On February 18, 1909, Vicente Rodriguez and brothers, through their attorneys, filed with  the  Court of First Instance of Tayabas a complaint  amending  their  previous one of January 5  and alleging, as a cause  of action, that they are the owners of  a  parcel of rice land, of an area such as is commonly sown with  2 1/2 cavanes of seed, situated in the barrio of Remedios of the pueblo of Mauban, Province of Tayabas, the boundaries of which are, on the north, the land of Epifania Rodriguez,  on the east, the  lands of Clara Escueta, and on the south and west, the Quinainit River; that they occupied the  said  parcel  until the  year 1906, when they were dispossessed by the .defendant Jose Taino who, since then, has usurped it and occupied it without the permission and notwithstanding the opposition of the plaintiffs who,  in consequence thereof,  have been deprived of  the said land and of  its fruits and products, by reason of  which they have suffered  injury and damages to the amount of P300; that they therefore pray that the aforedescribed  land be restored to them and that the defendant be  sentenced to the payment of the said amount and the costs.

The  defendant Jose Taino, in  answer to the preceding complaint, denies each and all of the allegations thereof except such portions as he subsequently admits or modifies, and alleges that the land claimed belongs to Epifania Rodriguez Sanchez, a native of these  Islands now  residing in Cadiz,  Spain; that in 1906 the defendant took possession of the said land as the administrator of its said owner and is  at  the present time in possession as such administrator,  duly authorized to administer her  properties in Tayabas; wherefore he prays  that the case be dismissed with the costs against  the plaintiffs.

The case  having come to trial, the testimony was taken and Bamon  Rodriguez and Igmidio Talabon were examined as witnesses for the plaintiffs; the witnesses  for the defendant were the  last named, and Hugo  Lopez and Francisco Pastrana.  Their  testimony was not recorded  stenographically  at the trial, although in the bill of exceptions the following statement is made:

"Be it likewise  recorded for the purposes of this bill of exceptions, that the facts proved in this case are all those mentioned and  related as  proved in the judgment pronounced by the court and which is as follows."

This judgment was rendered on March 31, 1909, and it is ordered  therein  that  the  plaintiffs recover from the defendant the possession of the land in litigation, with the costs  of the trial against the defendant, whose  counsel, by a motion of the 5th of April following, made a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the judgment was not in accordance with the law and that the  evidence did not justify the judgment of the court.  This motion was denied, to which exception was taken by  the defendant party, who duly filed the corresponding bill  of  exceptions which was certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.

The purpose of the present litigation,  according, to the terms of the claim made in the amended complaint, is to obtain the restitution of the land from the poswfcssion of which the plaintiffs were deprived by the defendant Jose Taiflo; and therefore the action brought has for its object the recovery of the said land from the  third party who usurped  it and holds it  to the prejudice  of the plaintiffs. Article 444  of the Civil Code  prescribes that "Acts which are merely  tolerated and  those clandestinely executed, without knowledge of.the possessor of the thing,  or  by force, do not affect the possession."

Article 446 of the same code provides that "Every possessor has a right to  be respected  in his possession;  and should he  be  disturbed  therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in the laws of procedure."

In  accordance with  the legal precepts laid down in the preinserted article of  the Civil Code,, it is unquestionable that the action for the recovery of possession, prosecuted by the plaintiffs against  the defendant, who personally and against the will of the  legitimate  possessors of the said land, usurped and now holds  it, is maintainable under the law.

It is a doctrine  established by the jurisprudence of this court that, even after the promulgation of the Civil Code, which did  not repeal article 1635 of the previous Law of Civil Procedure,  the accion publiciana subsists to obtain from the court protection of the right of possession.  Consequently,  the action  prosecuted  by the, plaintiff for the recovery of  the  possession  unlawfully  taken  by the defendant is proper, without prejudice to the right  that lies with the latter with respect to the  ownership, which must be proven  in  opposition to the presumption of title which already existed in favor of the legitimate possessor who in the present case is the plaintiff, he  having enjoyed a quiet and  peaceable possession of the land for a period of about twenty years when he  was  unlawfully deprived  thereof by the defendant.   (Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. Rep., 286.)

In the case of Ledesma vs.  Marcos (9 Phil. Rep., 618), the doctrine is established that the provisions of  Act No. 136  and  the Code of  Civil  Procedure which  give exclusive jurisdiction to the justices of  the  peace  for one year after  the cause of action  arises, to  try cases of detention  of real property, do not assume to  deprive the Courts of First Instance  of their  jurisdiction  in other cases for the recovery of possession of realty.

So that the loss  of possession dealt with in article 460 of the Civil Code may only be recovered within one year and one day by means of the action for the recovery of possession prescribed by section  80 of the  Code of Civil Procedure, but when it  is a question of real property its restitution may nevertheless be claimed, in a Court of First Instance, even after one year and one day, by means of the proper plenary action for the recovery of possession, that is,  the old action known as publiciana.

The act of spoliation  is a positive  attempt against  the rights of a private party and against public order and must instantly  be  suppressed,  without  regard to the  title held by  the injured party, in  order  to  avoid disturbances in the community and to  prevent  anyone  from taking  the administration of justice  into his own hands;  therefore, whoever possesses a thing as  the owner of it,  as well as he who holds it merely as tenant while the dominion appertains to another, is entitled to ask for the restitution thereof by prosecuting the proper action  against the  despoiler, even  though the latter be the proprietor or  owner of the property.  (Roxas vs. Mijares, 9 Phil. Rep.,  252.)

The facts are established in the judgment appealed from, that Ramon  Rodriguez,  for himself, and in representation of  his coheirs, was in possession of the land in question (which is admitted  by the defendant); that Taino entered into the possession  of the property, not in his own name, but as the representative of Epifania Rodriguez, residing at the present time in  Spain, notwithstanding the objection of the plaintiffs: wherefore it is said in the judgment appealed from, in considering the propriety of the restitution, that if the said Epifania Rodriguez  has any title of ownership to the said property she may show it on the institution of  a  proper action.

For the foregoing reasons, and accepting those contained in the judgment appealed from, it is proper in our opinion to affirm, and we do hereby affirm the said judgment, with the costs against the appellant.   So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.