This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2004-04-14 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| The defense of alibi, as a rule, is considered with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be easily fabricated.[24] Alibi can only prosper by indubitably proving that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, and that he could not have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission; physical impossibility, in other words, of being in two places at the same time.[25] | |||||
|
2001-10-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| When the credibility of a witness is at issue, the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded great respect by the appellate courts, because of its direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand and to determine whether he or she is telling the truth or not.[20] And where such assessment is affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ought not to interfere with the trial court's findings on the credibility of a witness.[21] | |||||
|
2001-10-12 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| affirmative testimony.[21] Appellant's contention that the complaint is defective as it fails to state that the accused is the common-law husband of Analyn's mother, is immaterial to the case as the special circumstance that qualified the rape committed by the accused is not relationship but the | |||||
|
2001-09-07 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| The accused's defense of denial and ill-motive deserve scant consideration. The accused denied the alleged rape and reasoned out that it could not have happened because on December 26, 1997, his whole family, including Arlin, was in his father's house and not in their own home where the rape allegedly took place. Arlin, however, testified that the rape took place shortly after Christmas but not specifically on December 26, 1997. Thus, their whereabouts on December 26, 1997 does not necessarily negate the finding that he raped Arlin shortly after Christmas. At any rate, the accused's denial, as negative and self-serving evidence, does not deserve as much weight in law as Arlin's positive and affirmative testimony.[27] The accused also testified that the instant case was filed against him because of the bad blood between him and Arlin's aunt, Violeta Castañeda. Such testimony, however, does not in any way prove that the instant case was filed against him only for an ill-motive as it was Arlin's mother, and not Violeta Castañeda, who caused the filing of this case. | |||||
|
2001-01-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| In the instant case, we note that petitioner fails to point out any matter which may have been overlooked or misconstrued by the trial court and the appellate court in their respective assessments of Miraflor Salvero's testimony. Petitioner's main contention that she was biased against him is merely grounded on her common law relationship to the brother of the deceased. Petitioner presented no concrete proof to show her testimony was biased. We have held that the witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.[12] No legal provision disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying if they are competent. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label Miraflor Salvero's testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. This Court has taken cognizance of the fact that in many instances, crimes are committed with just the victim's kinfolk as witnesses.[13] Note further that the records are bare of any showing that Miraflor Salvero was motivated by any ill motive to testify falsely against petitioner. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit.[14] We find no reason therefore, to disturb the findings of the trial court in which respondent court concurred, respecting the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Miraflor Salvero. | |||||
|
2000-10-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Appellants contend that the trial court was biased in disregarding their alibi. Alibi is one of the weakest defenses in a criminal case and should be rejected when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.[37] For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[38] In this case, appellants admitted their presence at the mini-cinema. Salanga averred that he was in the cinema ticket booth issuing tickets.[39] Dee testified that he was at the "jackpot section" (lakpatan) working.[40] Their employer, Robelio Aben, declared that both appellants were working at the time of the incident, "in front of the theater."[41] Ernesto Corpuz, a co-employee of appellants, also testified that when the attack on Malanum and Blaquer occurred, both appellants were working. Salanga was in front of the theater advertising the show, while Dee was managing the "tangga" table.[42] It was, therefore, not physically impossible for appellants to be at the locus criminis. | |||||
|
2000-08-15 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and, the execution of the crime; to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[56] There is a dearth of evidence, however, with respect to these facts. Nighttime cannot also be appreciated because although the crime took place at about 7:30 in the evening, the fact alone that the crime was committed at night does not automatically aggravate the crime. Nighttime becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is | |||||
|
2000-08-01 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| (3) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[54] The trial court appreciated this aggravating circumstance based on the accused's testimony. A close scrutiny of the accused's testimony, however, will show that he testified that it was not him but Payaoan who planned to kill the victim and clung to his determination to kill, and that there was sufficient interval of time between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow Payaoan to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There is no proof whatsoever with respect to the accused's plan to kill the victim and when he conceived of such plan. There being no circumstance to qualify the killing to murder, the accused should be convicted of homicide. The penalty imposed upon the accused should correspondingly be lowered to reclusion temporal. As there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper | |||||
|
2000-05-04 |
PARDO, J. |
||||
| We can not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must exist: (a) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act.[20] In this case, the record is bereft of sufficient evidence as to the time when accused-appellant decided to commit the crime. Eyewitness Rowena Dacut could not remember a prior incident which could incite accused-appellant to attack the victim. There was no proof when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of accused-appellant, or when he meditated and reflected on his intention to kill the victim. Evident premeditation must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning.[21] There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim.[22] When there is no showing as to how and when the plan to kill was decided or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered to exist.[23] | |||||