This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property.[33] In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.[34] Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang's conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent. | |||||
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2014-06-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.[9] The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage.[10] It retains its conjugal nature. | |||||
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2011-04-11 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| presumption.[22] The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.[23] Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.[24] There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family | |||||