This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-10-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Moreover, motive is not essential for conviction for a crime when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit, and that lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction for such crime when the crime and participation of the accused are definitely proved.[39] In the instant cases, SPO1 Indunan positively identified appellant as the one who sold to him shabu during the buy-bust operation. He also testified that he recovered shabu from appellant's possession during said incident. | |||||
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2007-04-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| On the alleged inconsistency in Braga's statements, that he failed to state in his written statement but was later able to testify that he and Aguinaldo were merely pacifying their other group members, it is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness' credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate.[11] Likewise settled is the rule that inconsistencies on minor, trivial, and insignificant matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses. There is hardly a witness who can perfectly remember the details of a crime. Human memory is not as unerring as a photograph.[12] We can attribute Braga's lapses to the natural fickleness of a man'�s memory. | |||||
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2007-04-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We agree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the accused failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the crime scene, which was just along the street near their respective residences. Reyes was only 100 meters away at Bambang Bridge from the crime scene and there was no proof of the exact time he had left the place. On the other hand, Resayo was pedaling his tricycle. We agree with the Court of Appeals' observation that Resayo's mobility, while pedaling his tricycle, during the time of the incident "only heightened the possibility that he could have momentarily lurked at the corner of Quezon and Mastrilli Streets to await the approaching Aguinaldo and stab him with a single fatal thrust at the heart, and then disappear right away."[23] Further, where there is even the slightest chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold.[24] In addition, Resayo's statement that he went home at 9:30 p.m. conflicts with the statement of another defense witness, Merlita Flores, who claimed that she saw Resayo park his tricycle at 8:00 p.m. | |||||
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2003-10-13 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Improbabilities claimed by appellant result from a misreading of the testimony by the eyewitness, his own wife Pilar Tacla. Appellant asserts lack of motive on his part to commit the crime charged. He concludes that he had no reason to shoot the victim. Established, however, is the principle that where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a criminal case. [51] Whether or not appellant had a motive or reason to shoot the victim, conviction may still follow from the identification and accusing words made by no less than a close kin, [52] his own wife, Pilar Tacla. Moreover, he admits authorship of the killing, so the burden of proof shifts to the appellant. | |||||
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2003-06-10 |
VITUG, J. |
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| "Atty. Casas: Now, it was in July 1998 which is finally the alleged (sic) contained in the information that you claimed you have been sexually molested, is that correct? "A: Yes, sir. "Q: And you told the Court in your direct examination that it was the first time that the same was committed? "A: Yes, sir."[10] Not only is her assailed statement that before the July 1998 incident she has also been subjected to sexual assault by appellant inconsequential in a material point but it also does not necessarily take away her credibility at the witness stand. It is acknowledged that affidavits, usually taken ex parte, are often held unreliable for being incomplete and inaccurate.[11] | |||||
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2001-01-25 |
PUNO, J. |
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| (a) Proof of necessity. -- A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competence examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination." (emphasis supplied) Thirdly, the defense faults the trial court for relying on a single eyewitness account in convicting the accused Rama. The Court has long held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.[27] The Rule also provides in Section 22, viz:"Section 22. Corroboration.-- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases." (emphasis supplied) The records of the instant case bear out the clear and straightforward manner by which Roxanne testified. The trial court thus correctly relied upon the sole testimony of Roxanne. | |||||
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2000-10-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail in the face of his positive identification by no less than two eyewitnesses,[25] both of whom are known to him. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requisites of time and place must be strictly met.[26] These, appellant failed to prove. Not only that, no less than three eyewitnesses placed him at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. To all their positive testimonies, appellant simply made a blanket denial, stating that he does not know them, and that he was not there. | |||||