This case has been cited 17 times or more.
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2014-07-23 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950]) [28] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2011-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,[21] to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said: xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.[22] | |||||
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2011-07-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| An eyewitness account established that the petitioner's vehicle actually hit Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution.[23] One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioner's cause, saw the incident in its entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime.[24] In his September 1, 1994 testimony, Victor positively identified the petitioner as the person who drove the car that ramped on an island divider along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street, and hit Rochelle. To directly quote from the records: ATTY. ALICIA SERRANO: Q: Mr. Soriano, do you remember where were you on or about 10:00 o'clock (sic) of January 21, 1993? VICTOR SORIANO: A: Yes, ma'am. Q: Where were you? A: I was at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon. Q: What were you doing at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon at that time? A: My sidecar was parked there because I was waiting for my wife, ma'am. Q: And when you were there at the corner of G. Tuazon and Governor Forbes at the said time and place, was there any unusual incident that happened? A: Yes, sir. Q: And what was that unusual incident? A: I saw an accident involving a speeding car which ramped over the island and bumped a woman who was crossing the street. Q: When you saw that the car ramped over the island and hit and bumped a woman, what happened to the woman that was hit and bumped by the car which you said ramped over the island? A: The woman was thrown at the middle of the road on her back, ma'am. Q: When you saw this woman after being hit and bumped by the car that ramped over the island and was thrown at the middle of the road, what else happened? x x x x A: The woman was no longer moving at that time when I saw another car coming. x x x x Q: What else happened when you saw the car coming very fast? A: The woman sprawled at the middle of the road was ran over by the speeding car and that car stopped while going up to the flyover. x x x x Q: You said you saw a car that ramped over the island and that the car that ramped over the island was the car that hit and bumped the victim that was thrown at the middle of the street. Now, will you be able to identify before this court the driver of that car that ramped over the island and hit and bumped the victim? A: Yes, ma'am. Q: If that driver of the car that hit and bumped the victim is inside the courtroom, would you be able to point to him before this Honorable Court? A: Yes, ma'am, he is here. Q: Will you kindly point before this courtroom who is that driver of the car that hit and bumped the victim? Although, Your Honor, there was already a stipulation at the start of the pre-trial admitting that the accused Tabao is the driver of the car which ramped at the divider. INTERPRETER: Witness approaching a man seated inside the courtroom and who stood up and identified as Edwin Tabao, the accused in this case.[25] [emphases ours] | |||||
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2011-04-04 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,[41] namely: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said: xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.[42] | |||||
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2008-10-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| This Court agrees with the plaintiff-appellee[11] that the RTC has passed upon enough circumstantial evidence to hold the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The plaintiff-appellee correctly cites the ruling in People v. Gallarde,[12] which distinguished the two types of positive identification of a perpetrator of a crime and discussed their legal importance, thus:Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. [Emphasis supplied] | |||||
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2008-09-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[10] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2005-06-15 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,[31] expulsion of morphine from one's mouth[32] and the tracing of one's foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v. Cañizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a woman's genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable. | |||||
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2004-05-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,[39] where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused. | |||||
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2004-02-13 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| At bottom, Fausto's defenses of alibi and denial appear entirely doubtful. They are untrustworthy, not only for being uncorroborated and unsubstantiated, but also for his lack of candor and straightforwardness when he testified thereon. He was always consulting notes on the witness stand.[36] Contrast his testimony with that of Janet, and we affirm the rule that as between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand, and bare denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[37] In sum, Fausto's defenses of denial and alibi, being unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[38] | |||||
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2004-01-15 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Truly, the incriminating testimonies of prosecution witnesses Soledad Piid and Kagawad Raymund Marquez remain firm and unchallenged. There being no evidence of undue bias or ill motive that would have impelled them to falsely testify against Jaime and implicate him in so despicable a deed as parricide, we conclude that none existed and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[25] Jaime's unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi, being negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law and cannot, therefore, be given evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[26] | |||||
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2003-08-12 |
VITUG, J. |
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| Appellant would assail the legality of his arrest and the consequent seizure of the subject tricycle solely on the basis of the inadmissible extrajudicial confession of Fuentes. The argument would be non sequitur. In any event, any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest or its consequences should be made before an entry of plea in the arraignment; otherwise, the objection would be deemed waived.[19] The records would show that on 01 October 1991, appellant and the other accused, Lobaton and Fuentes, entered a plea of not guilty[20] without assailing the validity of his arrest.[21] Indeed, on 25 November 1991, appellant filed a "Motion to Admit Accused to Bail"[22] setting the hearing of the motion on 29 November 1991. The trial court required the prosecution to file its comment on the motion.[23] After the prosecution submitted its opposition,[24] the trial court later granted the motion of appellant and required him to post a bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00 for his provisional liberty.[25] Appellant posted a property bond amounting to P80,000.00, secured by two parcels of land[26] which the trial court approved.[27] Appellant filed an "Entry of Appearance with Motion for Postponement."[28] After the prosecution had rested its case, appellant filed two "Motions with Express Leave of Court to file Demurrer to Evidence," one by the Public Attorney's Office and the other by his private counsel.[29] He even opposed the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits.[30] After the trial court had denied his earlier motion,[31] appellant participated in the trial of the case by testifying in his own behalf and by presenting other witnesses as evidence for the defense. It would, therefore, be much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after the accused was arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.[32] | |||||
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2001-03-07 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| The actions of accused-appellants Lucero and Reazon concurrent to and following the stabbing of the victim belie their claim of innocence. Instead of warding off the successive assaults on the victim, Baldomero San Juan, and assisting Benjamin Samudio when the latter tried to stop accused-appellant Antonio L. Samudio from further inflicting stab wounds on the victim, or even giving aid to the victim when he was bleeding profusely on the kitchen floor, accused-appellants Lucero and Reazon apparently did nothing. In fact, they even denied being at the scene of the crime and offered a simple alibi which is the weakest of all defenses. When weighed against positive testimony, negative assertions must fail. Bare denial amounts to nothing more than negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[49] | |||||
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2001-01-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is correct and is in accordance with our present rulings.[54] In addition, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim, also in consonance with our recent rulings.[55] | |||||
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2000-12-15 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The prosecution of the complex crime of rape with homicide is particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime.[18] | |||||
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2000-09-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| A: From the place where my wife fell down."[44] (emphasis supplied) Dr. Ledesma, the medico-legal expert who examined Teresita's body, testified that Teresita probably died of the gunshot wound she sustained on her head. He also concluded that she was shot from within two feet. Albacin carried a gun with which he shot Florencio. These circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the accused Albacin fatally shot Teresita. Direct evidence, i.e., an eyewitness account of the commission of the crime, is not always necessary to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, but he may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime.[45] sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, the rules on evidence and jurisprudence require that: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.[46] | |||||
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2000-08-01 |
PUNO, J. |
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| identify an accused as the perpetrator of the crime by direct evidence, i.e., an eyewitness account of the commission of the crime. There are instances, however, when a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, but he may still be able to identify the accused as the perpetrator as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. In this case, the positive identification forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. Otherwise, if circumstantial evidence could not be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available, then felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection.[44] The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[45] In fine, it is not decisive that Cruz did not actually see the accused shoot the victim. But immediately after the victim was shot, Cruz saw the accused holding the carbine which felled the victim, and then accused ran towards the house of Francisca Galpao. The trial court | |||||
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2000-07-24 |
PER CURIAM |
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| justice, accused-appellant's denial of commission of the crime and imputation of the same to another person is demolished to obscurity.[48] Besides, accused-appellant's imputation of the crime to another malefactor was heard of only during his testimony[49] and was never raised before the police authorities during the investigation. Clearly, his bare denial amounts to nothing more than negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[50] With respect to treachery, it is our view that the prosecution has convincingly established the same. Jurisprudence has required that treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself.[51] For treachery | |||||