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CARLOS LEOBRERA v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 201614 2016-01-12	SHERYL M. MENDEZ v. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT MENDOZA, J.
The Court, nonetheless, agrees with Mendez that the urgent motion lacked the requisite notice of hearing. It is immediately evident from the face of the motion that it did not contain the notice of hearing required by the Rules of Court which has suppletory application to the present case. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion is required to be heard and the notice of hearing shall be served in such manner as to insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.[51] The notice of hearing is intended to prevent surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the court. A seasonable service of a copy of the motion on the adverse party with a notice of hearing indicating the time and place of hearing is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with as this is the minimum requirement of procedural due process.[52]
	GR No. 181458 2013-03-20	REPUBLIC v. TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ SERENO, C.J.
The Sandiganbayan is incorrect. By the very words of Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the moving party is required to serve motions in such a manner as to ensure the receipt thereof by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing. The purpose of the rule is to prevent a surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the trial court.[29] Plainly, the rule does not require that the court receive the notice three days prior to the hearing date.
	GR NO. 157745 2006-09-26	GENALYN D. YOUNG v. SPS. MANUEL SY AND VICTORIA SY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Leobrera v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint; the parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action. However, in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Co.,[21] the Court held that a broad definition of causes of action should be applied: while a matter stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the cause of action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its allowance but only a factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion; and of course, a broad definition of "cause of action" should be applied here as elsewhere.[22]
	GR NO. 153777 2005-04-15	PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. LZK HOLDINGS CALLEJO, SR., J.
The parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action. In Leobrera v. Court of Appeals,[47] the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint. However, a broad definition of causes of action should be applied. As the United States Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Biggs Boiler Works Co.: [48]
	GR No. 81024 2000-02-03	ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST v. CA PURISIMA, J.
In Leobrera v. Court of Appeals[27] the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the cause of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint. In that case, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) granted Carlos Leobrera an P800,000.00 credit facility that was secured by two (2) real estate mortgages. The credit facility was later converted into "a revolving promissory note line" the last of which was renewed on March 21, 1986 through two (2) ninety-day promissory notes. Upon maturity of the notes, Leobrera and BPI negotiated for renewal thereof but they failed to agree. Consequently, BPI demanded full payment of the 90-day loans. Because Leobrera failed to pay the loans, BPI prepared to foreclose the mortgages. However, before BPI could institute the foreclosure proceedings, Leobrera filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages. The trial court issued the writ applied for.