcala her share  of the usufruct of said property, was sued by her and a judgment was finally rendered against him for the same.  (Alcala vs. Salgado, 7 Phil. Rep., 151.)  An execution was issued upon said judgment and one-half of the undivided property in question was sold some time  in  the year 1907, to  one Macario Decena.  On  the. 22d and  24th days  of  October, 1908  (see Exhibits 2 and 3),  the said one-half of the property in question was repurchased by the heirs of Francisco  Salgado.  The money used in  repurchasing  the property by  the heirs of Francisco  Salgado  was the money of four of  the heirs of Juan Banatin, to wit: Modesta  Pabalan, Procopio Pabalan, Basilio Salgado, and Juan Banay- banay (see Exhibit 4  of defendants herein), and  not  the money of the heirs of Francisco Salgado.  On the 25th day of November, 1908, thirteen of the nieces and nephews or heirs of Juan  Banatin,  by means  of a  public document, recognized the right of the said Modesta Pabalan, Procopio Pabalan, Basilio Salgado, and  Juan Banay-banay as  the owners of the one-half of the undivided property in question. (See Exhibit 5.)   On the 25th day of November, 1908, six. teen of.the  heirs of the said  Juan Banatin, by. a public document, unanimously appointed the said Modesta Pabalan as  "administradora" of  all of  the  house in question,  in substitution of the said Francisco Salgado deceased.  (See Exhibit 6.)  Since the 25th day of November, 1908,  until the commencement of the present action, Modesta  Pabalan had administered the  property in  question, collected the rents of the  same and had paid the one-half of said rents to the plaintiff herein as the usufructuary of the one-half of said property,

The first assignment of error made by the plaintiff is that "El juzgado erro al estimar que la testamentaria del finado Juan Banatin no ha finalizada."

With reference to this assignment of error, the heirs of Juan Banatin were at  perfect  liberty to divide the estate among themselves, assuming the responsibility of any debts which might exist. There is no proof that any debts existed.   After the actual division of the estate among themselves they became the absolute owners of their respective allotments and were tenants in common of that portion of the property which remained pro indiviso.  After the mutual agreement among themselves for the division of the estate, either actually distributing their respective shares or leaving the same undivided, the property in question was no longer the property of the estate  of  Juan Banatin, but the undivided property  of the heirs.  They were tenants in common  of that portion of  the  property  which remained undivided.  As such  tenants in common the majority of them had a  right to agree upon the appointment  of an administrator of  their property,  (Art. 398,  Civil Code.) The  property belonged to them.  They had a right to administer it.

The lower court in appointing the plaintiff and  appellee as administratrix of the property in question, evidently did so upon the theory that the  said property  was  still the property of the estate of Juan Banatin.  In this theory the lower court  was mistaken.  There was nothing left of the estate of Juan Banatin to be administered.  The heirs by mutual  agreement had divided the property  among themselves.  There was  no occasion and  no  reason  for the appointment of an administrator by the probate court, and, therefore, the judgment of the  lower court appointing Damasa Alcala as administratrix of the estate of Juan Banatin for the purpose of administering the property mentioned in paragraph 4 of the petition, is hereby revoked.

We deem it unnecessary in the present case to discuss the right of a usufructuary to manage or assist in managing or to administer the property in  usufruct which belongs to tenants in common.  That question is not presented in the present cause.

Without any finding as to costs, it is  hereby directed that a judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the lower court appointing  Damasa Alcala as  administratrix of the property in question.  It is so ordered.

Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur in  the dispositive part.