This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2014-02-12 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases.[13] The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.[14] In the present case, such necessity is wanting. | |||||
|
2001-08-28 |
PARDO, J. |
||||
| After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that Atty. Padilla's innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered contumacious. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt.[83] Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae.[84] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,[85] and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.[86] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[87] | |||||
|
2001-01-24 |
PARDO, J. |
||||
| We find that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to serve one day in jail. It was the respondent judge who first shouted successively at petitioner to "shut up." When petitioner persisted in making his explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt, to the extent of stating that the judge had "absolute power."[21] The lawyer's remarks explaining his position in the case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contumely that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt.[22] Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae.[23] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindicative principle,[24] and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.[25] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[26] | |||||